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ABSTRACT 
Within a multilevel secure (MLS) system, flaws in design and implementation can 
result in overt and covert channels, both of which may be exploited by malicious 
software to cause unauthorized information flows.  To address this problem, the use of 
control dependency tracing has been explored to present a precise, formal definition for 
information flow.  This work describes a security Domain Model (DM), designed in the 
Alloy formal specification language, for conducting static analysis of programs to 
identify illicit information flows, such as control dependency flaws and covert channel 
vulnerabilities.  The model includes a formal definition for trusted subjects, which are 
granted extraordinary privileges to perform system operations that require relaxation of 
the mandatory access control (MAC) policy mechanisms imposed on normal subjects, but 
are trusted to behave benignly and not to degrade system security.  The DM defines the 
concepts of program state, information flow and security policy rules, and specifies the 
behavior of a target program.  The DM is compiled from a representation of the target 
program, written in a specialized Implementation Modeling Language (IML), and a 
specification of the security policy written in the Alloy language.  The Alloy Analyzer 
tool is used to perform static analysis of the DM to detect potential security policy 
violations in the target program.  This approach demonstrates that it is possible to 
establish a framework for formally representing a program implementation and for 
formalizing the security rules defined by a security policy, enabling the verification of 
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Working calmly will let you elaborate and extend things, but the 
breakthroughs generally come only after great frustration and emotional 
involvement.  
       — Richard Hamming 
 
A. HYPOTHESIS 
In the development of secure systems, ensuring that the implementation of a 
system is faithful to its stated security objectives is a process laden with difficulties and 
challenges.  It is possible, however, to establish a framework for formally representing a 
program implementation and for formalizing the security rules defined by a security 
policy.  This enables the verification of that program representation for adherence to the 
security objectives.  Such a framework can be supportive of the Common Criteria 
requirements for secure system development. 
B. INTRODUCTION AND MOTIVATION 
Widely accepted evaluation standards (Common Criteria, 2006; DoD TCSEC, 
1985), and (NSA SKPP, 2007) require that high assurance secure systems be designed, 
developed, verified, and tested using rigorous development processes.  This evaluation 
process must include demonstration of correct correspondence between system 
representations at various levels of abstraction, such as security policy objectives, 
security specifications, and program implementation.  In addition, the National Institute 
of Standards and Technology Source Code Security Analysis Tool Functional 
Specification (NIST, 2007) requires that security analysis tools report weaknesses that 
they identify using semantically meaningful names and identifying location within a 
program, with an “acceptably low false positive rate.”  This dissertation describes an 
approach to analyzing programs for preservation of security properties through state 
transitions, and advances the ability to analyze software for information flow by 
describing automated techniques for information flow static analysis.  Classic work on 
secure information flow, including the use of lattice theory for ordering of security 
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classes based on the dominance relationship and the idea of labeling state variables to 
track such flows as a way to certify a program (Denning, 1976; Denning and Denning, 
1977), and type systems for security analysis (Volpano et al., 1996), provide a foundation 
for this research.   
Formal security models are often based on an expression of properties such as 
program secure state and state transitions (McLean, 1994).  High assurance evaluation 
standards (Common Criteria, 2006; DoD TCSEC, 1985) require a formal verification that 
the state transitions resulting from program execution preserve the security properties 
defined by a policy.  Formal verification must also include advanced vulnerability 
analysis of a system, during which covert channel analysis must be considered in order to 
achieve successful evaluation of such systems at the highest levels of assurance 
(Common Criteria, 2006).  The approach described here analyzes programs for 
preservation of specific security properties across state transitions.  This dissertation 
presents a precise, formal definition for an MLS security policy, and for various types of 
information flow violations with respect to that policy, including examples of control 
dependency flaws and covert channels, extending classic work in this area by Denning 
and Denning (1977), and Volpano et al. (1996).  A security domain-specific model is 
described as a framework for conducting static analysis of abstract representations of 
target program implementations (see Chapter VI).   
Within a multilevel secure (MLS) system, trusted subjects may be granted 
privileges to perform operations, in some cases within prescribed limits (Schell et al., 
1985; Schellhorn et al., 2000) not normally allowed for ordinary subjects controlled by 
mandatory access control (MAC) policy enforcement mechanisms.  Granting of such 
privileges is predicated on the idea that trusted subjects will not conduct malicious 
activity or degrade the system’s overall security.  This dissertation presents a formal 
definition for trusted subject behaviors, which depend upon a representation of 
information flow during execution of a high-level language program, referred to as a 
target program.  It describes a security domain model to formally represent security 
policy with respect to trusted subjects, trusted subject behaviors, information flow tracing 
through program execution, various types of covert channels, and a means for conducting 
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static analysis of target program implementations.  In addition to trusted subjects and 
security kernels, we also include the analysis of programs (see Section VI.2) comprising 
interleaved statements of subjects with different labels.  While this is not necessarily a 
literal representation of an application program, it can be viewed as the sequential actions 
that a trusted subject or security kernel takes in response to the interleaved requests of 
different subjects.   
Static analysis of non-trivial programs has been shown to be undecidable (Rice, 
1953).  Even heuristics for static analysis may be computationally challenging, for 
example the problem of state explosion with model checkers (Clarke et al., 1986).  
Jackson (2006) suggests a pragmatic approach to this dilemma, in the form of the Alloy 
language small scope hypothesis, which conjectures that most flaws in models can be 
revealed on small instances.  In the approach described here, the Alloy Analyzer tool 
(Alloy, 2008) is used to perform static analysis of an abstract representation of a target 
program, referred to as a base program, to identify execution paths that might violate 
security policy rules.  Our work assumes the small scope hypothesis for information flow 
tracing, and in the examples examined (see Section VI.C), a scope within the processing 
power of current technology was sufficient.  The impact of this decision is that our 
approach is somewhat limited to evaluation of classes of programs for which proofs are 
not required.  We feel that, as a proof of concept of the ability of our approach to perform 
automated static analysis, this is acceptable, and the work provides an important first step 
toward future advances that may overcome this. 
This dissertation research is being conducted under the auspices of the Naval 
Postgraduate School’s (NPS) Center for Information Systems Security Studies and 
Research (CISR) Trusted Computing Exemplar (TCX) project.  The overarching goal of 
the TCX project is to present a working example to demonstrate how trusted computing 
systems and components could be constructed (Irvine et al., 2004; Nguyen et al., 2005).  
The goals of the TCX project are directly supported by the Office of Naval Research, the 




0430566.  Any opinions, findings and conclusions or recommendations expressed in this 
material are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the ONR or 
the NSF.  
C. CONTRIBUTIONS 
This dissertation advances classic work in information flow tracing and static 
analysis verification of high assurance systems by presenting a new framework for 
automating the verification program representations for their adherence to a set of 
security policy rules.  The framework is based on a domain-specific model (DSM) for 
security properties that supports static analysis of a representation of the target 
implementation.  Our research delivers the following contributions: 
1. The Implementation Modeling Language (IML), a language that supports 
basic information processing via assignment statements, conditional and loop statements, 
read/write statements, file random access, and access to a system clock.  The IML 
facilitates static analysis of source code by providing a formalism that captures the 
essence of imperative programming language paradigms, while ignoring non-essential 
(for these purposes) elements, such as data type, inheritance, polymorphism, etc.  In this 
research, a target program refers to the high-level language program under examination; 
the base program represents an IML abstraction of the target program and provides a 
basis for analysis for adherence to a security policy.  At this time, the verification of 
correspondence of the base program to the target program is outside the scope of this 
dissertation. 
2. The security Domain Model (DM), represented as an Alloy (Jackson, 2006; 
Alloy, 2008) specification, has a two-fold purpose in providing a model of program 
behavior, as well as a model for describing security properties.  The DM is a unified 
representation of a base program and the intended information flow policy, including 
restrictions on both overt and covert information flow.  The DM comprises an Invariant 
Model, which defines the logical structure for program state, information flow, and 
security policy; and an Implementation Model, which specifies the semantics of the base 
program.   
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3. This research has formalized well-established security properties by defining 
specific security rules in the DM framework.  We have defined an information flow 
security rule to verify that information flows within a program abide by a policy and do 
not flow in an illicit manner.  For example, a policy might authorize information to flow 
from a Low source to a High destination, but not the reverse; the information flow 
security rule will identify any program execution path that allows information to flow 
illicitly from Low to High. 
In our framework, we have also defined rules for detecting potential covert 
channels in a program.  In the context of the DM, we do this by formalizing the definition 
of both a covert storage channel, using a shared information storage repository, and a 
covert timing channel, based on access to an abstraction of the system clock.  For each of 
these covert channel classes, we define a security rule that identifies programs with 
execution paths that may be vulnerable to either violation. 
In addition to covert channels, we have formalized the concept of overt control 
dependency flaws within a program.  Using dynamic slicing techniques to track control 
dependencies through execution of a program representation, the security rule identifies 
execution paths with implicit control dependencies that violate the defined security 
policy. 
Finally, our model is expressive enough to support trusted subjects and their 
behaviors.  The DM defines a trusted subject through a special assignment operation that 
abstracts the idea of trusted downgrading.  The model allows trusted subject behaviors, 
while ensuring that regular subjects cannot perform illicit activities during execution of a 
program.  We do this through verification of the described security rules. 
4. We have implemented a prototype for static analysis of programs based on the 
DM framework.  This framework includes a specialized DM-Compiler, developed to 
translate a base program written in IML into an Implementation Model and to integrate it 
with the Invariant Model to form a complete DM specification to represent the original 
target program.  This prototype implementation architecture is depicted in Figure 1, and 
will be explained in detail in Chapter V. 
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5. Early results in this dissertation work were presented at several conferences 
and workshops.  Our paper presented at the ACM International Conference on Object-
Oriented Programming, Systems, Languages, and Applications (OOPSLA’07) workshop 
on Domain-Specific Modeling (Shaffer et al., 2007) demonstrated the ability of the DM 
approach to detect illicit information flow violations.  At the ACM Conference on 
Programming Language Design and Implementation (PLDI) workshop on Programming 
Languages and Analysis for Security (PLAS’08), we presented our work on analysis of 
programs for detection of covert channels, and overt flaws based on control dependency 
analysis (Shaffer et al., 2008).  We presented our implementation of trusted subjects and 
their behaviors at the Modeling Security Workshop in association with the ACM/IEEE 
International Conference on Model Driven Engineering Languages and Systems 
(MODELS’08) (Shaffer et al., 2008).  At the International Conference on Software 
Engineering and Knowledge Engineering (SEKE’08) (Shaffer et al., 2008) we presented 
a survey of our overall approach to static analysis using the DM, and have submitted a 
comprehensive article discussing the final stage of our research for inclusion in the 
Computers and Security Journal special issue on “Software Engineering and Secure 
Systems” (Shaffer et al., 2008).   
 
 
Figure 1.   Domain Model approach to system security verification. 
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In addition to these publications, we have built a Security Domain Model Project 
website (http://cisr.nps.edu/projects/sdm.html) that provides discussion of the research, 
with links to our papers, and example IML base programs with respective DM 
specification code. 
6. Relevance to Department of Defense (DoD).  Highly secure systems are 
significantly more expensive to build than typical IT systems.  because a contributing 
factor to these high costs is the need for formal verification, which requires a large 
amount of effort by highly trained specialists.  The contributions described in this work 
advance the ability to automate a portion of the formal verification process.  This 
automation has two significant effects: it has the potential to reduce errors caused by 
human mistakes in the verification process, making systems more secure; and it can 
reduce the effort required for verification, making secure systems more affordable.  
These techniques are applicable to the verification of a specific class of 
components (target programs) in secure MLS systems, for which the DoD has projected 
both a significant need and future support of extensive research and development (NSA 
GIG, 2005).  These components perform the following abstract function: 
• Given a machine with two input ports (labeled HIGH and LOW) and two 
output ports (also labeled HIGH and LOW), the machine processes inputs 
and sends output only to the appropriate output port, where “appropriate” 
is defined by the security policy. 
The framework developed here supports automated static analysis to determine 
whether the system component in question conforms to, or enforces, its security policy.   
The framework does this by: (1) associating with each incoming datum an internal label 
equal to the label of the input port, (2) modifying the internal label of a datum, if 
necessary, as it is processed, and (3) detecting if a datum leaves the component through 
an output port that is inappropriate with respect to the datum’s internal label and the 
output port label. 
Examples of such components are trusted subject programs, security kernels, and 
separation kernels configured to enforce an MLS policy.  Trusted subjects are often used 
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in MLS systems as downgraders, multilevel switches, and for other critical functions that 
make MLS systems useful and effective.  Security kernels and separation kernels are the 
foundation of most DoD systems that provide multilevel security.  The DoD, working 
with other government agencies, is researching systems for sharing information across 
differing security levels, under the aegis of the Unified Cross Domain Management 
Office (UCDMO) (Thuermer, 2007). 
D. DISSERTATION ORGANIZATION 
An outline for the remainder of this dissertation follows: 
• Chapter II presents an overview of information assurance principles germane 
to this dissertation research.  Specific discussions include high assurance system 
evaluation processes and standards, formal security models and policies, multilevel 
secure (MLS) systems, information flow tracing, covert channels, trusted subjects, and an 
introduction to dynamic security policies. 
• Chapter III provides an analytical review of previous work related to the fields 
of the dissertation, to include background research on security models and policies, 
analysis of systems for illicit control dependencies and covert channels, implementation 
of a trusted subject into secure systems, and development and implementation of systems 
which implement dynamic security policies. 
• Chapter IV presents the Implementation Modeling Language (IML), 
developed as a specialized language for representing target program implementations as 
base programs. 
• Chapter V presents the Security Domain Model (DM) framework and an 
associated approach to performing static analysis of base programs to verify their 
adherence to security policy rules.  
• Chapter VI presents several example base program test cases, each with 
security vulnerabilities discoverable using the DM approach, and provides an analysis of 
results of the testing. 
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• Chapter VII presents conclusions of this research, and suggests areas of future 
work. 
• Appendices are included at the end of this dissertation to provide RIGAL 
compiler construction language code for the DM-Compiler files, and several example 
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II. INFORMATION ASSURANCE PRINCIPLES 
A. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter discusses concepts and principles, within the information assurance 
domain, germane to this research.  It begins with an introduction to high assurance 
system evaluation, and the established standards that govern this process.  A discussion 
of formal security models and policies follows this.  Next, we introduce the concepts of 
information flow through program execution, and control dependencies which can affect 
such flows.  The concepts of covert channel analysis, and trusted subjects and their 
behaviors are then discussed.  Finally, dynamic security policies are introduced, as an 
area for future work in this research. 
B. HIGH ASSURANCE COMPUTER SYSTEM EVALUATION 
1. Introduction 
The Common Criteria (CC) is a recognized International Organization for 
Standardization (ISO) standard for evaluating computer systems against varying levels of 
assurance.  Initially published in January 1996, the CC essentially combined the older 
and independent U.S., European and Canadian standards for system evaluation, 
incorporating the best principles and tenets of each.  While the CC was also intended to 
replace the older Department of Defense (DoD) Trusted Computer Security Evaluation 
Criteria System (TCSEC), the de facto U.S. standard since the mid 1980s, a few 
proponents of the TCSEC continue to promote it as a superior standard.  Thus, while the 
CC is the official evaluation criteria used by the U.S. government and DoD, both 
standards have their advocates within the security community. 
2. Trusted Computer Security Evaluation Criteria System (TCSEC) 
Developed by the DoD as part of the Rainbow Series of computer security 
publications, the TCSEC (commonly referred to as “the Orange Book” because of the 
color of its cover page) was initially drafted in 1983, and accepted in 1985 as the US 
standard for computer systems assurance evaluation and classification (DoD TCSEC, 
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1985).  The TCSEC defined a range of hierarchical assurance levels, based upon the 
effectiveness of security provided by and within a particular system being evaluated, such 
that a given level includes all of the requirements of a lower level, and more.  The 
assurance levels increase from level D through level A, with the higher levels (C, B, A) 
further divided into classes based on the specific protection characteristics provided.  
These levels represent the assurance classification for a system, from one evaluated to 
have minimal or no security capabilities (level D), up through one that has undergone 
formal methods verification that its protection system and model are correct, and whose 
implementation corresponds to the formal top-level specification (level A1). 
The TCSEC required the identification of security properties such as those 
identified by Bell and LaPadula (1973) in their security model of mandatory access 
control, and was based heavily on the reference monitor concept for adjudicating 
accesses of subjects to objects within an operating system (Anderson, 1972).  Also, the 
Orange Book focuses on operating system security, while the need clearly exists to 
account for security of many other types of systems (in fact, other books in the Rainbow 
Series were written specifically to address non-OS computer systems).  These shortfalls, 
coupled with the lack of an international standard, provided the impetus for development 
of an encompassing standard for system security evaluation. 
3. The Common Criteria 
Schell (2001) defined four epochs spanning the history of scientific developments 
in computer security, each one progressing beyond the previous toward better security 
and more assured systems – that is, each epoch but the last.  This final (and current) 
epoch Schell defined as being one of a period of security decline, with the Common 
Criteria as its hallmark.  He pointed to the fact that, while the CC evaluates individual 
products, the science of computer security should instead focus on evaluating entire 
systems, which comprise multiple software and hardware products.  Schell believed that 
by making no distinction between system and subsystem evaluation, the CC limits us to 
examining only isolated components of any system, never evaluating the system and its 
IT environment in their entirety. 
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Schell’s negative assessment notwithstanding, the CC represented a paradigm 
shift in the security evaluation process, and has become the US and international standard 
for the development of computer system security specifications.  The CC allows 
evaluation of a specific system (or product), or more generally, families of systems (or 
products), by establishing security assurance criteria against which they can be measured.  
The CC introduced the concept of a Protection Profile (PP) to describe the security 
requirements of a category of products.  A PP is typically written to define the 
requirements for a class of system by some user community, and it generally defines the 
requirements for both functionality and assurance of the system.  A Security Target (ST), 
on the other hand, is used to evaluate a specific system or product.  An ST is often written 
based on an existing PP for a like class or category of system, in order to define the 
requirements of the target of evaluation (TOE) (Common Criteria, 2006). 
The CC defines a number of assurance classes within which security criteria and 
requirements are defined.  Among the assurance classes are such topical areas as 
development, life-cycle support, and testing, for example.  These broad classes are 
subdivided into families that further describe the unique objectives of the class.  As an 
example, the Development class (identified as “ADV”) contains a family called Security 
Architecture (uniquely identified as “ADV_ARC”) whose objective is to allow “the 
developer to provide a description of the security architecture of the TSF” (Common 
Criteria, 2006).  Finally, each family is defined by some number of hierarchically ordered 
components, each of which describe the scope, depth and rigor required of a security 
criterion, in order for the product to meet a particular assurance level. 
The goal of the CC in defining assurance classes is to allow evaluators to measure 
a system against the objectives described by the families of these classes.  For this, the 
CC defines Evaluation Assurance Levels (EALs) which “provide an increasing scale that 
balances the level of assurance obtained with the cost and feasibility of acquiring that 
degree of assurance” (Common Criteria, 2006).  The CC EALs were written with the 




that earlier evaluated systems could remain relevant.  Since the two systems evaluate 
assurance in different ways, however, their respective grading levels should not be 
regarded as equivalent. 
For a system to achieve a given EAL, it must meet the security criteria for all of 
the family components of that level.  To be evaluated at the highest CC assurance level – 
EAL7 – a computer system must undergo a more comprehensive analysis than that 
required for lower assurance levels.  This evaluation analysis must include formal 
representation of system requirements, demonstration of formal correspondences, and 
comprehensive testing of system components.  In particular, the formal correspondences 
must be demonstrated as mappings between the security policy model and the functional 
specification of a system.   
Further, a complete correspondence must be demonstrated between the system 
security objectives and functional requirements, and between the functional specification 
and functional requirements.  In general, with respect to the implementation of the 
system, a full mapping must be shown to exist between all levels of design description 
and specification, as depicted in Figure 2.  This formal correspondence must be proven 
between all constructs of the system in order for a high-assurance system to be evaluated 





Figure 2.   Common Criteria development class (ADV) correspondences  
(from Common Criteria, 2006). 
4. The Trusted Computing Exemplar (TCX) Project 
The Trusted Computing Exemplar (TCX) project is being conducted by the 
Center for Information Systems Security Studies and Research’s (CISR) at the U.S. 
Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) in Monterey, California.  The goal of TCX is to 
demonstrate in an openly distributed, worked example, how a trusted computing system 
and its components can be built to meet high assurance evaluation criteria.  Its specific 
approach to meeting this goal is fourfold (Irvine et al., 2004): 
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• Create a prototype framework for high-assurance system development 
• Develop a trusted computing component as a reference 
• Evaluate the component, through a third-party, against CC EAL7 
• Provide a means for open distribution of all deliverables and artifacts 
To date, the TCX project has achieved milestones in defining a high-assurance 
development framework, and the design specification for a web-based dissemination 
system (Levin et al., 2004; Nguyen et al., 2005).  Its least privilege model has been 
articulated, and features to support transitive trust have been described.  The project has 
created a working prototype and is developing design and implementation of the TCX 
Least Privilege Separation Kernel (TCX-LPSK) as a trusted component.  By developing a 
framework of application mechanisms for specifying and verifying the mapping of higher 
level security requirements for a system, this dissertation research directly supports the 
goals of the TCX project.  
C. FORMAL SECURITY MODELS AND POLICIES 
1. Introduction 
McLean (1994) stated that security models are “used to describe any formal 
statement of a system’s confidentiality, availability, or integrity requirements.”  Security 
models provide a detailed and precise means of formally describing security policies, and 
proving their validity.  Since a system must not only be secure, but demonstrably so, 
formal security models provide system designers with evidence that they are constructing 
a self-consistent system, and with a foundation for further demonstration that the system 
as implemented meets its specifications (Landwehr, 1981). 
In a typical formal methods approach to security model development, a security 
policy is initially translated from words into a mathematical model.  From this, a formal 
specification is created and shown to satisfy the mathematical model, deriving from the 
original policy.  To prove conformance to the policy, the specification must be 
implemented and shown to be an accurate representation of the specification.  This “chain 
of correspondence” may not be sufficient, however, to ensure a secure system as various 
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aspects of security may be outside the scope of the formal security policy model (for 
example, physical security and good password hygiene). 
While it would be difficult to provide an exhaustive review of every security 
model that has ever been developed or proposed, we attempt to provide here a 
representative overview of some well-known ones.  This analysis will divide security 
models into two logical categories: discretionary access control (DAC) models and 
mandatory access control (MAC) models.  Generally, DAC systems allow one user to 
extend to other users or subjects his rights to the objects for which he controls access.  In 
DAC systems, the ability to modify access rights is subject to some set of rules which can 
change during the course of system operation.  Conversely, MAC systems attempt to 
provide a global and persistent policy, where access control is fixed in a predetermined 
state by a predefined set of rules and all modifications are relative to that established set 
of allowed access rights.  
2. Discretionary Access Control (DAC) Models 
a. Access Matrix Models / Graham-Denning 
In the context of computer operating systems, Lampson (1971) defined 
protection as “all the mechanisms which control the access of a program to other things 
in the system.”  To describe how this control of access would occur, he developed the 
concept of using matrices as a way to illustrate the access of subjects to objects within a 
computer system. 
An access matrix scheme is comprised of objects and subjects formed into 
a matrix of allowed accesses.  The objects can represent anything in the system that needs 
to be protected, including files and processes.  Subjects represent system entities that can 
have access to objects.  The access matrix scheme also includes a set of rights 
representing the types of accesses which a subject may have to an object, for example 
read, write, execute, or owner. 
In general, an access matrix defines a cross-mapping between the objects 
and subjects in a system.  Cells in the matrix represent monitors that control access of a 
particular subject to a particular object.  A given access matrix reflects a security policy 
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for the system.  A “snapshot” of the current access matrix can be thought of as a specific 
protection state of the system, and defines the access rights in that state; to modify or add 
to the set of allowed accesses would require some transition into a new matrix, or 
protection policy. 
The Graham-Denning Model (1972) formalized the concept of using 
access matrices for access control within operating systems.  Their model defined basic 
access rights of a system in terms of a set of eight allowable operations across subjects 
and objects within that system.  These operations permitted a subject x to create and 
delete objects and subjects, and to read, grant, delete and transfer the access rights of 
another subject s to an object o.  The Graham-Denning model is generally considered to 
be the first formal DAC scheme proposed and the first general access matrix model. 
An access matrix is a static representation of a security system, and 
corresponds to a set of access rights for a given security policy.  Rules might be 
established to define how subject-to-object access rights could be modified over time, 
possibly allowing users the discretion to extend rights to other subjects.  Changes to the 
system from such rules would transition the system into a new state, essentially 
representing a new security policy.   
b. HRU Model 
The Harrison-Ruzzo-Ullman (HRU) Model (Harrison et al., 1976) defined 
authorization systems that allowed the modification of access rights, along with the 
ability for creating and deleting subjects and objects within the system.  It also introduced 
a safety property: that access to an object within the system was impossible without the 
concurrence of the owner of that object. 
In reality, since an owner in a DAC system may extend rights to an object 
that in turn may be given away without his knowledge, no protection system can be safe 
by this definition.  To solve this problem, the HRU model provided a weaker definition 
that simply required a protection system to ensure that objects are kept “under control” by 
their owner, meaning that the owner has some intuition as to whether his granting of a 
right could lead to possible leakage of that right to an unauthorized subject in the system.  
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Even this weaker definition of safety is too strict for all protection systems, since it is 
generally undecidable whether, “given an initial access matrix, there is some sequence of 
commands in which a particular generic right is entered at some place in the matrix 
where it did not exist before.”  They proved that, while an algorithm could be found to 
show whether a given mono-operational system is unsafe for some generic right, it is not 
possible to devise an algorithm to decide the safety of any generic protection system for 
all of its possible configurations. 
3. Mandatory Access Control (MAC) Models 
Mandatory access control models are representative of multilevel systems in 
which subjects and objects are hierarchically or partially ordered according to their 
sensitivity levels, and the system ensures that data from objects higher, or non-
comparable, in the hierarchy is not available to subjects lower in the hierarchy.  One of 
the most common examples of a MAC structure is the military classification system. 
a. Bell and LaPadula Model 
The Bell and LaPadula (BLP) Model (Bell and LaPadula, 1973) can be 
used to formally describe the enforcement of military policies associated with classified 
information.  At the heart of the BLP model is the concept that all objects in the system 
are assigned a classification level based on their relative sensitivity, and all users are 
similarly assigned a clearance level based on their job, rank, experience, etc.  System 
subjects (users) are granted access to objects (files, applications, resources, etc.) based on 
the relationship between the clearance level they possess and the defined classification 
level of the object. 
The BLP Model defines the simple security (ss-) property, which states 
that a subject at a given security level can only access objects assigned an equal or lower 
classification level, commonly referred to as “read down”.  Similarly, they define the 
confinement (*-) property, which prevents sensitive information from being copied into 
less sensitive objects by malicious software, by ensuring that a subject cannot write into 
an object that is of a lower classification level; this rule prevents “write down”.  These 
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rules allow (and restrict) the flow of information across the multiple levels of the security 
structure, thus the BLP model and its derivatives are popular information flow models. 
The BLP model can be described by a set of rules governing the 
relationship between objects and subjects, and the associated access functions over them.  
Stated more formally these rules, or properties, provide the most common way of 
representing the model: 
• The simple security (ss-) property states that every “observe” access triple (subject, 
object, read right) in the current access set b must have the property that the level of 
the subject dominates the level of that object. 
• The *-property states that, if a subject has simultaneous “observe” access to object O1 
and “alter” access to object O2, then the level of O1 is dominated by the level of O2. 
• The discretionary security (ds-) property states that, if (subject i, object j, attribute x) 
is in the current access set b, then x is recorded in ij’th component of the access 
matrix M. 
As an example of the BLP model, suppose a system user has been 
assigned a clearance level of “secret.”  This means that the user possesses the access 
rights to read documents that are classified at the secret level and lower while logged 
onto the system at the secret level, and to write to secret and higher documents (although 
the user would not have read access to higher classified documents in this system, in 
order to write to them in a coherent manner). 
The rigidly defined structure of the BLP model is both its strength for 
protecting military classified information, and its most commonly highlighted weakness.  
In particular, enforcement of the *-property does not allow an object to be downgraded to 
a lower classification level.  While this is a basic requirement of a practical MLS system, 
the *-property prevents it.  To address this shortcoming, Bell and LaPadula introduced 
the idea of a trusted subject, which is one that can be trusted not to violate the intent of 
the *-property.  Critics have also pointed out that the BLP model could allow a malicious 
user to simply request the system administrator to temporarily declassify a file, thus 
allowing a low user to potentially read a high file.  To address this criticism, Bell and 
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LaPadula added the so-called tranquility property (Bell and LaPadula, 1976).  The strong 
tranquility property states that the security labels of objects can never change during 
system operation, while the less stringent weak tranquility property stated that the labels 
can never be changed in such a way that violates any of the other defined security 
properties.   
b. Biba Integrity Model 
The BLP model was concerned only with confidentiality of objects.  
While this was intended by design, a follow-on information flow model was developed 
that specifically classified data according to integrity levels; here, integrity can be 
thought of as the quality of the information, for example, stored in an object.  The Biba 
Integrity Model (Biba, 1977) can be thought of as complementary to the BLP model: 
whereas BLP focuses on the sensitivity of objects, Biba defines its rules based on 
maintaining their integrity.  With the proliferation of digital data storage, there is good 
reason for a policy that ensures that the near- and long-term integrity of data is 
maintained. 
The goal of the Biba model is to ensure that high integrity documents will 
not be contaminated by lower integrity data.  In doing this, Biba ensures that a subject is 
only allowed to view objects of an equal or higher integrity level than itself.  Under the 
Biba model, individual integrity levels are defined for all subjects and objects in the 
system.  The higher the integrity level, the higher the level of confidence, reliability and 
trustworthiness in that entity (this concept has nothing to do with an object’s inherent 
sensitivity).  The rules of the Biba model define a strict integrity policy which prevents 
information flows from lower to higher integrity levels, and can be formalized by the 
following axioms (note that the differences between these and the properties that define 
the BLP model are symmetric): 
• The simple integrity (si-) axiom states that a subject s can read from an object o iff the 
integrity of the subject is dominated by that of the object; in other words, a subject 
cannot read from an object of lesser integrity (“no read down”). 
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• The integrity *-property axiom states that a subject s can have write access to an 
object o iff the integrity of the subject dominates that of the object; in other words, a 
subject cannot write data to a higher integrity level than its own (“no write up”). 
While the concepts underlying the Biba model seem straightforward, 
particularly when understood as the dual of BLP, Biba has been difficult to implement in 
real-world systems.  However, integrity policies have been investigated in some high 
assurance systems, such as GEMSOS (Schell et al., 1985), which implemented Biba 
controls using integrity labels.  The general difficulty in implementing Biba lies in how 
one defines integrity.  Whereas the sensitivity level for subjects and objects can be 
readily defined and assigned – one only need consider the military classification system 
as a practical example of this – the same cannot be said for assigning integrity levels.   
Establishing criteria for assignment of various integrity levels to subjects 
and objects has proven difficult.  What parameters should be taken into account when 
assigning an integrity level to a user?  Integrity for one class of users may be defined very 
differently from that of another, for example the integrity of medical records is quite 
different from that of the source code for a popular video game.  In addition, Irvine and 
Levin (2001; 2002) pointed out the “integrity problem” of a system based on its integrity 
capacity.  They showed that, in order to ensure the integrity of all its objects, a system is 
practically limited to maintaining (modifying) only data whose integrity is as low as its 
lowest integrity component.  For implementation of integrity policies in high-assurance 
systems, Schellhorn et al. (2000) have suggested using Common Criteria EAL levels, for 
example, as integrity labels when storing applications to smart cards, however, this 
requires that evaluation criteria for these applications must always be compatible.   
c. Lattice Model 
The Lattice Model is another in the class of mandatory access control 
models, and is based on the idea of classes of objects being organized into a universally 
bounded lattice.  Developed by D. Denning (1976) as “a structure consisting of a finite 
partially ordered set together with least upper and greatest lower bound operators on the 
set,” her goal was to find a model with suitable restrictions such that its security would be 
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not only decidable, but simply decidable.  This would ensure a system with proven ability 
not to leak information from an object at a high sensitive level to a subject at a lower 
sensitivity level. 
For her lattice model, Denning defines the flow operator “→” acting on a 
pair of object classes X and Y, such that X→Y indicates that information is permitted to 
flow from an object in X to one in Y.  In this sense, “information flow” means that 
information associated with one class affects the value of information associated with the 
other.  Figure 3 shows an example of a three-dimensional universally bounded lattice.  
The lattice represents a set of properties {x, y, z} in a system, and establishes a 
hierarchical dominance relationship among the set and its subsets.  Information in one 
object can only flow into another object if the second possesses at least the properties of 
the first; that is if the second dominates the first.  For example, an item of information 
contained in class x could flow into {x, y} or into {x, z}, but could not flow into class {y, 
z}.  Similarly, information contained in class {y, z} could not flow into class {x, z}, since 
y is not contained in the class {x, z}. 
 
 
Figure 3.   Lattice of Subsets for {x, y, z} (from Denning, 1976). 
Objects within the lattice can be defined by any ordering, and the lattice 
may be defined with categories non-comparable to one another in ordering objects.  This 
does not preclude, however, a lattice from being ordered by a combination of sensitivity 
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or integrity, provided information flows were properly defined to ensure that the ss/si-
properties and the *-property were adhered to (Lunt et al., 1990).   
d. Clark/Wilson Model 
As with the previous examples of MAC models, the Clark/Wilson Model 
(Clark and Wilson, 1987) is an information flow security model which, like the Biba 
Model, ensures the integrity of objects.  Clark and Wilson stated that prevention of 
unauthorized disclosure of sensitive information, which is vitally important in military 
security, is less important in commercial applications where integrity of information and 
prevention of unauthorized data modification is paramount.  Loss or corruption of a 




Figure 4.   Clark/Wilson Model of Integrity (from Neumann, 1998). 
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The C/W model addresses the flow of information by relying on software 
application well-formed transactions (WFT), and separation of duties among users to 
ensure that no single user can contaminate a data object through unauthorized changes.  
WFTs ensure that no user can arbitrarily modify data, either maliciously or 
unintentionally, and can only act in constrained ways that ensure data integrity.  In 
addition, strict logging of all user actions facilitates auditing the system for erroneous or 
malicious transactions.   
In addition, the C/W model further defines constrained data items (CDI) 
as those objects requiring integrity; integrity verification procedures (IVP) as 
applications procedures which provide confirmation that all data adheres to security 
specifications on the system; and unconstrained data items (UDI) as those objects outside 
the system that have yet to be verified for integrity. 
Figure 4 provides a simple example of data object flow through a C/W 
system.  In this snapshot of the system, all CDIs have previously been verified for 
integrity by an IVP, thus placing them in a valid state.  Any proposed manipulation on a 
CDI must be performed via a WFT, which will ensure the CDI’s return to a valid state.  
Introduction of a new UDI into the system will require verification of its integrity through 
an IVP before it can be reclassified a CDI and placed into a valid state. 
Shockley (1988) showed how the C/W model could be partially 
implemented as an MLS system, using BLP mechanisms, and Ge et al. (2004) showed 
the implementation of the C/W model using a DBMS server.  Since the C/W model relies 
heavily on application procedures for its WFTs, these procedures must be proven valid 
for all possible states.  Otherwise, there is no assurance that a WFT returns a CDI to a 
new valid state after the transaction.   
e. Noninterference 
Some approaches to secure information flow do not distinguish between 
classes of covert channels, or between covert and overt flows for that matter.  These 
approaches rely on the concept of noninterference, which states that the actions of one 
subject can have no effect on the output of a lower subject in a system.  Goguen and 
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Meseguer (1982) described a model wherein security policies are defined in terms of only 
noninterference assertions, rather than by the combination of access control and covert 
channel restrictions.  In their research on security policies and models, they described 
noninterference within a system in terms of information flows permitted between high 
and low subjects.  They explained that “one group of users, using a certain set of 
commands, is noninterfering with another group of users if what the first group does with 
those commands has no effect on what the second group can see.”  Haigh and Young 
(1987) further expanded the noninterference ideas of Goguen and Meseguer in follow-on 
work.   
The noninterference concept, when initially proposed, appeared to be a 
logical description of confidentiality in the context of an MLS system, however, 
problems were soon realized in implementing noninterference.  In practice, high-level 
data often has an effect on low-level data, such as the case where a highly classified file 
is encrypted or declassified, and then transmitted over a low channel.  An activity such as 
this would represent a low user receiving information (declassified data) based on the 
actions of a high user (the downgrader), and would not be allowed under the strict 
definition of noninterference.  In addition, noninterference had a significant shortcoming, 
with respect to BLP, in that it did not prevent “read up” of high sensitivity objects by a 
low sensitivity subject.  While noninterference ensures that the actions of a high level 
subject will not affect low level outputs in a system, it does nothing to prevent a low level 
subject from somehow observing high level information, and then acting on that 
information.   
The access control models described above (the BLP Model, etc.) are used 
in formal verification to prevent Low subjects from accessing High information, using a 
two-part strategy: (1) by enforcing rules regarding how subjects may access objects; and 
(2) by performing covert channel analysis to close remaining illicit flows.  While 
noninterference was ostensibly proposed as a way to define information flows, in practice 
it was also seen as a better way to explain covert channels, since access control did not 
adequately do this, and in fact, noninterference sought to unify the concepts of access 
control and covert channel analysis. 
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Noninterference with respect to security properties is often considered 
limited by the refinement paradox, which states that a system’s abstract security 
properties for information flow cannot be guaranteed to be preserved through refinement 
to concrete implementation (McLean, 1990; 1996; Roscoe, 1995).  Also, in their report 
from the 2001 Computer Security Foundations Workshop, Ryan et al., (2001) stated that 
noninterference, as a way to ascertain covert channels (due to algorithm or design flaws), 
does not pass the necessary and sufficient test.  A covert channel does not necessarily 
imply the presence of interference on a practical level.  That is, while interference is 
sufficient to imply a covert channel, it may be so small as to be of no practical exploitable 
use.  The report stated, “in most noninterference models, a single bit of compromised 
information is flagged as a security violation, even if one bit is all that is lost.  To be 
taken seriously, a noninterference violation should imply a more significant loss.”  The 
ability of noninterference to adequately contain information flows and covert channels, as 
well as its overall validity as a security model, has been hotly debated in the computer 
security field.   
4. Role Based Access Control (RBAC) Model 
RBAC security models represent a hybrid class of non-discretionary access 
control security policies that were designed to provide for the security requirements of 
non-military organizations.  RBAC was developed at the National Institute of Standards 
and Technology (NIST) to meet the needs of industry and civilian government 
organizations, where the strict requirements of a military MAC policy do not address the 
security needs for handling sensitive unclassified information (Ferraiolo and Kuhn, 1992; 
Sandhu et al., 1996).  This type of environment can be exemplified by a medical facility, 
where personal patient information can often be extremely sensitive, although not 
classified in a strict sense.  In this type of environment, specific information should be 
handled by only qualified classes of users, based on the sensitivity level of the 
information.  As an example, while medical charts and patient history are vital 
information that doctors and nurses must access to effectively do their jobs, such data 
need not (and should not) be made available to hospital administrative staff, who have no 
such valid access requirement.  The opposite would be true of financial information 
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concerning a patient’s ability to pay for medical care services.  In each case, the role of 
the user represents the key factor in determining whether or not information should be 
made available. 
To address this type of security environment, an RBAC model grants access 
rights to groups of users based on their role requirements, rather than providing rights to 
users individually.  Essentially, RBAC is a variation of an access matrix model, where 
groups of subjects represent roles, and rights are assigned uniformly to the group, as 
opposed to individual users (subjects).  Each role defines a specific set of operations that 
the individual acting in that role may perform, or in terms of access rights, the set of 
objects a user has access to, based on his role.   
The military classification system’s compartmentalization labels for classified 
messages may be viewed as another application of RBAC.  In addition to hierarchical 
classification labels representing secrecy level, messages may also be tagged with a 
compartment label, e.g., NUCLEAR, which can be viewed as analogous to a role.  In this 
scheme, users are granted access to messages with a particular compartment label 
(assuming they also possess adequate clearance level), based on their job requirements.  
At a later time based on changing job requirements, a user may be debriefed out of a 
particular compartment, essentially losing this role, at which time that user would no 




Figure 5.   RBAC Role Relationships (after Ferraiolo and Kuhn, 1992). 
Figure 5 shows a simple relationship between users, roles, and objects.  In the 
example, User4 is identified as possessing Role1, presumably by virtue of his job 
description.  Because he possesses this role, he implicitly has been granted access to 
Object1.  If at some time in the future User4 were to lose possession of Role1, he would 
no longer have access to Object1 (note that this change would require no modification 
whatsoever to Object1, nor to User5’s or User6’s access to it). 
The RBAC model provides the means to readily support the principle of least 
privilege at the granularity of the role or group.  This principle states that a subject will 
have access to only the objects needed to perform his or her job, and nothing more.  In an 
RBAC model, specific rights and privileges can be granted to an entire group based on 
the required functionality of their role.  The administrative strength of RBAC is that 
privileges can be granted (or retracted) to the group as a whole, without the need for 
manipulation of individual user rights.   
5. Summary 
This section has described well-known mandatory and discretionary access 
control security models, intended to protect both confidentiality and integrity of 
information.  Because our research focuses on MLS systems, particularly systems 
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managing military classification information, we have designed our approach using a Bell 
and LaPadula type of security policy.  As will be described later in this dissertation, the 
BLP simple security and *-properties are formalized as security rules against which 
programs are verified for security.  However, our model can facilitate expanding the 
security policy to capture integrity policies, for example by defining rules associated with 
the Biba model, or by defining information “compartments” using RBAC-style roles to 
adjudicate access. 
D. COVERT CHANNELS  
As defined in early research by Lampson (1973) and Kemmerer (1983), covert 
channels use system properties not intended as communication channels as a way to 
transfer information between system subjects.  Such channels allow processes to take 
advantage of communication channels to transfer information in a manner that violates a 
security policy. 
An operating system may virtualize a shared physical resource so that each 
subject, or equivalence class of subjects, perceives that it has exclusive access to the 
resource.  A covert channel can result from the incomplete virtualization of a resource 
such that some attribute of the resource remains shared, indirectly.   
Schaefer et al., (1977) defined covert channels as being either storage or timing 
channels.  For both storage and timing channels, the sender and receiver (typically 
subjects) must have the following capabilities (Kemmerer, 1983): 
1. Indirect access to an attribute of a shared resource, which the sender can modify, 
and the receiver can view.  For example, the shared resource is the CPU, and the 
attribute is its “busy” state; or the shared resource is the disk, and the attribute is 
the location of the disk arm, or the attribute is the “full” state (Karger and Wray, 
1991).  
2. A means to initiate and synchronize their actions.  The sender and receiver need 
to know when to modify and observe the attribute, the importance of which 
increases when they wish to transmit a stream of data.  
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This dissertation research essentially distinguishes between a covert storage 
channel and a covert timing channel by the means in which the receiver observes the 
change in the attribute: 
1. Storage – the receiver views an error message, or other information placed in its 
address space by the system, for example if a storage disk is filled the receiver is 
provided an error message to that effect. 
2. Timing – the receiver views changes to the relative timing of “legal” events.  For 
example, if the sender’s activity makes the CPU busy, the receiver’s request to 
execute an operation on the CPU will complete (event 1) after the expected time 
of day occurs (event 2).  Or, in the case of the disk arm attribute, depending on 
where the sender has left the arm (by reading a sector near the inner or outer edge 
of the disk), two disk sectors read by the receiver will occur in a different order 
(events 1 and 2). 
Goguen and Meseguer (1982) defined a point of interference between two 
subjects as the point where the high subject interferes with the context of the low subject.  
An exploitable covert channel can result in information flow in violation of the intended 
security policy.  The point of interference of a covert channel is considered an internal 
resource of the system, as it is not directly accessible to subjects, as are exported 
resources (NSA SKPP, 2007).  Note that if a low subject can directly view the value of 
an exported resource (such as a variable) that has been modified by a high subject, then 
an overt flaw rather than a covert channel results. 
In the case of a mandatory access control (MAC) policy, the covert channel 
sender’s sensitivity level will be higher than the covert channel receiver’s sensitivity 
level, with respect to confidentiality (Kemmerer, 1983).  Thus, the determination of the 
potential covert channels in a system depends not only on the policy in place, but also on 
the implementation of that policy on a specific system (Gligor, 1993). Our approach here 
considers both the security policy and its implementation.  The criteria for a covert 
channel described above enable one or more bits of information to be passed for each 
interference event (log2(n) bits, where n is the number of possible states that the observer 
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can differentiate in the shared resource, such as different amounts of delay).  When the 
interference event can be repeated in a cycle, or loop, a stream of data can be transmitted 
through the channel, although additional synchronization between sender and receiver 
may be required. 
E. DYNAMIC SLICING 
Integral to certain covert channels is the notion of data or control dependency.  
Slicing algorithms are used as a means of tracing such dependencies between variables 
and statements processed during program execution, traditionally for program debugging 
purposes (Korel and Rilling, 1997).  Slicing algorithms generate an executable subset of a 
program, creating a subprogram whose behavior is the same as the original with respect 
to some variable.  They allow one to isolate the behavior of, and dependencies acting 
upon, that variable.   
Slicing algorithms are categorized as either dynamic or static, depending on 
whether they take into account dependencies derived during one particular program 
execution path (dynamic), or for all possible execution paths (static).  Dynamic slicing 
techniques generally analyze only the narrow portion of the code representing a single 
execution path. 
Since slicing techniques have been shown to be useful in tracking data and control 
dependencies, they can also provide a means of detecting potential overt flaws based on 
dependencies.  As an example, consider the following code snippet: 
(s1) Read_dev (SysHigh, v3); 
(s2) Read_dev (SysHigh, v4); 
(s3) if v3 >5 then  
(s4)    v1 := 0; 
(s5) else if v4 = 5 then 
(s6)         v1 := 1; 
(s7)   else v1 := -1; 
(s8) v2 := v1; 
In the example above, it is clear that v2 depends on v1, based on the assignment 
in (s8).  Static slicing shows that v2can depend on both v3 (s3) and v4 (s5), since there 
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is a dependency from each of these to v1.  With dynamic slicing, however, not all 
execution paths will result in the same control dependencies.  When the conditional 
expression in (s3) evaluates to true, the final value of v2 depends on v3 but not on v4, 
since the else-block statements in (s5 – s7) are never executed. 
 
Figure 6.   Program Dependency Graph for Code Snippet  
(after Agrawal and Horgan, 1990). 
Figure 6 depicts the program dependency graph created by the execution of the 
code snippet above.  In the graph, the solid edges reflect direct data dependencies, and the 
dashed edges reflect control dependencies.  The bold nodes depict a dynamic slice with 
respect to the assignment to variable v2 (s8) when the conditional in (s3) has evaluated to 
true, in which case the assignment depends on statements (s4), (s3), and (s1).  Access 
labels of variables can be used to determine potential security violations, based on the 
dependencies between these variables.  For a finite number of paths within a given scope 
of analysis, our framework performs static analysis of the DM by using dynamic slicing 
to discard previous states that could not have contributed to an overt flaw, thus a 
complete result is obtained without having to maintain a history of all preceding states. 
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F. INFORMATION FLOW AND CONTROL DEPENDENCIES 
With respect to information flows between objects in an MLS system, one 
category of information flow error occurs when high sensitivity objects indirectly affect 
information flow between objects at the same (lower) sensitivity level.  Such errors are 
based on unintended control flow dependencies (Denning, 1976).  For example, during a 
program execution, information being written from one variable to another, both of the 
same classification level, might take place within a control structure that depends on a 
higher classified variable, such as an if-else block.  In this case, the higher classified if-
else control variable will create a implicit dependency over the information flow taking 
place within the control structure, even though this flow is between two lower classified 
variables.  Our approach is capable of detecting this type of overt flaw caused by control 
flow dependencies.  We consider this to be overt, as the program must be processing on 
behalf of a High or Low subject, and in either case, reading the High control variable and 
writing to the Low variable should not ever be done on behalf of a single-level subject. 
The approach used here for discovering flaws based on control dependencies 
employs dynamic slicing analysis.  Dependencies within a program are identified by 
examining the chain of statements preceding a value assignment with respect to the  
sensitivity labels of the variables in these statements.  If the context of a previous 
statement includes variables that are higher than the destination, then there is an overt 
flaw. 
The code snippet below provides an illustration of a control flow dependency that 
constitutes an overt flaw.  In the example, constant value1 is written out to a SysLow 
external device (s3), depending on the SysHigh value read into variable v1 (s1). 
(s1) Read_dev (SysHigh, v1); 
(s2) if v1 > 0 then  
(s3)    Write_dev (SysLow, 1); 
The Write_dev operation in (s3) depends on a SysHigh source (v1) in the if-block 
(s2), therefore an information flow implicitly exists from v1 (at SysHigh) to the SysLow 
device.  Sabelfeld and Myers (2003) described information flows such as these, based on 
control dependencies, as implicit flows. 
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G. TRUSTED SUBJECTS 
Users in a multilevel secure (MLS) environment are assigned a clearance level 
based on the relative level of trust placed in them by security administrators.  A user is 
allowed to log into a system at any level that is at or below (dominated by) his assigned 
clearance and a session at that level is created.  Subjects that act on behalf of a given user 
are labeled with an access class that is at the same level as the user’s session.  A subject is 
allowed to read information (objects) whose sensitivity level is up to the subject’s 
sensitivity level (access class), and write to objects at or above its sensitivity level. 
In contrast to this, a trusted subject is one that is allowed to read and write within 
a range of access classes (Lunt et al., 1990), which limits the authority of the trusted 
subject to “read-up” and “write-down” (Bell and LaPadula, 1973).  Lunt et al. described 
that MLS systems with trusted subjects defined this way do not require a separate access 
control lattice or special rules specifically for their actions.  As a result, a trusted subject 
does not need to be given a privilege to bypass or violate the security rules. 
Since trusted subjects are allowed to interact with (read and write) information 
across access classes, they must be trusted not to abuse these special privileges.  The 
existence of trusted subjects is generally required for certain services provided in MLS 
systems, such as login, information downgrading, and data backup utilities across 
multiple access levels.  MLS system administration may also require a trusted subject to 
interact with and manage regular user accounts and information across multiple access 
levels (Thomas and Sandhu, 1996).  Such actions represent a good target for trusted 
subject implementation, however the design principle (Levin et al., 2007) that trusted 
subjects should be small and minimized within an MLS system is not always observed. 
According to Steffan and Clow (1996), with respect to security policies, a trusted 
subject should not move data between sensitivity levels, other than in constrained, 
explicitly defined ways.  The specification of a trusted subject must explicitly define how 
it can do this.  Levin et al., pointed out that trusted subjects do not violate the general 
policy in place, but their behavior must be a defined part of a policy.  Such a policy for 
trusted subjects, referred to as a “relaxed MLS policy,” must be integrated with the 
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general MLS policy, such that the resultant union of the two can allow trusted subjects to 
effectively operate, while ensuring that non-trusted subjects cannot conduct malicious 
activity.  In a “downgrader” role, for example, a trusted subject may essentially change 
the label of information from high to low by reading information from a SysHigh object 
and moving it into another SysLow object. 
Trusted subjects can be defined by their behaviors in an MLS system.  Steffan and 
Clow (1996) described examples of trusted subject actions, including the ability to 
process information across multiple access control levels to view (read) a highly sensitive 
document in order to comment (write) on its contents at a lower level, and the ability to 
change the sensitivity label contents of a document file.  In the latter case, they describe 
that a trusted subject may regrade a classified document, temporarily overriding the 
tranquility principle that a subject’s or object’s label will not change while being 
referenced (Bell and LaPadula, 1973).  Although some (Steffan and Clow, 1996) would 
allow trusted subjects to relabel objects, this dissertation research maintains the 
tranquility of object labels, abstracting the idea of downgrading information by changing  
variable labels from the viewpoint of, that is, internal to the trusted subject.  Allowing 
movement of information within a range of access classes represents the trusted subject 
actions we model in our DM approach. 
H. SUMMARY 
In this chapter, we have introduced several information assurance concepts 
germane to the research presented here.  The next chapter will expand these discussions 
by presenting work in several areas related to this dissertation.  Some of the work 
presented is classic in nature and provides a foundation for this dissertation research; in 
other cases, we present more recent work and contrast it to our research. 
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III. REVIEW OF RELATED WORK 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Previous work related to this dissertation research is described below.  
Discussions include information flow tracing, covert channels and their analysis, control 
dependencies which may cause overt flaw in a program, system trusted subject 
implementations, and dynamic security policies. 
B. INFO FLOW TRACING AND COVERT CHANNEL ANALYSIS 
Related work in modeling secure information flow and in covert channel analysis 
is described below.  We have extended previous work by integrating a language for 
formally specifying an implementation with a framework for expressing security policies, 
particularly with respect to covert channel rules and control dependency flaws. 
Graham-Cumming and Sanders (1991) described system refinement from abstract 
to concrete representation, with respect to security, where they defined security solely in 
terms of noninterference.  They used the unwinding theorem (Goguen and Meseguer, 
1984; Haigh and Young, 1987) to describe refinement such that noninterference between 
users in an abstract specification of the system could be preserved through more concrete 
representations of the system, however the results of this work were limited to 
noninterference.  In contrast, our work describes implementation of a proof-of-concept 
prototype system, where enforcement of a range of security properties is possible through 
the use of security assertions that are explicitly checked during Alloy program analysis.  
These abstract security properties are formalized through refinement as security rules 
(Alloy assertions) in the base program representation of a target program.  The semantics 
of information flow are represented in the DM by the definition of access label ordering, 
and through the compiler-generated transition predicate, unique to a particular target 
program. 
Volpano et al. (1996) furthered the language-based flow analysis work by 
defining a linguistic type system for secure flow, and rigorously proving the soundness of 
the core language with respect to noninterference.  Well-typed programs are then  
 38
guaranteed to be noninterfering, and thus secure by this definition.  Sabelfeld and Myers 
(2003) summarized subsequent work in their survey on language-based information flow 
systems.   
Other work in using sound type systems for secure information flow has focused 
on areas such as: encryption and decryption of information, where flows from plaintext 
(high secrecy) information to ciphertext (low secrecy) information must be addressed in 
light of noninterference rules that would seem to prevent such interaction (Laud, 2003; 
Smith and Alpizar, 2006); probabilistic noninterference, where probability distributions 
are used to determine a likelihood of noninterference from high to low variables, 
primarily for multi-threaded processes where scheduling is nondeterministic (Volpano 
and Smith, 1999; Sabelfeld and Sands, 2000; Smith, 2006); and type inference, in which 
the flow of information is automatically determined based on semantic analysis (Volpano 
and Smith, 1997; Simonet, 2003; Deng and Smith, 2006).  Eventually, Smith and Thober 
(2007) enhanced the linguistic type system model of secure information flow such that 
sensitivity labels need to be assigned only at I/O boundaries, while the labels of variables 
and constants, as well as data information flow through a program’s execution, are 
automatically derived relative to the I/O (device) labels.   
In contrast, our work implements the DM-Compiler, which similarly tracks the 
flow of data based on the input device label, but with no requirement to annotate the code 
in any other way.  Our work differs from the linguistic type system approach in that, 
rather than constructing a type-safe language with which to write secure programs, we 
apply abstract interpretation to the analysis of programs in order to detect potential 
problems and otherwise demonstrate their security with respect to select security 
properties.  Our approach is based on exhaustive information flow tracing of all execution 
paths in a program, to a certain length (determined by the model scope of Alloy).  This 
tracing is applied to both overt and covert channel static analysis using dynamic slicing 
techniques, where appropriate, such that read-up as well as violations of noninterference 




formal specification of a program.  Although it yet lacks a formal soundness proof, the 
DM-Compiler enables generation of formal logic that can be automatically analyzed 
(using the DM) for secure information flows. 
Other covert channel research has also focused on information flow analysis, 
using the principles of Kemmerer’s SRM (1983).  For example, the concept of network 
covert channel analysis introduced detection methods based on in-depth IP packet 
analysis as a way to differentiate covert channels from legitimate network traffic 
(Padlipsky et al., 1978).  Approaches such as these could potentially be incorporated into 
the DM security rule assertions, as methods for detecting covert channels in base 
programs within this domain. 
C. TRUSTED SUBJECT IMPLEMENTATION 
In his early work in trusted subject implementation, Wilson (1989) developed a 
framework for running a trusted multi-level database management system (DBMS), 
referred to as a “trusted subject,” to be hosted on any trusted operating system.  This 
work established a layered policy, with a general policy for the trusted computing base 
(TCB) layer of the operating system, and a separate policy for the DBMS TCB layer.  
The goal of this approach was to ensure no illicit disclosure of sensitive DB information 
(secrecy), and to prevent illicit alteration of DB stored data (integrity).  Their premise 
was that, for a DBMS hosted on a known secure operating system, only the DBMS TCB 
layer must be subjected to security analysis to ensure that it meets all access control 
requirements.  This concept provided “portability” of the DBMS trusted subject, and 
negated the time and expense of testing every system on which the DBMS may be 
targeted.  Further, only the DBMS TCB layer need be checked for security when it is 
operated on a new secure operating system.  This work did not appear to outline a 
traditional concrete security policy for trusted subjects, and only used them in the context 
of a trusted DBMS.  While the Wilson paper allowed modification of object tranquility as 
a valid action for trusted subjects, we preserve object tranquility by allowing trusted 
subjects to only modify variable labels during program execution. 
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Landauer et al. (1989) introduced a formal model for managing trusted processes 
by defining a state machine whose state space can be locked, or isolated, in order to allow 
privileged actions to overlap, modeling the interleaving of trusted processes.  The authors 
described a trusted process as possessing special privileges to alter operating system 
kernel access control decisions, or other security critical operations.  They divided these 
privileges into four basic types of trusted process actions which could be taken by trusted 
users: 
1. Change level of data; 
2. Perform some integrity-critical functions; 
3. Perform service on behalf of non-trusted client (kernel access); or, 
4. Export processor information to some non-trusted process. 
Additionally, they categorized three general security properties for trusted processes, as 
components of a trusted security policy (Landauer et al., 1989): 
1. Downgrade only at discretion of some privileged subject 
2. Execute integrity-critical commands correctly 
3. Execute all commands such that resultant state does not violate 
noninterference (covert channel prevention) 
This paper provided an in-depth mathematical analysis of the security policy derived 
from trusted process principles, and is valuable as a source of background discussion on 
security policy issues for trusted subjects. 
Steffan and Clow (1996) defined a set of trusted process classes, to identify their 
relative privileged status.  These classes correspond to combinations of override 
privileges in the areas of Tranquility (labels), MAC (content) and DAC (privileges).  As 
the class numbers increase, so do the privileges granted, and the risk associated with 
using a trusted process in that class.  In contrast to this paper, our work characterizes 
trusted subjects without violating tranquility of object labels.  
Thomas and Sandhu (1996) presented three architectures for trusted object-
oriented databases, based on: a kernel, a replicated DBMS, and a trusted subject 
architecture.   The last of these was the focus of their paper.  Their architecture was 
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composed of a session manager, which was trusted and running across multiple access 
control layers; several message managers, which were untrusted and operated within a 
single access control layer; and read/write service requests to the DB from a client.  The 
trusted session manager can always maintain a global snapshot of the system for a given 
session, across all access control layers, to allow it to coordinate message requests and 
scheduling.  Clearly, the session manager must be a trusted subject for this architecture to 
maintain security of messages across layers.  As Wilson did in his paper (1989), this 
work describes the implementation of a trusted subject architecture to support a DBMS.  
They provided a thorough analysis of how the session manager (trusted subject) could 
manage messages within the system with respect to security, as well as proofs of both 
noninterference and confidentiality of the session manager.  However, the paper did not 
appear to focus on security policies for trusted subjects, or how separate policies could 
effectively coexist. 
Levin et al. (2006) discussed trusted subject actions within a security kernel 
architecture.  With respect to the principle of least privilege (Saltzer and Schroeder, 
1975), they described how a trusted subject in a downgrader role must be able to perform 
only the minimum required operations, namely, downgrading of labels in this case.  Other 
operations such as “dirty word search” (DWS) of a document for specific words or 
phrases prior to downgrade, must be handled by other untrusted system processes to 
prevent unintended or malicious consequences.  They defined a framework for 
performing filtering and downgrade of information, separating tasks between users and 
processes, both untrusted and trusted.  We believe our model is aligned with this 
thinking, when one considers that if our trusted subject acts as a downgrader, the DM can 
reflect a separate untrusted process in the target program that performs DWS.  We 
generalize this concept by allowing the trusted subject to modify variable labels based on 
content or label information.  In our model, the DWS might represent examination of a 
highly classified document for specific references to some classified topic, with 




the DWS could represent filtering of a document by its creation date, where downgrading 
of the document will occur only if this information is older than some predetermined 
date. 
D. DYNAMIC SLICING FOR SECURITY TRACING 
Previous work in implementing dynamic slicing algorithms for security property 
tracing has included development of a tool for finding privacy violations in networked 
environments, targeting spyware in networked applications (Kruger et al., 2004).  The 
approach uses dynamic slicing techniques to trace program execution, to search for data 
dependencies that might illuminate privacy violations.  When such dependencies are 
found, they are specified using an event description language to capture event parameters, 
values, etc.  Their goal is to use these parameterized events as abstract inputs for an event 
sequence language, as a means of generating a security policy.  Based on the observed 
privacy violations, a policy is written that will prevent the specific events that caused the 
violations.  Our suggested approach differs in its goal of analyzing a target program for 
adherence to a specific policy, as opposed to some generated policy.  
E. DOMAIN-SPECIFIC MODELING IN SECURITY 
Research has been ongoing in applying domain-specific modeling (DSM) to 
computer security applications, for example in modeling particular domains such as 
sensor networks, using DSM principles.  Our investigation has not found, however, 
research in specifically using a security DSM framework for security analysis and 
verification of programs, such as is the case in this dissertation research.  Examples of 
recent work in this area are discussed below. 
Hanna et al. (2008) developed Slede, a framework for modeling and verifying 
sensor network protocols.  Their approach uses the nesC language for specifying network 
embedded systems, and the Spin model checker for verifying network security protocols 
modeled using nesC.  While their work has parallels to ours, it differs significantly in that 
its focus is on verification of security protocols, as opposed to verifying programs for 
adherence to a security policy.  It also differs in that it is targeted specifically to sensor 
networks and not program implementations in general.  
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Basin et al. (2006), in their model driven security approach to system 
development, point out that software system design models are often disjoint from 
security models, and their integration is not well understood or supported.  Just as 
automated synthesis of systems from a specification are thought of as a “holy grail” in the 
software engineering world, the goal of model driven security is automated synthesis of 
secure systems from functional and security specifications.  Their approach uses UML to 
express a security policy, called secureUML in their research.  While secureUML 
formalizes access control, with the concepts of subjects, objects, roles (their paper 
illustrates an RBAC style security policy) and permissions, it does not perform 
information flow tracing or analysis, as our approach does, and cannot perform covert 
channel analysis, which we consider a vital aspect of our Security DM approach. 
The Security Assertion Markup Language (SAML) was developed by the World 
Wide Web Consortium (W3C, 2008) as a variant of the more general Extensible Markup 
Language (XML) to specify security attributes of subjects (users) in a system, such as 
identity, entitlements, etc.  Using established standards for XML Signature and XML 
Encryption (W3C, 2008), SAML was intended to provide a domain model for security, 
primarily for business related applications.  While SAML can be used to model, for 
example, digital signatures, message encryption and integrity, and assertions for user 
authentication, it currently cannot be used to model an access control policy, with 
assertions for covert channel identification, and could not be applied to our research 
approach.  
The Alloy language has been used to model security requirements for secure 
communications (Chen et al., 2006) where predicates were specified for secure message 
confidentiality, integrity, authenticity and non-repudiation, as well as numerous 
“obstacles to security”, such as eavesdropping or spoofing.  The work was successful in 
designing a general, reusable model for communication security properties, and differs 
significantly from the research presented here, which analyzes models of program 
representations for adherence to a specified security policy.  
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F. DYNAMIC SECURITY POLICY DEVELOPMENT 
Because programs typically interact with an external environment, all aspects of 
that environment cannot be predicted at compile time.  A dynamically secure system 
must provide mechanisms for observing the environment during runtime, and allow for 
security updates of the system in order to adapt to that environment (Zheng and Myers, 
2004).  A static policy cannot provide mechanisms for real-time updates in applications 
where a change in environment might necessitate immediate enforcement of an updated 
policy; such a situation requires a specifically dynamic security policy that can adapt to 
changes in the environment surrounding the system. 
A dynamic security policy can be defined as a program consisting of a set of 
guards and actions that provide the logic to modify a system’s implementation in order to 
change its operational parameters, and includes the necessary guards to enforce good 
behavior and prevent misuse of the system (Naldurg et al., 2002).  Dynamic policies 
provide adaptive access control measures that can be responsive to time (temporal aspects 
of the system), events (emergent situations or unanticipated actions in the environment), 
perceived security risk, and operational needs. 
The goal of Quality of Service (QoS), the ability of a distributed system to provide 
sufficient and timely service to meet the desires of each of its users, is expanded to 
Quality of Security Service (QoSS), with the vision of making security a constructive tool 
for network management, rather than a performance inhibitor (Irvine and Levin, 2000; 
Levin et al., 2006).  A QoSS framework becomes a directing factor in the implementation 
of a dynamic policy, employing variant mechanisms that make security decisions based 
on changing network operating conditions, always working to maximize benefit to its 
users (Irvine and Levin, 2000).  Research in this area has included study in the 
development of adaptive policies for management of databases (Ray, 2005), tools for 
design and verification of dynamic policies (Janicke et al., 2005), and the manner in 
which an adaptive policy should be implemented.   
The DoD and National Security Agency (NSA) are currently developing the 
Global Information Grid (GIG) (NSA GIG, 2004), which will provide the military with 
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greater net-centric communications capability and flexibility by leveraging “information 
technology and innovative network-centric concepts of operations to develop 
increasingly capable joint forces.”  The GIG will address limitations and inefficiencies 
inherent in the military’s traditional specialized “stove-pipe” communications systems by 
providing the ability to share information across networks of differing classification 
levels, and across coalition networks. 
Among the GIG’s information assurance goals are high assurance authentication, 
multi-level security, and development of flexible, dynamic security policies.  To that end, 
the GIG program has introduced a new type of security policy known as Risk-Adaptive 
Access Control (RAdAC).  The RAdAC policy represents a confluence of MAC and 
DAC, enforcing a need-to-know policy, with SAC (Situational Access Control), which 
enforces a more adaptive need-to-share policy.  RAdAC is described by a general rule 
that “users may access information they are cleared and permitted to access, or when the 
situational need is severe enough, as long as the risk of doing so is within tolerable 
limits,” (NSA GIG, 2004).  The RAdAC model would provide the flexibility to meet 
need-to-share requirements, weighing potential risk against operational need, making 
decisions to grant access based on: 
• security risk in granting access (primarily a function of the user, the object 
being accessed, the environment in which they exist, and historical allowed accesses) 
• operational necessity for access 
• any policy for a balance between the two in conflicting situations 
G. SUMMARY 
In this chapter, we have presented classic and recent related work in secure 
information flow tracing, and specially the relationship of this to covert channel analysis 
and noninterference properties.  We have described research in the trusted subject 
concept, and how others have chosen to implement trusted subject behaviors in a secure 
system.  Finally, we have described the DoD’s goal of finding solutions to implementing 
dynamic security policies, particularly for military secure systems. 
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The next chapters will introduce the approach presented in our work, beginning 




IV. IMPLEMENTATION MODELING LANGUAGE 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The Implementation Modeling Language (IML) defines a specialized language 
that presents some of the basic capabilities and constructs, with respect to security, of 
high-level programming languages.  The current IML enables the specification of 
relatively simple programs written in some common programming language, such as Java 
or C++.  While future iterations of IML might handle more advanced language features 
such as concurrency, inheritance, etc., this initial language description was motivated by 
a requirement to represent essential security information flow properties in target 
program implementations, balanced by the desire to limit complexity during 
experimentation. 
B. IML SYNTAX 
The following describes syntax and statement constructs of the IML. 
1. Lexical Concepts 
A variable name is an identifier distinct from IML keywords and Alloy keywords.  
No variable declarations are required. 
The only assumption about values stored in variables is that they can be compared 
for equality and inequality (<, =, >, <=, >= operators) with other variables, or with 
constants.  Variables can hold integer constants, but the value of a variable can be 
interpreted also as a time value (see GetClock below).  Constants are represented by 
integers: -1, 0, 1, etc. 
Statement constructs provided in IML include capabilities for assignment to a 
variable, reading to and writing from a variable, accessing an I/O device’s flags and a 
system clock, and basic control structures.  Semicolons separate statements in IML. 
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2. Assignment 
Assignment statements propagate access labels from the right-hand side to the 
left-hand side of the statement.  For the current model, constants have a Low secrecy 
access label by default. 
variable := variable; 
variable := constant; 
The IML enables trusted subject behavior by providing a special trusted 
assignment statement.  This statement allows trusted subjects to modify the labels of 
internal variables (“regarding”), while respecting the tranquility of external object labels.  
The trusted assignment allows filtering of variable values based on existing content 
and/or label.  This filtering is analogous to a “dirty word search” of a document prior to 
downgrading its classification level, to ensure that certain sensitive words are first filtered 
from the document. 
The trusted assignment statement allows a trusted subject to assign a value to a 
destination variable, with an explicitly defined security label.  When an IML base 
program is translated, it is under the context that only a trusted subject may perform 
trusted assignment.  The trusted assignment syntax follows: 
Assign destination from source as alt_source; 
In this operation, the destination variable takes on a new data value 
(destination_value’) from the source variable, however it does not automatically take the 
source label as would normally be the case for an assignment statement in IML.  Instead, 
destination is explicitly assigned a new label (destination_label’) based on the source and 
alt_source labels, as determined by a filter function that is automatically invoked with 
each trusted assignment.  In trusted assignment, source can be either a variable or 
constant, and alt_source can be either a variable (in which case the access label currently 
assigned to the value stored in this variable is used) or an explicitly defined access label. 
The new content and access label of the destination variable (destination_value’ 
and destination_label’, respectively) are defined by the Alloy function tsFilter in the 
DM Invariant Model (further discussed in section 4.1.1), as follows: 
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(destination_value’, destination_label’) =  
 tsFilter ( (destination_value, destination_label),  
         (source_value, source_label), 
         (alt_source_value, alt_source_label) ) 
This function specifies the behavior of trusted subjects in our model, and 
examples are described in detail in Chapter VI. 
3. Device Input/Output Statements 
The IML statements Read_dev and Write_dev abstract the input from and 
output to an external device at a specific access level. We make the simplifying 
assumption that there are three external devices, each at high, medium and low secrecy 
levels, respectively; the operation label (SysHigh, SysMid or SysLow) indicates which of 
these devices is being read to or written from.  For a Read_dev statement, the variable 
is assigned the label of the device that is read from; for a Write_dev statement, source 
may be either a variable or a constant. 
Read_dev (label, variable); 
Write_dev (label, source); 
4. File Random Access 
The IML abstracts the concept of random access to an indexed file, where (key, 
value) pairs are used to store and retrieve information in a finite-sized repository.  This 
conceptual repository, referred to as a direct file, can be thought of as a database or 
memory file and (for this model) is represented as a single-level store (there is no 
distinction between persistent and volatile memory).  
All subjects in the base program can access a single instance of the direct file, 
according to their access label.  Initially, all direct file slots have a SysLow access label, 
and can be written to by any subject.  Once a subject has stored a value into a keyed slot 
using the PutDirectFile statement, that slot retains the label of the subject.  
Subsequently, another (or the same) subject may read from this direct file slot using the 
GetDirectFile statement, only if the subject’s label dominates that of the key slot.  
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A given key slot can be overwritten an unlimited number of times by a subject with a 
higher- or lower-labeled value, so the label of a given slot may change over time. 
The direct file has a limited number of keyed slots, all of which have empty keys 
and values at the start of program execution, and a given slot’s key value is determined 
when it is first assigned a key/value pair.  The direct file tracks the number of slots that 
have been assigned a key, zero at the start of execution and incremented by one whenever 
a key slot in the direct file is written to for the first time.  The direct file capacity equates 
to the number of key slots that can be allocated in the direct file.  
When a PutDirectFile is executed for a given key for the first time, an 
available key slot is allocated, the data is stored in the direct file, and a global Success 
flag is set to 1; otherwise, if no key slot is available, the Success flag is set to 0, and no 
data is stored.  When all available slots have been allocated, the direct file is considered 
filled, and a global Full flag is set to 1.  The Success and Full flags are global state 
variables maintained by the execution environment, and are internal resources that would 
not be directly accessible in a high-level language.  Their values could be inferred, 
however, based on system errors seen by the user, and we abstract such system errors in 
the IML by allowing direct examination of the flags in a base program. 
The following statements are provided in the IML for storing and retrieving 
values to/from the direct file.  The label indicates the level of the subject performing the 
operation; the key and source may be either variables or constants: 
GetDirectFile (label, key, variable); 
PutDirectFile (label, key, source); 
5. System Clock 
This statement stores the current clock value to a variable: 
GetClock (variable); 
We model only the time taken by file and external device accesses during 
Read_dev/Write_dev and Get/PutDirectFile operations.  These statements 
may cause the CPU, or some other resource, to be busy such that some action visible to 
another subject is delayed with respect to a reference clock (for simplicity, we model one 
time source – the system clock). 
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The clock value can be compared with other constants and variables, using the 
Before operator: 
(var1 Before var2) 
6. Program Control Statements 
A conditional expression is constructed from variables, constants, flags, and 
operators =, >, <, >=, <=, Before, not, and, or.  A statement may be any single 
statement or block of statements (a sequence of statements is enclosed by braces).  Two 
forms of control statements are provided: 
if condition then statement [else statement]; 
while condition do statement; 
In the if-then-else statement, the else block is optional.  The while-do 
control statement repeats its body as long as the condition holds true. 
The following statement signifies termination of a base program: 
Stop; 
C. SUMMARY 
This chapter introduced the Implementation Modeling Language (IML).  This 
specialized language, developed as an integral part of the Domain Model (DM) concept, 
provides a way to represent high-level language programs in a common modeling format, 
to enable automated static analysis of a representation the program’s execution.  The IML 
provides all of the functionality necessary for program analysis of security properties, 
particularly with regard to information flow analysis. 
We next present the Security DM approach, which enables automated static 
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V. THE SECURITY DM APPROACH 
A. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter presents the Domain Model (DM) approach to security verification.  
It provides discussions of the overall structure of the DM framework, including the 
Invariant and Implementation Models, and the compilation process during which the 
DM-Compiler is used to generate a complete DM, in Alloy notation, from a base program 
written in the IML. 
B. DM STRUCTURE 
An overview of the Security Domain Model (DM) approach to program security 
verification is depicted in Figure 7.  The DM includes the definition of program state and 
transitions between states, as well as security rules, specified as Alloy assertions, 
representing the generic policy a program must conform to.  The DM is composed of an 
invariant and a variable section, derived from the security rules and a target 
implementation, respectively.   
Figure 7.   Domain Model approach to system security verification. 
While there are numerous model checker tools currently available, we chose to 
use the Alloy specification language primarily because of its ability to represent program 
 54
language abstractions simply and explore their semantics with a well-integrated analysis 
tool.  As Jackson (2006) points out, referring to his approach as “lightweight formal 
methods,” Alloy models can be easily created and initially tested early in the 
development process, and then incrementally expanded.  He states that the goal of Alloy 
was to “obtain the benefits of traditional formal methods at lower cost, without requiring 
a big initial investment,” presumably in time and effort.  
As do traditional model checkers, Alloy deals with finite models though it handles 
them very differently.  Model checkers typically build Kripke structures to represent the 
states and transitions of a program execution.  Such finite model structures have limits 
not easily adjusted by the user during analysis.  The Alloy Analyzer tool, however, 
affords the ability to easily increase the depth of analysis for models as they are 
developed and expanded.  For our approach, Alloy and its Analyzer provide an ideally 
suited tool for creating and analyzing target program abstractions. 
As previously explained, a base program is an abstraction of a target program 
implementation, and is written in IML notation.  By analyzing a model of the program 
rather than actual program code, security verification can focus on elements of 
information flow such as I/O, access labels, direct file access, and timing (clock), while 
ignoring other program details not pertinent to such analysis.   
In the current prototype, translation of the base program from an implementation 
is a manual step.  Developing a separate compiler to translate a high-level language 
program to IML is a difficult task, beyond the scope of this work. The possibility must be 
considered that covert channels existing in the original program implementation may be 
lost in the IML representation, and for now we depend on the knowledge of the manual 
translator to avoid this problem. 
Security rules, written as Alloy assertions, are derived from the security policy.  
Such policies are typically written in natural language, and extraction of security rules is 
a manual step in our approach.  As currently implemented, the DM defines security rules, 
which have as their basis the Bell and LaPadula (1973) security model, meaning that 
information flows from High to Low secrecy levels are not allowed. 
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After the base program and Invariant Model with security rules are defined, the 
DM-Compiler compiles the base program from IML into state transition predicates, 
written in Alloy notation, creating the DM Implementation Model.  The DM-Compiler 
combines this with the Invariant Model to complete the DM.  The approach uses the 
Alloy Analyzer tool (Alloy, 2008) for automated verification of the security rules, 
defined in the DM as Alloy assertions, to find execution paths within the DM that might 
violate the security policy or create covert channels.  In essence, it creates an interpreter 
for the specific base program, modeled by the DM. 
1. Invariant Model 
The Invariant Model specifies the conceptual framework of the DM with the 
Alloy specification language.  This section describes statement types and structure, 
program execution state, direct file structure, and clock signature. 
In the Alloy language, all atomic structures are modeled as sets and relations.  
Sets are represented as unary relations; scalars are simply singleton sets.  A set or relation 
declaration can be constrained using several keywords indicating multiplicity: one 
restricts sets to exactly one instance of a type; while lone restricts them to either zero or 
one instance; and none refers to the empty set.  The all quantifier must hold for all 
instances of a type, and the disj quantifier specifies variables that are necessarily 
disjoint from one another.   
Alloy provides standard logical operators, for example negation (!), conjunction 
(&&), disjunction (||), implication (=>), and bi-implication (<=>).  Pairs (type-
>type) represent binary relations, and ‘+’ is the set union operator.  The override 
operator ‘++’ examines two sets of pairs and overwrites the pair in the first set with the 
second whenever the first elements of the pairs match.  The ‘^’ operator represents 
transitive closure for binary relations.  
The signature (sig) construct in Alloy, roughly synonymous with the class 
declaration in object-oriented programming languages, defines a set of atoms (elements), 
and any relations between them.  Signatures with the abstract qualifier cannot have 
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their own instances, and are used only to derive other signatures.  For further details on 
the Alloy language, see the website at (Alloy, 2008). 
The signatures below describe program state, the initial state, and structures for 
variables and values, which are extended in the DM-Compiler generated Implementation 
Model (discussed in next Section).  The Policy signature defines a partial ordering 
between security access labels, representing a dominance relationship between the labels 
(see Figure 8).  For illustration purposes, the model defines an Alloy enumerated type, 
AccessLabel with access labels SysLow, SysMid and SysHigh.  The Policy 
signature defines an ordering ord as the transitive closure between the three labels, as 
well as the identity, or reflexive, relationship for each of the labels. 
enum AccessLabel { SysHigh, SysMid, SysLow } 
 
one sig Policy { 
  ord: AccessLabel -> AccessLabel 
} 
{ord = ^( (SysLow -> SysMid)  
        + (SysMid -> SysHigh) ) 
        + (iden & (AccessLabel -> AccessLabel) ) 
} 
 
Figure 8.   Alloy enumerated type for AccessLabel,  
and signature for the DM Policy element 
The Statement abstract signature (see Figure 9) captures a single instance of a 
given statement.  For I/O (Read_dev/Write_dev) and direct file access statements, the 
signature defines statement type, destination, source, key (for direct file only) 
and subject_label attributes.  The subject_label specifies the security label of 
the calling subject for a particular statement; this label represents the access label of the 
device, in the case of I/O statements.  For assignment statements, only source and 




defines the set of control variables used in an if-then-else or while-do statement.  
For GetClock statements, only the destination attribute is defined, while the Stop 
statement defines no attributes. 
 
sig Statement { 
  type:       Stmt_type, 
  destination:   lone Variable, 
  source:       set Variable + Value, 
  source_label:  lone (AccessLabel + Variable), 
  key:           lone (Variable + Value), 
  subject_label: lone AccessLabel 
} 
 
Figure 9.   Alloy signature for the DM Statement element 
The Stmt_type enumerated type (see Figure 10) defines the different statement 
types that can be used in a base program representation of a target program. 
enum Stmt_type { 
  Assign, 
  Condition, 
  Read_dev, 
  Write_dev,  
  GetDirectFile, 
  PutDirectFile, 
  GetClock, 
  Stop  
} 
 
Figure 10.   Alloy enumerated type for the DM Stmt_type element 
The DirectFile signature (see Figure 11) defines key/value pairs 
(keyContent) for each of its storage slots, and the current access label (keyLabel) 
for each key slot value.  The latter is used to track the label of the current value to ensure 
that flows are valid during subsequent accesses of the value using GetDirectFile 
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statements.  The element last_written stores the label of the last subject that wrote 
to the direct file, and is used when checking for potential covert storage channels 
(discussed in detail later).  The signature also defines the direct file max_slots size (set 
to 2 for modeling purposes); note that Alloy provides the predefined type Int to 
represent sets of integer atoms.  Also, full and success are used as internal resource 
system flags (essentially Booleans), as previously described in Chapter IV. 
 
sig DirectFile { 
  keyContent:   Value -> lone Value, 
  keyLabel:     Value -> lone AccessLabel, 
  last_written: lone AccessLabel, 
  full:         (const0 + const1), 
  success:      (const0 + const1), 
  max_slots:    Int 
} 
{ max_slots = 2 
} 
 
Figure 11.   Alloy signature for the DM DirectFile element 
 
sig Time {} 
 
one sig Clock { 
  before:      Time -> Time, 
  long_before: Time -> Time 
} 
{ long_before in before &&all t1: Time, t2: Time - t1 | 
  ((t1->t2) in before <=> t2 in TO/nexts[t1]) && 
  ((t1->t2) in long_before <=> some t3: Time | 
    (t3 in before[t1] && t3 in before.t2))  
} 
 
Figure 12.   Alloy signatures for the DM Time and Clock elements 
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The Clock signature (see Figure 12) provides an abstraction for program 
execution time.  The signature defines the concept of some event occurring at some time 
before another event (before relation), which enables testing for the relative timing of 
events during base program analysis.  In this implementation, ‘TO’ is defined as a Time 
ordering instance, using the Alloy library utility for ordering.  The nexts function 
returns a set of all next values in an ordering – in this case the next Time values after the 
one in question.  For example, the code below checks whether t2 is contained within the 
set of time values that occur after t1.  
sig State { 
  stmt:              Statement,  
  vars:              Variable -> one (Value + Time), 
  access_label:      Variable -> one AccessLabel, 
  direct_file:       DirectFile, 
  current_clock:     Time, 
  prev_state:        lone State, 
  err_msg:           lone Error, 
  influenced_by:     Variable -> State, 
  last_cond_checked: set State, 
} 
{ 
  ( err_msg = InfoFlow_error <=> 
    not consistent_with_FlowPolicy [this] ) && 
  ( err_msg = Overt_flaw_detected <=> 
    dependency_flaw_found[this] ) && 
  ( err_msg = Storage_channel_detected <=> 
    storage_channel_found[this] ) && 
  ( err_msg = Timing_channel_detected <=> 
    timing_channel_found[this] )   
} 
 
Figure 13.   Alloy signature for the DM State element 
The State signature (see Figure 13) captures the current state of the system, and 
the next base program statement (stmt) to be executed during static analysis.  Its 
elements include the type of statement to be executed, the current table of variable values, 
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the access label for each value stored in vars (for information flow tracing), and a 
snapshot of the current direct file; the flags full and success are contained within the 
direct_file attribute.  This signature also includes the current_clock value, the 
previous state leading to the current state, and last_cond_checked, which identifies 
a set of conditionals within which the current statement may be nested, enabling 
dependencies from those conditionals to be propagated.   
The influenced_by attribute is used for tracking control flow dependencies, 
and is at the heart of the dynamic slicing algorithm used in this approach.  It stores, for 
each source variable in the current state, all of the previous states that have influenced 
that variable.  This attribute enables the Alloy Analyzer to narrow its focus in examining 
previous states, thus reducing the search space necessary in determining control 
dependencies. By storing variable/state pairs, we can enable the Analyzer to examine all 
variable access labels from previous influencing states.  
The State signature also defines specific error conditions, referred to as 
err_msg in the signature.  These errors represent security violations which might occur 
during static analysis, and provide positive feedback that the Alloy Analyzer has 
discovered an assertion counterexample and a potential violation.  For modeling purposes 
the State signature currently defines errors for illicit information flows (flows which 
violate the Policy signature partial orderings), overt control dependency flaws, and 
covert channels, to include both storage and timing channels, as defined in the Alloy 
enumerated type Error (see Figure 14). 
enum Error { 
  InfoFlow_error, 
  Overt_flaw_detected, 
  Storage_channel_detected, 
  Timing_channel_detected  
} 
 
Figure 14.   Alloy enumerated type for the DM Error element 
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In order to provide a starting state for static analysis of a base program, the DM 
Invariant Model defines an initialization signature, called InitialState, which sets 
appropriate values for the various elements of the State signature (see Figure 15).    
 
one sig InitialState extends State {} 
{  
  vars                = (Variable -> const0)  
  access_label        = (Variable -> SysLow)  
  stmt                = S1  
  direct_file.full    = const0 
  direct_file.success = const1 
  current_clock       = TO/first[] 
  prev_state          = none 
  err_msg             = none 
  last_cond_checked   = none 
  no influenced_by  
  no direct_file.keyContent 
  no direct_file.keyLabel 
} 
 
Figure 15.   Alloy signature for the DM InitialState element 
When analyzing a base program, the Alloy Analyzer performs an exhaustive 
search of all execution paths up to a defined length, referred to as the scope, specifying 
the upper limit of the size of the models considered.  In fact, it performs symbolic 
execution of all base program paths with length up to the defined scope.  In the DM-
Compiler, the scope is generated heuristically based on the total number of statements in 
a base program.  For example, the resultant scope for a given base program will 
encompass all of its control statements and I/O statements, and will be one more than the 
number of statements in the program to ensure that the initial state is included in the 
analysis.  The heuristic addresses while-loop statements in a base program to a limited 
extent, by increasing the scope to allow for a single iteration.   
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The DM-Compiler scope heuristic ensures that all execution paths for 
deterministic programs will be scrutinized, however, it cannot be assured of generating 
execution paths for non-deterministic programs.  For example, the Analyzer cannot 
generate all possible execution paths for a program with a while-loop structure of 
indeterminate length, thus a scope cannot be determined that will ensure all possible 
paths are scrutinized. 
The Invariant Model also includes the definition of security rules that must be 
enforced by the DM security policy.  These rules are specified as Alloy assertions, and 
will be described further in Chapter VI. 
2. Implementation Model 
The DM Implementation Model is generated by the DM-Compiler from a base 
program, and specifies the base program’s semantics in terms of statement signatures and 
state transitions.  Example base programs, and their resultant compiled Alloy models, are 
presented in Section 5. 
From the base program, the DM-Compiler generates Variable and Value 
signatures, representing variable names and constant values used in the base program, 
respectively.  The Variable signatures reflect the variables defined in the base 
program; similarly, the number and value of constants defined in the Value signature 
depend on the number and value of unique constants explicitly present in the base 
program (the constant 0 will always be added by default for initial variable values).  To 
represent the state space, additional constants may be needed to fill the intervals between 
explicitly defined constants.  The DM-Compiler defines an Alloy signature which 
establishes a simple less-than relationship between the constant values, thus enabling the 
comparison of values for equality and inequality from within the base program.  Figure 
16 shows example Variable and Value signatures generated by the DM-Compiler. 
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one sig x1, x2, t1 
  extends Variable {}  
one sig const_minus_1, const0, const1, const2, const3 
  extends Value {}  
one sig LT {  
  lt:  Value -> Value }  
{ lt = ^(  
      ( const_minus_1 -> const0)  
    + (  const0 -> const1)  
    + (  const1 -> const2)  
    + (  const2 -> const3) )  
} 
 
Figure 16.   Example Alloy signatures for Variable and Value elements 
C. DM-COMPILER 
The DM-Compiler compiles each base program statement into a separate Alloy 
signature, based on the type of statement and associated variables and constants used.  
Elements of the Statement signature not needed for a particular statement type are not 
initialized.  The base program in Figure 17 shows a simple signature sequence, translated 
into IML, for an assignment statement (s2) nested within a conditional statement (s1).   
(s1) if ( x1 < 0 ) then  
(s2)   x2 := x1;  
(s3) Stop; 
Figure 17.   Sample Base Program Statements, in IML Syntax 
From the sample base program above, the DM-Compiler would generate the 
sequence of Alloy Statement signatures shown in Figure 18. 
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one sig s1 extends Statement {}  
{ type = Condition  
  source = x1  
  destination = none 
  key = none 
}  
one sig s2 extends Statement {}  
{ type = Assign  
  source = x1  
  destination = x2  
  key = none 
}  
one sig s3 extends Statement {}  
{ type = Stop  
  source = none 
  destination = none 
  key = none 
}  
 
Figure 18.   DM-Compiler Generated Alloy Signatures for Sample Base Program 
From these statement signatures, the DM-Compiler generates a transition 
predicate representing the state transition trace for the base program execution.  The 
approach used to derive the transition predicate is based on compilation of the base 
program statements, using the RIGAL compiler construction language (Auguston, 1990; 
Auguston, 1991).  During the compilation process, each base program statement is 
translated into a set of Alloy statements that represent the transition from the present 
execution state to the next state, following execution of the statement in question.  The 
transition predicate defines a frame condition (Borgida et al., 1995) for each statement, 
capturing the semantics of the base program by specifying all possible sequences of 
statement executions for the base program.  The transition predicate also implements 
dependency tracking within the execution path.  Although we refer generally to the  
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transition “predicate,” we represent this structure using an Alloy fact rather than a 
pred (predicate), because a pred only holds when invoked, while a fact is assumed 
to always hold. 
The remainder of this section shows a representation of the state transition 
predicate derived by the DM-Compiler for the base program in Figure 17.  Note that for 
each statement, pre represents a state before the statement (stmt) has been executed, 
and post represents the state after statement execution.    
fact trans {  
  all post: State - InitialState |some pre: State |  
For the conditional statement (s1), since no variable value assignments are made, 
the variable table, access labels, direct file (including system flags), clock time value, and 
influence_by table remain the same after execution: 
(pre.stmt = s1 && 
  (post.vars = pre.vars && 
   post.access_label = pre.access_label && 
   post.direct_file = pre.direct_file && 
   post.current_clock = pre.current_clock && 
   post.influenced_by = pre.influenced_by && 
The last_cond_checked attribute is calculated to include all previous states 
currently in last_cond_checked (excluding the current state, s1), plus the pre 
state itself, in order to set the context of statements within the conditional: 
post.last_cond_checked = 
     {cond: pre.last_cond_checked |cond.stmt != s1 } + pre && 
Based on the outcome of the conditional check, the next statement to execute is 
set to either the “then” branch (s2), or the “else” branch (s3) statement: 
   (((pre.vars[x1]-> const0) in LT.lt) => post.stmt = s2 
      else post.stmt = s3) 
   ) 
&& post.prev_state = pre  
) ||  
In the assignment statement (s2), the access label and value for the target variable 
(x2) are set to those of the source variable (x1): 
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(pre.stmt = s2 && 
  (post.vars = pre.vars 
     ++ (x2 -> pre.vars[x1]) && 
   post.access_label = pre.access_label 
     ++ (x2-> pre.access_label[x1]) && 
   post.stmt = s3 && 
The direct file (including system flags), clock value, and 
last_cond_checked attribute all remain the same after execution of an assignment: 
   post.direct_file = pre.direct_file && 
   post.current_clock = pre.current_clock && 
   post.last_cond_checked = pre.last_cond_checked && 
The influenced_by attribute is calculated based on the source variable 
dependencies.  Recall that influenced_by is declared within the State sig as the 
relation (Variable->State), which is a set of pairings from variables to states. Alloy 
treats sets and subsets the same when defining relations, thus the pairing of a variable to a 
set of states (Variable->{State}), shown below, denotes a set of pairings from that 
variable to each of the states ({Variable->State}).  Jackson (2006, pp. 36-37) provides a 
discussion of Alloy’s treatment of sets as relations. 
In calculating influenced_by, first all previously recorded dependencies 
(other than those for x2, the destination variable) are included:  
post.influenced_by =  
   {v: Variable, s: State | (v -> s) in pre.influenced_by && v != x2}  
Second, dependencies for x1, the current assignment statement source variable, 
are added as dependencies for x2: 
   + (x2 -> pre.influenced_by [x1])  
Next, from the current set of states defined in last_cond_checked, those 
whose scope this assignment falls within are included.  This captures dependencies from 
any conditional within which the current statement may be nested; in this case base 
program statement (s1): 
   + (x2-> {cond: pre.last_cond_checked | cond.stmt = s1} 
)  
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Finally, when an assignment statement is nested within a conditional statement, 
dependencies from the source variables participating in the conditional must be 
included: 
   + (x2 -> State.{cond: pre.last_cond_checked, 
       infl: cond.influenced_by [cond.stmt.source] | cond.stmt = s1}) 
   ) && post.prev_state = pre  
) || 
The transition predicate concludes with the Stop statement (s3). Since execution 
terminates when this point is reached there is no need to assign values for the resultant 
(post) state, other than setting the previous state for tracing continuity: 
(pre.stmt = s3 && 




This chapter has described the Security DM approach to static analysis and 
verification of a program representation for adherence to a security policy – 
specifically,rules associated with a security policy.  Specifically, we described the 
structure of the Security DM, and how it is generated based on a base program 
representation of a target program, and a specific security policy. 
In the next chapter, we present several base program examples for which the 
Security DM approach is used to conduct static analysis for the presence of specific 
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VI. EXAMPLE DM IMPLEMENTATIONS 
A. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter presents examples of program security vulnerabilities, discoverable 
using the DM approach.  The examples illustrate security rules – defined using Alloy 
notation – for discovering direct information flow errors, indirect control dependency 
flaws, and covert channels, based on regular and trusted subject actions.  For each 
example, a base program written in IML is presented to demonstrate a particular security 
violation, and how the domain model approach can be used to find it. 
The success of these examples shows the possibility of conducting automatic 
analysis and verification of target programs.  For specific program instantiations, we have 
demonstrated the characterization of several classes of security flaws and successfully 
analyzed example programs automatically for presence of these flaws.  These results 
indicate a direction for future research, to represent broader abstractions for automatically 
detecting entire classes of security flaws in a target program. 
Regarding the covert channel examples presented, each describes the transmission 
of one bit of information, for conceptual purposes.  More complex real-world examples 
would involve such concepts as looping, synchronization, etc., to provide exploitable 
covert channels with a stream of bits. 
The complete Alloy models for these and other examples can be found on the 
dissertation research website at http://cisr.nps.edu/projects/sdm.html. 
B. EXAMPLE PROGRAMS 
1. Overt Control Dependency Flaw 
The first example illustrates an overt flaw based on a control flow dependency.  
This example shows an exploitation scenario that culminates with an IML Write_dev 
operation, where the variables written to the external device have been influenced by 
values at a higher level than that of the device itself. 
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The Alloy predicate in Figure 19 examines each execution state, and evaluates as 
true whenever the state (current) is the result of a Write_dev statement, and the 
value to be written out was influenced_by some previous state (pre) that had access 
to a variable with a higher access_label than that of current state, that is, the flow 
from the previous State to the current State is from SysHigh to SysLow. 
pred dependency_flaw_found [current: State] { 
let stm = current.stmt, pre = current.influenced_by[stm.source]| { 
  stm.type = Write_dev  && 
  stm.source in Variable && 
  not ((pre.access_label[pre.stmt.source] -> stm.subject_label)  
     in Policy.ord) 
  } 
} 
 
Figure 19.   Alloy Predicate to Discover Overt Control Dependency Flaw 
The following base program illustrates an example of this flaw.  Initially, a 
SysHigh value is read into variable x1 (s1).  Based on the value of x1 (s2), new variable 
x2 is assigned either ‘0’ (s3) or ‘1’ (s4).  Variable x2 is then written to a SysLow device 
(s5). 
The violation occurs when x2 is written to a SysLow device, because its value has 
been potentially influenced by a SysHigh value, specifically x1 when it was accessed in 
(s2).   
(s1) Read_dev (SysHigh, x1); 
(s2) if x1 = 0 then  
(s3)    x2:= 0; 
(s4) else x2:= 1; 
(s5) Write_dev (SysLow, x2); 
(s6) Stop; 
The Alloy Analyzer detects this situation, and correctly reports an overt flaw by 
tracing the control flow through statements (s1)(s2)(s3)(s5). 
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2. Timing Covert Channel Resulting from Exploitation of System Clock 
The second scenario describes a covert timing channel that occurs when a SysLow 
subject executes two GetClock statements, and between them a SysHigh subject 
prevents the SysLow subject from executing, through execution of a Read_dev/Write_dev 
or direct file operation (rw state in the text).  Thus, when the SysLow subject next runs, it 
can examine the clock to detect this interference with its access to the CPU; these 
channels are thus often called CPU channels.  The Alloy assertion in Figure 20 detects 
this potential covert timing channel, utilizing the system Clock element. 
pred timing_channel_found [gc2: State] { 
some disj rw, gc1: State | { 
  (gc2 -> rw) in State_order.st_after && 
  (rw -> gc1) in State_order.st_after && 
  gc1.stmt.type = GetClock && 
  gc2.stmt.type = GetClock && 
  rw.stmt.type in (Read_dev + Write_dev + 
                   PutDirectFile + GetDirectFile) && 
  gc1.stmt.subject_label = gc2.stmt.subject_label && 
  not ((rw.stmt.subject_label -> gc2.stmt.subject_label)  
     in Policy.ord)  
  }  
} 
 
Figure 20.   Alloy Predicate to Discover Timing Covert Channel 
The base program below illustrates this timing channel.  A SysHigh value is 
initially read into variable x1 (s1).  A SysLow subject then stores the current clock value 
in t1 (s2).  Based on a check of x1 (s3), its value is stored into the direct file at key slot 
1 (s4).  The SysLow subject again examines the clock, and stores its value into t2 (s5).   
(s1) Read_dev (SysHigh, x1); 
(s2) GetClock (SysLow, t1); 
(s3) if x1 < 0 then 
(s4)   PutDirectFile (SysHigh, 1, x1); 
(s5) GetClock (SysLow, t2); 
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At this point (subsequent to execution of statement s5) an interference event has 
occurred, which can be exploited as a timing covert channel by the SysLow subject, and 
the Alloy Analyzer detects the violation, tracing execution flow through statements 
(s1)(s2)(s3)(s4)(s5).  The crux of this covert channel is that a SysLow subject, the covert 
channel receiver, has been allowed to observe (by examining the clock) a change in some 
internal resource (the CPU busy state), which was indirectly affected by the actions of a 
SysHigh subject, the covert channel sender.  The remaining statements illustrate how the 
SysLow subject compares the two clock values (s6) to see whether the SysHigh subject 
has interfered with it through performance of some operation, and writes either a ‘1’ or 
‘0’ accordingly (s7 and s8). 
(s6) if t1 Before t2 then 
(s7)   Write_dev (SysLow, 1); 
(s8) else Write_dev (SysLow, 0); 
(s9) Stop; 
3. Flow Violation Caused by a Trusted Subject Operation 
The third example illustrates a trusted subject regrade operation that, based on 
allowed trusted subject behavior, leads to an information flow violation.  In the example, 
an attempt is made by a trusted subject to downgrade a destination variable label from 
SysHigh to SysLow.  Here, trusted subjects are allowed to perform downgrading of 
information from SysHigh to SysMid.  To support the policy, a tsFilter Alloy 
function is defined in Figure 21 to ensure that any “downward” information flows are 
allowed only from SysHigh to SysMid.  The function takes as input parameters three 
Values and three AccessLabels, specifically, the values and labels of the destination, 
source and alt_source variables in the Trusted Assignment (see Chapter IV for IML 
syntax of the trusted assignment statement), and returns as its result an instance of 
Alloy signature FTuple, which the DM uses as the new (filtered) Value and 
AccessLabel of destination (see Figure 21).  In essence, the policy for trusted subject 
behaviors is captured in the semantics of the tsFilter function, which may override 
the normal value and label of the assignment destination parameters. 
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For example purposes, the tsFilter function here returns the greater of 
constant 0 and the source Value (source_val), and the higher of SysMid and the 
alt_source AccessLabel (alt_src_label) when a downgrade is performed; 
otherwise it returns alt_src_label for an upgrade or when the label is not changed.  
As shown in the example tsFilter, it is not necessary to use all of the parameters 
passed into the function to generate a resulting FTuple.  Note that a different DM 
Invariant Model might define a tsFilter function that would return different results 
based on the specific input parameters, and thus define a different security policy for 
trusted subject behaviors. 
sig FTuple { 
  val:   Value, 
  label: AccessLabel 
}  
 
fun tsFilter[ dest_val, source_val, alt_src_val      : Value,  
              dest_label, source_label, alt_src_label: AccessLabel ]: 
  FTuple { { result: FTuple |  
  { 
 
//assign result.val to be the greater of source_val and 0 
  result.val =  
       (((source_val -> const0) in LT.lt)  
           => const0  
       else source_val) 
 
//assign result.label to be the higher of SysMid and alt_src_label,  
//  when downgrade is executed; otherwise assign alt_src_label 
  result.label =  
       (((dest_label -> alt_src_label) in Policy.ord)  
           => alt_src_label 
       else SysMid) 
  }  
} } 
 
Figure 21.   Alloy Function for Trusted Subject Filter 
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The base program example below demonstrates a security violation based on the 
trusted subject filter and security policy.  Initially, values are read into two variables with 
security labels SysHigh and SysMid, respectively (s1 and s2).  A trusted assignment 
operation is then performed (s3), in which the data value stored in x2 is copied into 
variable x1, and x1 is assigned a SysLow label.  The trusted assignment statement 
invokes the tsFilter function, which overrides the label assignment, from SysLow to 
SysMid (as described above), resulting in destination variable x1 being assigned a higher 
label (SysMid) than was intended (SysLow).  
(s1) Read_dev (SysHigh, x1); 
(s2) Read_dev (SysMid, x2); 
(s3) Assign x1 from x2 as SysLow; //now x1 has the label SysMid 
(s4) Write_dev (SysLow, x1); 
(s5) Stop; 
When the next statement (s4) attempts to write the value held in x1 to a SysLow 
external device, an illicit flow results since x1 is labeled as SysMid.  The Alloy Analyzer 
detects this situation as a violation of the information flow security predicate in Figure 
22, and correctly reports an illicit information flow, tracing execution through statements 
(s1)(s2)(s3)(s4).  The same base program, under a DM Invariant Model with a different 
policy and filter function, would not necessarily result in this flow violation. 
pred consistent_with_FlowPolicy [current: State] { 
  let stm = current.stmt | { 
    (stm.type in (Write_dev + PutDirectFile) && 
     stm.source in Variable ) 
    => (current.access_label[stm.source] -> stm.subject_label) 
       in Policy.ord 
  } 
} 
 
Figure 22.   Alloy Predicate to Discover Illicit Information Flow 
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4. Trusted Subject Dual Violation – Information Flow Violation and 
Overt Flaw 
The fourth example base program illustrates two different security violations that 
may result from a trusted subject operation.  In the program, a successful trusted subject 
regrade creates an overt control dependency flaw, however when the trusted subject 
regrade fails to occur, illegal information flow results.  For purposes of this example, the 
security policy and tsFilter function described above apply. 
In the base program, values are initially read into three variables, with assigned 
security labels SysHigh, SysMid and SysLow, respectively (s1 through s3).  Depending on 
the value stored in x1 (s4), a trusted assignment statement is performed (s5) in which the 
value of x1 is modified to the greater of x2 and 0, and the label of x1 is downgraded to 
that of x3, SysMid in this case.  Since a regrade from SysHigh to SysMid is allowed by 
the security policy (as reflected in the tsFilter function), x1 is assigned the SysMid label.   
(s1) Read_dev (SysHigh, x1); 
(s2) Read_dev (SysLow, x2); 
(s3) Read_dev (SysMid, x3); 
(s4) if x1 < 0 then { 
(s5)   Assign x1 from x2 as x3; //now x1 has the label SysMid 
(s6)   Write_dev (SysMid, x1); } 
(s7) else Write_dev (SysMid, x1); 
(s8) Stop; 
The next statement (s6) attempts to write the value of x1, which is now labeled 
SysMid, to a SysMid external device.  However, since this operation occurs within the if-
block, it creates a control dependency from SysHigh (x1 label when it was examined in 
s4) to SysMid, representing an overt access control flaw (in the SysHigh context, a write 
to SysMid violates the security policy).  Based on the Alloy security rule predicate (see 
example in section 5.1), the Alloy Analyzer properly detects this violation, tracing 
execution through statements (s1)(s2)(s3)(s4)(s5)(s6). 
An additional violation occurs when the conditional check (s4) evaluates to false, 
and the else-branch is executed.  In this case, an attempt is made to write the value stored 
in x1 (still assigned its original SysHigh label) to a SysMid external device (s7).  Since 
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this represents an overt illegal flow from SysHigh to SysMid, the Alloy Analyzer properly 
identifies and reports the error, tracing execution through statements (s1)(s2)(s3)(s4)(s7). 
5. Storage Covert Channel Resulting from a Trusted Subject Operation 
The final example combines the concepts described in the previous ones by 
showing how the execution of a trusted assignment could produce a covert storage 
channel (Levin et al., 2006).  This example demonstrates that, even with a consistent 
security policy for trusted subjects, common data flow violations that are outside the 
trusted subject’s allotted permissions may occur in a base program.  Security violations, 
such as covert channels or information flows in violation of the policy, may be 
perpetrated by the illicit actions of regular subjects, regardless of the actions of a trusted 
subject.   
The DM formalizes the notion of covert channels with an Alloy security predicate 
(see Figure 23) to identify a class of covert storage channel vulnerability in a base 
program execution. 
pred storage_channel_found [current: State] { 
  let stm = current.stmt | { 
    stm.type = PutDirectFile && 
    current.direct_file.full = const1 && 
    not (current.direct_file.last_written -> stm.subject_label) 
       in Policy.ord 
  } 
} 
 
Figure 23.   Alloy Predicate to Discover Storage Covert Channel 
In the example base program below, we assume a direct file with a maximum 
capacity of two records, initially empty.  To begin, SysLow values are read into variables 
x1 and x2 (s1-s2).  A trusted assignment is then performed (s3) in which x1 is assigned 
the value of the greater of x2 and 0 (based on the tsFilter function described above), 
and upgraded to a SysHigh label.  At this point in execution, the value stored in x1 will 
be 0 or greater.  Next, the value of x1 is examined (s4).  When this check evaluates to 
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true, the values of x1 and x2 are stored into the direct file by the SysHigh sender, 
resulting in the internal full direct file flag being set.   
(s1)  Read_dev (SysLow, x1);  
(s2)  Read_dev (SysLow, x2);  
(s3)  Assign x1 from x2 as SysHigh; //now x1 has the label SysHigh 
(s4)  if x1 > 1  then {  
(s5)    PutDirectFile (SysHigh, 1, x1);  
(s6)    PutDirectFile (SysHigh, 2, x2); }  
Figure 24 graphically depicts the sequence of events that take place during 
execution of the code sequence above.  This execution results in the Direct File being 
filled by the storage channel sender at SysHigh when the values stored in variables x1 
and x2 are written as SysHigh labeled values to direct file key locations 1 and 2, 
respectively.  At this point, the direct file is full. 
 
Figure 24.   Direct File filled by storage channel SysHigh sender 
The next sequence of program statements represents execution by a SysLow 
covert channel receiver.  When the SysLow subject attempts to store a value into the 
direct file using a new key 3 (s7), the system issues a failure indication since the direct 
file is full (note that in the translation to a base program, the internal system flag returned 
as an error message to the program, translates to the explicit full flag, accessible in 
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IML as in statement (s8)).  Depending on the success or failure of the direct file store 
(s8), whether or not the covert channel receiver found the direct file to be full, the SysLow 
subject writes a constant ‘1’ or a ‘0’ to an external device (s9 & s10) to complete the 
storage channel. 
(s7)  PutDirectFile (SysLow, 3, 1);  
(s8)  if full = True then  
(s9)    Write_dev (SysLow, 1);  
(s10) else Write_dev (SysLow, 0);  
(s11) Stop;  
Because a higher-labeled subject caused the direct file to become full, the Alloy 
Analyzer detects and reports this violation of the Alloy security predicate, tracing the 
flow of execution through statements (s1)(s2)(s3)(s4)(s5)(s6)(s7).  Although this 
violation occurred subsequent to a trusted subject action (s3), the storage channel was not 
precipitated by the trusted assignment, and the illicit actions of two regular subjects at 
SysHigh and SysLow, acting in collusion to exploit the direct file, brought about the 
security violation (a storage channel). 
C. TESTING RESULTS 
The base program examples presented above were evaluated using Alloy 
Analyzer version 4.1.8, running under Mac OS X™ 10.5.4 on a 2.5 GHz Intel Core 2 
Duo processor, with 2 GB of memory.  In test runs, the Alloy Analyzer successfully 
found valid counterexamples for violations of each security rule assertion described 
above.   
Test results are summarized in Table 1 below.  The Analysis Size defines the size 
of Alloy model instances considered (scope) during static analysis; Analysis Time 
represents total time (ms), broken down into (time to build model, time to analyze and 
find a counterexample): 
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Security Violation Description Analysis Size, scope 
Analysis Time, ms 
(build, analyze) 
Overt control dependency flaw 7 688  (640, 48) 
Timing covert channel 10 5891 (2771, 3120) 
Information flow violation, resulting from 
trusted subject operation 7 
1516  
(1277, 239) 
Overt control dependency flaw, resulting 
from trusted subject operation 9 
3335  
(2290, 1045) 
Information flow violation, resulting from 
trusted subject operation 9 
2692  
(2236, 456) 
Storage covert channel, resulting from 
trusted subject operation 12 
48631  
(9852, 38779) 
Table 1.   Results of Alloy Analysis Testing 
With regard to the state explosion dilemma associated with most model checkers, 
testing was conducted to study the effect of DM base program size on Alloy Analyzer 
static analysis time.  As discussed earlier, the Alloy Analyzer tool relies on the small 
scope hypothesis to assert that any flaws in a model are found in relatively small 
instances of that model.  With this in mind, static analysis was performed on simple base 
programs of steadily increasing size, with associated increasing analysis scope.  Note that 
in each example base program, a security flaw was intentionally implemented in order to 
ensure that a counter-example could be discovered by the Alloy Analyzer. 
Figure 25 shows the results of these test runs.  The chart graphically depicts how, 
with increasing base program size (measured as lines of IML code), the time taken for the 
Alloy Analyzer tool to find a valid counter-example to one of the security assertions 
increased with exponential growth.  This result was not unexpected, given that the Alloy 
model size for increasing DMs tends to grow exponentially during Alloy Analysis, and 
even a relatively small scope can equate to a very large search space (Jackson, 2006).  
With increasing architecture speeds, and efficiencies gained with new Alloy 




Figure 25.   Alloy Analyzer Static Analysis Times for Increasing Base Program Sizes 
D. SUMMARY 
This chapter has demonstrated the feasibility of the Security DM approach to 
program verification.  We have demonstrated that this approach can be used successfully 
to perform static analysis of a representation of a target program, and verify its adherence 
to a security policy abstraction, represented by a set of formalized security rules. 
We will next present conclusions from this work, and propose areas for future 
advances in this research. 
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VII. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK 
A. CONCLUSIONS 
This dissertation has described the development of a security domain model for 
representing high-level language programs and security policies, for both regular and 
trusted subjects.  The approach defines a formal Security Domain Model (DM) that 
facilitates specification of a security policy (security rule assertions) and security 
vulnerabilities (such as covert channels), and is independent of a particular program 
implementation.  Although encoding and checking static program semantics and 
properties is not in itself revolutionary, this work is evolutionary in extending previous 
work in the area of information flow tracking based on a precise, formal definition for 
overt information flaws and covert channels.   
The Security DM framework provides a means of conducting automated static 
analysis of a program implementation within a finite scope of execution paths.  Flow 
control dependencies and related overt flaws are analyzed using dynamic slicing 
techniques.  Our model has the ability to identify security flaws such as covert channels, 
as well as overt flaws in a program, which may allow illicit information flow control 
dependencies.  In addition, we provide special trusted behavior in our DM by 
representing a trusted subject.  Our implementation of a relatively small trusted subject is 
in line with the Reference Monitor Concept principle that a reference validation 
mechanism “must be small enough to be subject to analysis and tests” to ensure its 
correctness (Anderson, 1972).  
Using the Alloy Analyzer to perform static analysis of a base program, as 
represented by an Alloy language DM, provides assurance that a counterexample to a 
security rule will be found when one exists.  This is true for analysis of deterministic 
programs of a finite length, which are assured of terminating.  For such programs, a scope 
of analysis is calculated based on the number of statements in the program.  This ensures 
that all program statements, and by extension all execution states, are included in a 
generated model of the program, thus Alloy Analyzer static analysis results in neither 
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false negatives nor false positives within the defined scope of analysis.  In the case of 
false negatives, assuming a proper scope of analysis is chosen, every execution path is 
examined thus if a security violation (as defined by an Alloy assertion) exists, it will be 
reported.  In the case of false positives, a violation will only be reported when the specific 
conditions defined by a security assertion exist in some base program execution path.  
Because a reported violation can be investigated in the wake of static analysis, false 
positives would seem to be less egregious than false negatives. 
We have shown through examples that the Security DM approach is able to 
generate a unique specification for a target program representation (base program) and 
security policy (security assertions), and automatically identify counterexamples for the 
security assertions where they exist, to identify security violations in base program 
representations of target programs.  We base our conclusion in part on the small scope 
hypothesis, and while it is just that – a hypothesis – previous work (Andoni et al., 2002) 
has demonstrated its validity, and the effectiveness of systematic testing within a small 
scope (as the Alloy Analyzer performs) as compared to larger scale testing of fewer 
inputs, for refuting specification assertions.   
This dissertation research has introduced several contributions that are integral to 
the Security DM approach, reiterated below: 
1. Implementation Modeling Language (IML) 
The IML is a specialized language that supports basic information processing to 
facilitate static analysis of a representation of high-level language source code, by 
providing a formalism that captures the essence of imperative programming language 
paradigms, while ignoring non-essential (for these purposes) elements. 
2. Security Domain Model (DM) 
The security Domain Model (DM), represented as an Alloy specification, 




properties.  The DM is a unified representation of a base program representation of the 
target program, and the intended information flow security policy, including restrictions 
on both overt and covert information flow.  
3. DM-Compiler 
A specialized compiler was developed to translate a base program, written in 
IML, into an Implementation Model, and then integrated with the Invariant Model to 
form a complete DM specification to represent the original target program. 
B. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FUTURE WORK 
In the wake of this dissertation work, a number of areas for further research have 
been identified.  These areas fall generally into two broad categories: formal analysis of 
the DM and its artifacts, and expansion of the DM to facilitate more complex 
programming constructs and to allow formalization of more advanced security policies. 
1. Correctness of the DM 
Currently, we define information flow not in theoretical terms, but in terms of 
Security DM constructs.  For example, we formalize an illicit flow in terms of the access 
labels defined in a base program statement, and their relationship to labels associated 
with variables currently in existence at some execution point.  Through static analysis the 
DM discovers violating flows, but how can we be assured that this static analysis is 
correct?  An important area for future research would be to address the correctness of the 
DM with respect to a formal information flow property, such as noninterference.   
In order to demonstrate correctness of the DM, we must identify an information 
flow security property independent of the Security DM, and demonstrate that whenever 
static analysis concludes that a program is secure, it is indeed secure in the sense that it 
exhibits this property.  For example, can it be shown that programs identified by the DM 
as secure indeed satisfy the noninterference (or some other) property for deterministic 
programs?  
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2. Formal Analysis of DM Artifacts 
Currently, extractions of base programs from target programs, and iteration of 
security rules from a natural language security policy, are manual steps in our approach.  
Future work can focus on formally analyzing the semantics of the IML and DM-
Compiler to ensure that the artifacts of each (the base program and implementation 
model, respectively) are accurate abstractions of the original target implementation.   
As Sabelfeld and Myers (2003) pointed out, information flow analysis should take 
place “as close to the execution code as possible.”  Formal analysis of this process of 
extracting the base program from a target program to ensure an absolute correspondence 
between the two will help achieve the goal of being “as close…as possible” to the target 
program source code. 
3. IML Expansion 
The IML currently supports basic information processing using assignment 
statements, conditional and loop statements, read/write statements, file random access, 
and access to a system clock.  In order to focus specifically on programming constructs 
that support static analysis for information flow tracing, we essentially ignored more 
advanced constructs, such as data type, inheritance, polymorphism, etc.  To enable 
modeling of a larger domain of high-level language constructs, and target program 
examples, the IML can be extended greatly to capture these and other programming 
language constructs. 
4. Dynamic Security Policies  
Future work could expand the DM to enable dynamic security policies (Levin et 
al., 2006).  This concept would allow the DM to support, for example, a sequence of 
polices during program execution, and support the ability of a system to adapt to a 
dynamically changing security environment (NSA GIG, 2004).  This could be extended 
by adding functionality for multiple trusted subjects, each potentially operating under 
different trusted policy rules.  By defining multiple filter functions within a DM Invariant 
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Model, and modifying the IML syntax to support this, the model could represent separate 
trusted subjects, each governed by a different policy as defined by its own filter function. 
Traditional security models are aimed at ensuring a computer system is statically 
secure by showing that, given a proven secure state of the system (typically the initial 
state) and a secure transition from that state to another, the resultant state must be secure.  
By extension, if all state transitions are secure, the entire system must be secure.  Under a 
dynamic security policy, however, a transition could take place which might not be 
considered secure.  For example, consider an uncleared user in the field who requires 
immediate emergency access to a highly sensitive piece of information in order to 
accomplish his mission.  Once that sensitive object has been exposed to the uncleared 
user, an unsecure transition has taken place leaving the system in an unsecure state, thus 
the system is no longer secure.   
However, in a dynamic policy sense, perhaps the system is still perfectly secure 
despite the transition; the question is - how can this be modeled?  Beyond that, can the 
system be returned to a secure state without unjustifiably modifying the sensitivity level 
of the user or information, that is, without raising the clearance level of the user or 
declassifying the information, when neither might be appropriate?  Alternatively, could 
the policy be defined to automatically declassify the information after such an access, or 
after a specified time period?  If our example was modified to one where a malicious 
uncleared user had accessed the same piece of sensitive data, clearly this should represent 
an unsecure situation, but how does the system recognize this difference?  These are 
some of the questions that must be addressed in the definition of a dynamic security 
policy. 
5. Networked Analysis 
Padlipsky et al. (1978) introduced the concept of network covert channel analysis 
and introduced detection methods based on in-depth IP packet analysis as a way to 
differentiate covert channels from legitimate network traffic.  Approaches such as these 
could potentially be incorporated into the DM security rule assertions, as methods for 
detecting covert channels in base programs within this domain. 
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6. Model-Driven Software Development 
Future work in this research can focus on tailoring our approach toward the 
model-driven software design process.  It is understood that automation of the software 
development cycle, such that resulting software systems fully conform to the Common 
Criteria evaluation requirements, is not a trivial effort.  We have focused specifically on 
the Implementation Representation and Security Objectives stages of development 
(Common Criteria, 2003), the base program and security policy assertions respectively, 
devising an automated way to verify that the former adheres to the latter.  A framework 
to automate the actual production of these artifacts would be an ideal goal for future 
development in this work. 
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APPENDIX A – DM-COMPILER RIGAL FILE 
This appendix is provided to show the RIGAL compiler files used in defining the 
DM-Compiler.  Because of RIGAL file length limitations, the DM-Compiler is defined 
using two files: parser.rig and generate.rig.  Generally, the first file (parser.rig) parses a 
source base program (filename.b file) and generates appropriate Alloy signatures for its 
program statements.  The first file then calls the second RIGAL file (generate.rig), which 
generates the transition predicate for the source base program, defining the semantics of 
its execution. 






--  $variable_table: <* $Id: T *> 
--  $constant_list: (. (* Number *) .) 
--  $constant_ctr: Number 
--  $stmt_num: Number 
--  $while_ctr: Number 
--  $program: (. (* stmt *) .) 
--  $stmt_table: <* SNNN: atomic_stmt *> 
------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
  $Parm:= #PARM(T); 
  $input_file  := #IMPLODE( $Parm [1] '.b'); 
 
  OPEN MSG ' '; -- for error messages 
 
  $output_file := #IMPLODE( $Parm [1] '.txt'); 
  OPEN GEN $output_file; -- generated Alloy part 
 
  --call the C lexer  
  $Lex:= #CALL_PAS( 35 $input_file 'L+A-U-P-C+p-m+'); 
 
  MSG<< 'Base Model Generator v.1.0 input from'  $input_file;  
  MSG<< '   ' Total #LEN($Lex) tokens; 
  
  $stmt_num := 0; 
  $while_ctr := 0; 
  $constant_list := (. 0 .); -- 0 always included 
  
  -- do the parsing 
  $program:= #ast( $Lex); 
 
  IF $program -> 
 MSG<< 'Parsing completed'; 
 






 -- start generation 
 MSG<< 'Start generation'; 
 
 GEN<< '/********************************/'; 
 GEN<< '/** DM Implementation Model **/'; 
 GEN<< '/********************************/'; 
  
 -- generate the source code comment 
 #show_program($program); 
 
 -- generate statement signatures 
 #gen_stmt_sigs($stmt_table); 
 
 -- generate variable sigs 
 #gen_variable_sigs($variable_table); 
 
 -- generate constant sigs 
 #gen_constant_sigs($constant_list); 
 
 -- generate state transition predicate 
 #gen_state_transition($stmt_table); 
 
 -- generate run commands 
 GEN<< '--------------------------'; 
 GEN<< 'run show for' #LEN($stmt_table) + $while_ctr + 1 'but' 
#LEN($variable_table)*($constant_ctr) 'FTuple'; 
 GEN<< 'check verify_security for' #LEN($stmt_table) + $while_ctr + 
1 'but' #LEN($variable_table)*($constant_ctr) 'FTuple'; 
 GEN<< 'check verify_flow_policy for' #LEN($stmt_table) + 
$while_ctr + 1 'but' #LEN($variable_table)*($constant_ctr) 'FTuple'; 
 GEN<< 'check verify_no_dependency_flaw for' #LEN($stmt_table) + 
$while_ctr + 1 'but' #LEN($variable_table)*($constant_ctr) 'FTuple'; 
 GEN<< 'check verify_no_storage_channel for' #LEN($stmt_table) + 
$while_ctr + 1 'but' #LEN($variable_table)*($constant_ctr) 'FTuple'; 
 GEN<< 'check verify_no_timing_channel for' #LEN($stmt_table) + 
$while_ctr + 1 'but' #LEN($variable_table)*($constant_ctr) 'FTuple'; 
  
 MSG<< '   ' Total #LEN($stmt_table) statements; 
 
  ELSIF T -> MSG<< 'Errors detected...' 





 (. (* $stmt_list !.:= #stmt [';'] *) .) 




 Read_dev '(' $al ',' $Id ')' 
 /LAST #main $stmt_num +:= 1; 
  LAST #main $variable_table ++:= <. $Id: T .>; 
  RETURN <.  type:  Read_dev, 
   stmt_num: COPY(LAST #main $stmt_num), 
   destination: <. var: $Id .>, 
   subject_label: $al 
    .>/;; 
 
 Write_dev '(' $al ',' $e:= #expr5 ')' 
 97
 /LAST #main $stmt_num +:= 1; 
  RETURN <.  type: Write_dev, 
   stmt_num: COPY(LAST #main $stmt_num), 
   source: $e, 
   subject_label: $al 
    .>/;; 
 
 GetDirectFile '(' $al ',' $e:= #expr5 ',' $Id2 ')' 
 /LAST #main $stmt_num +:= 1; 
  LAST #main $variable_table ++:= <. $Id2: T .>; 
  RETURN <.  type: GetDirectFile, 
   stmt_num: COPY(LAST #main $stmt_num), 
   key:   $e, 
   destination: <. var: $Id2 .>, 
   subject_label: $al 
    .>/;; 
 
 PutDirectFile '(' $al ',' $e1:= #expr5 ',' $e2:= #expr5 ')' 
 /LAST #main $stmt_num +:= 1; 
  RETURN <.  type: PutDirectFile, 
   stmt_num: COPY(LAST #main $stmt_num), 
   key:   $e1, 
   source:  $e2, 
   subject_label: $al 
    .>/;; 
 
 '{' (* $stmt_list !.:= #stmt * ';' ) [';'] '}' 
 /RETURN <.  type:  block, 
   stmt_list: $stmt_list, 
   stmt_num:  $stmt_list[1].stmt_num 
    .>/;; 
 
 'if' /LAST #main $stmt_num +:= 1; 
       $stmt_num:= COPY(LAST #main $stmt_num)/ 
       $expr:= #expression 'then' $b1:= #stmt [';'] 
   [ 'else' $b2:= #stmt [';'] ] 
 /RETURN <.  type: if, 
   cond: $expr, 
   then_branch: $b1, 
   else_branch: $b2, 
   stmt_num: $stmt_num, 
   var_set: $expr.var_set 
     .>/;; 
 
 'while' /LAST #main $stmt_num +:= 1; 
   LAST #main $while_ctr +:= 1; 
       $stmt_num:= COPY(LAST #main $stmt_num)/ 
   $expr:= #expression 'do' $b1:= #stmt  
 /RETURN <.  type: while, 
   cond: $expr, 
   body: $b1, 
   stmt_num: $stmt_num, 
   var_set: $expr.var_set 
     .>/;; 
 
 $Id1 ':' '=' $rhp:= #expr5 
 /LAST #main $stmt_num +:= 1; 
  LAST #main $variable_table ++:= <. $Id1: T .>; 
  RETURN <.  type:  Assign, 
      destination:  <. var: $Id1 .>, 
      source:  $rhp, 
      stmt_num:  COPY(LAST #main $stmt_num) .>/;; 
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 Assign $Id 'from' $e1:= #expr5 'as' $e2:= #expr5 
 /LAST #main $stmt_num +:= 1; 
  LAST #main $variable_table ++:= <. $Id: T .>; 
  RETURN <.  type: Assign, 
   stmt_num: COPY(LAST #main $stmt_num), 
   destination: <. var: $Id .>, 
   source:   $e1, 
   source_label:  $e2 
    .>/;; 
 
 Stop  
 /LAST #main $stmt_num +:= 1; 
  RETURN <.  type: Stop, 
   stmt_num: COPY(LAST #main $stmt_num) 
    .>/;; 
 
 GetClock '(' $al ',' $Id ')' 
 /LAST #main $stmt_num +:= 1; 
  LAST #main $variable_table ++:= <. $Id: T .>; 
  RETURN <.  type:  GetClock, 
   stmt_num: COPY(LAST #main $stmt_num), 
   destination: <. var: $Id .>, 
   subject_label: $al 
    .>/;; 
 
 V'($$<>'}') (* $x!.:= S'($$<>';') *) 




-- an expression contains a set of variables 
 $a1:= #expr2 
 (* 'or'  $a2:= #expr2 
  /$a1:= <.  arg1: $a1, 
   arg2: $a2, 
   op: 'or', 
     var_set: $a1.var_set ++ $a2.var_set 
     .>/ *) 




 $a1:= #expr3 
 (* 'and'  $a2:= #expr3 
  /$a1:= <.  arg1: $a1, 
   arg2: $a2, 
   op: 'and', 
     var_set: $a1.var_set ++ $a2.var_set 
     .>/ *) 




 'not' $a1:= #expr3 
 /RETURN <.  arg: $a1, 
   op: 'not', 
     var_set: $a1.var_set 
    .>/;; 
 
 '(' $a1:= #expression ')'  





 $e:= #expr4 





 $a1:= #expr5  
  ( ( '>' '=' /$op:= '>='/ ) ! 
    ( '<' '=' /$op:= '<='/ ) ! 
    $op:= ( '>' ! '<' ! '=') ) 
 $a2:= #expr5 
 /RETURN <.  arg1: $a1, 
   arg2: $a2, 
   op:   $op, 
     var_set: $a1.var_set ++ $a2.var_set 
     .>/;; 
 
 $Id1 $op:= (Before ! LongBefore) $Id2 
 /RETURN <. arg1: <. var: $Id1 .>, 
     arg2: <. var: $Id2 .>, 
     op: $op, 
     var_set: <. $Id1: T, $Id2: T .> 





 $a1 := ('full' ! 'success') 
 /RETURN <. flag: $a1 .>/;; 
 
 $a1 := ('True' ! 'False') 
 /RETURN <. bool: $a1 .>/;; 
 
 $a1 := ('SysHigh' ! 'SysMid' ! 'SysLow') 
 /RETURN <. src_label: $a1 .>/;; 
 
 $Id  
 /LAST #main $variable_table ++:= <. $Id: T .>; 
  RETURN  <. var: $Id, 
   var_set: <. $Id: T .> .>/;; 
 
 '0' 
 /RETURN <. constant: (1-1) .>/;; 
 
 $Num 
 /IF NOT #member($Num LAST #main $constant_list) -> 
  LAST #main $constant_list !.:= $Num 
  FI; 










 /$indent:= 0; 
  GEN<< '-- The base program is below. Total of'  
  LAST #main $stmt_num statements/ 






 <. type:  block /GEN<] '{'/, 




 <. stmt_num: $stmt_num .> 
 /GEN<< @ '-- (s' $stmt_num ')  ' #CHR(9); 
  #tabs_indent(LAST #show_program $indent);  
  FAIL/;; 
 
 
 <. type: $t:= ( Read_dev ! Write_dev ! GetClock ), 
    [ destination: <. var: $Id .> ], 
    [ source:      ( <. var: $Id .> ! <. constant: $Num .>) ], 
  subject_label: $al 
 .> 
 /IF $Id -> 
  GEN<] $t '(' $al ', ' $Id ');' 
  ELSIF T -> 
  GEN<] $t '(' $al ', ' $Num ');' 
  FI/;; 
 
 
 <. type: $t:= ( GetDirectFile ! PutDirectFile ), 
    key:           ( <. var: $Id .> ! <. constant: $Num .>), 
    [ destination: <. var: $Id2 .> ], 
    [ source:      ( <. var: $Id2 .> ! <. constant: $Num2 .>) ], 
    subject_label: $al 
 .> 
 /IF $Id -> 
  GEN<] $t '(' $al ', ' $Id ',' 
  ELSIF T -> 
  GEN<] $t '(' $al ', ' $Num ',' 
  FI; 
  IF $Id2 -> 
  GEN<] $Id2 ');' 
  ELSIF T -> 
  GEN<] $Num2 ');' 
  FI/;; 
 
 
 <. type: if /GEN<] 'if'; 
       LAST #show_program $indent +:= 1/, 
    cond: #show_expr /GEN<] ' then'/, 
    then_branch: #show_stmt, 
    [ else_branch:  
  / GEN<< @ '-- ' #CHR(9) #CHR(9) ; 
    #tabs_indent(LAST #show_program $indent); 
    GEN<]'else'/  
  #show_stmt ] 
 .> 
 /LAST #show_program $indent +:= -1/;; 
 
 
 <. type: while  /GEN<] 'while'; 
    LAST #show_program $indent +:= 1/, 
    cond: #show_expr /GEN<] 'do'/, 
    body: #show_stmt 
  .> 
 101
 /LAST #show_program $indent +:= -1/;; 
 
 
 <. type: $t := Assign, 
  destination: <. var: $Id .>, 
  source: (<. var: $Id2 .> ! <. constant: $Num .>), 
  [ source_label: (<. var: $Id3 .> ! <. src_label: $sl .>)] 
 .> 
 /IF ($Id3 OR $sl) -> 
  GEN<] $t $Id 'from'; 
  IF $Id2 -> 
   GEN<] $Id2 'as' 
  ELSIF T -> 
   GEN<] $Num 'as' 
  FI; 
  IF $Id3 -> 
   GEN<] $Id3 ';' 
  ELSIF T -> 
   GEN<] $sl ';' 
  FI; 
 ELSIF T -> 
  GEN<] $Id ':='; 
   IF $Id2 -> 
    GEN<] $Id2 ';' 
   ELSIF T -> 
    GEN<] $Num ';' 
   FI; 
 FI/;; 
    
 
 <. type: Stop  .> 
 /GEN<] 'Stop;'/;; 
 
  






 <. flag: $f .>/GEN<] $f/;; 
 
 <. bool: $b .>/GEN<] $b/;; 
 
 <. src_label: $sl .>/GEN<] $sl/;; 
 
 <. var: $Id .> /GEN<] $Id; RETURN T/;; 
 
 <. constant: $Num .> /GEN<] $Num; RETURN T/;; 
 
 <. arg1: /GEN<] '('/ #show_expr, 
    op:   $op /GEN<] $op/, 
    arg2: #show_expr /GEN<] ')'/ 
 .>;; 
 
 <. op: 'not' /GEN<] 'not ('/, 
    arg: #show_expr  /GEN<] ')'/  
 .>;; 
 







 /$x:= COPY($n); 
  LOOP 
  IF $x = 0 -> BREAK FI; 
  GEN<] @ #CHR(9);  
  $x +:= -1 
  END/ 
## 
------------------------------------------------- 




 /$n:= 1; 
  FORALL $s IN $program DO 
  $n +:=1; 
  IF $n <= #LEN($program) -> 
   $next_stmt:= $program[$n].stmt_num 
  FI; 








 ( $stmt:= <. type: ( Read_dev ! Write_dev ! GetDirectFile ! 
PutDirectFile ! 
        Assign ! GetClock ) .> 
    /$stmt ++:= <. next: COPY($next) .>; 
     LAST #main $stmt_table ++:= <. #IMPLODE( S $stmt.stmt_num): 
$stmt .>/ 
   ! 
 
   $stmt:= <. type: Stop, 
       stmt_num: $stmt_num .> 
    /$stmt ++:= <. next: $stmt_num .>; 
     LAST #main $stmt_table ++:= <. #IMPLODE( S $stmt.stmt_num): 
$stmt .>/ 
   !  
 
   $stmt:= <. type: if, 
       then_branch: $then_branch, 
       [ else_branch: $else_branch ] 
   .> 
   / 
    #add_nextref_to_stmt( COPY($next) $then_branch); 
    IF $else_branch -> 
  #add_nextref_to_stmt( COPY($next) $else_branch); 
  $stmt ++:= <. next_if_false: $else_branch.stmt_num .> 
    ELSIF T -> 
  $stmt ++:= <. next_if_false: COPY($next) .> 
    FI; 
    $stmt ++:= <. next_if_true: $then_branch.stmt_num .>; 
    LAST #main $stmt_table ++:= <. #IMPLODE( S $stmt.stmt_num): 
$stmt .>/ 
 
   ! 
 
   $stmt:= <. type: while, 
       body: $body 
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    .> 
   /$stmt ++:= <. next_if_false: COPY($next), 
    next_if_true:  $body.stmt_num   .>; 
    #add_nextref_to_stmt( COPY($next) $body); 
    LAST #main $stmt_table ++:= <. #IMPLODE( S $stmt.stmt_num): 
$stmt .>/ 
 
   ! 
    $stmt:= <.  type:  block, 
   stmt_list: $list 
     .> 
    /$stmt ++:= <. next: COPY($next) .>; 
     $n:= 1; 
     FORALL $s IN $list DO 
  $n +:=1; 
  IF $n <= #LEN($list) -> 
   $next_stmt:= ($list[$n]).stmt_num 
  FI; 
  #add_nextref_to_stmt( $next_stmt $s) 
     OD; 







-- add reference to the enclosing if and while stmt 




 /FORALL $s IN $program DO 
  #add_enclosing_refs_to_stmt( NULL $s ) 







 ( $stmt:= <. type:  if, 
    stmt_num:  $stmt_num, 
    then_branch:   $then_branch, 
    [ else_branch: $else_branch ] 
      .> 
   /#add_enclosing_refs_to_stmt( (. $stmt_num 
.)!!$enclosing_cond_list  $then_branch); 
    IF $else_branch -> 
  #add_enclosing_refs_to_stmt( (. $stmt_num 
.)!!$enclosing_cond_list  $else_branch); 
    FI; 
    $stmt ++:= <. within_scope_of_cond: $enclosing_cond_list .>/  
 
   ! 
 
   $stmt:= <. type: while, 
                 body: $body, 
                 stmt_num: $while_stmt_num 
            .> 
  /$stmt ++:= <. next_if_false: COPY($next), 
                 next_if_true:  $body.stmt_num   .>; 
   #add_nextref_to_stmt( COPY($while_stmt_num) $body); 
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   LAST #main $stmt_table ++:= <. #IMPLODE( S $stmt.stmt_num): 
$stmt .>/ 
 
   ! 
 
    $stmt:= <.  type:  block, 
   stmt_list:  $list 
       .> 
    /FORALL $s IN $list DO 
  #add_enclosing_refs_to_stmt( $enclosing_cond_list  $s ) 
     OD / 
 
   ! 
 
    $stmt 







  GEN<< '-------------------------'; 
  GEN<< '/*** Statement sigs ***/'; 
  GEN<< '-------------------------';/ 
 <* $s: /GEN<< one sig $s extends Statement '{}'; 
  GEN<< '{'/ 
  #gen_stmt_sig  
  /GEN<<'}'; 





 <. type: ( (if ! while) /GEN<< #CHR(9) 'type = Condition'/ ! 
      $t          /GEN<< #CHR(9) 'type =' $t/ ), 
    [ source:  
  /GEN<< #CHR(9) 'source ='/ $source:= #atomic_expr], 
    [ destination:  
  /GEN<< #CHR(9) 'destination ='/ $destination:= #atomic_expr], 
    [ source_label:  
  /GEN<< #CHR(9) 'source_label ='/ $source_label:= #atomic_expr], 
    [ key:  
  /GEN<< #CHR(9) 'key ='/ $key:= #atomic_expr], 
    [ var_set: /GEN<< #CHR(9) 'source ='; $plus:= ' '/ 
    <* $var: T /GEN<] $plus $var; $plus:= '+'/ *> ],  
    [ subject_label: $al ] 
 .> 
 /IF NOT ($source OR $var) -> GEN<< #CHR(9) 'source = none' FI; 
  IF NOT $destination -> GEN<< #CHR(9) 'destination = none' FI; 
  IF NOT $source_label -> GEN<< #CHR(9) 'source_label = none' FI; 
  IF NOT $key -> GEN<< #CHR(9) 'key = none' FI; 
  IF $t = Read_dev OR $t = Write_dev OR $t = GetDirectFile OR $t = 
PutDirectFile  






 <. var: $Id .>/GEN<] $Id; RETURN T/;; 
 <. constant: $Num .> /GEN<] @ const $Num; RETURN T/;; 





  /GEN<< '--------------------------------'; 
  GEN<< '/*** Variables & Constants ***/'; 
  GEN<< '--------------------------------'; 
  GEN<< enum Variable { ; 
  GEN<< #CHR(9); 
  $comma:= NULL/ 
 
 <* $Id: $a /GEN<] $comma @ $Id; $comma:= ','/ *> 
  





 /$sorted:= #sort($const_list); 
  $extended:= #extend($sorted); 
  LAST #main $constant_ctr:= #LEN($extended); 
  #gen_const($extended); 





 /$i:= 1; 
  LOOP  --just Bubble Sort 
    IF $i > (#LEN($x) - 1)  -> BREAK FI; 
    $j:= 1; 
    LOOP 
      IF $j > (#LEN($x) -  $i)  -> BREAK FI; 
      IF $x[$j +1] < $x[$j] -> 
  -- swap 
  $t:= $x[$j +1]; $x[$j +1]:= $x[$j]; $x[$j]:= $t; 
      FI; 
      $j +:= 1 
    END; 
    $i +:=1 
  END; 




-- extends list $x with number_of_vars constants 
 $x 
 /$var_count:= #LEN(LAST #main $variable_table); 
  $res:= #const_interval($x[1]-$var_count-1  $var_count-1); 
  $i:=1; 
  LOOP 
    IF $i >= #LEN($x) -> BREAK FI; 
    IF ($x[$i+1] - $x[$i] - 1) > $var_count -> 
     $res !!:= #const_interval($x[$i] $var_count) 
    ELSIF  T  -> 
     $res !!:= #const_interval($x[$i] ($x[$i+1] - $x[$i] - 1)) 
    FI; 
    $i +:=1 
  END; 
  $res !!:= #const_interval($x[-1]  $var_count); 





-- returns list of $len+1  integers starting with $from  
 $from   $len 
 /$i:= $from; 
  LOOP  
    IF $i >= ($from + $len +1) -> BREAK FI; 
    $res !.:= COPY($i);  
    $i := $i + 1 
  END; 





  GEN<< enum Value { ; 
  GEN<< #CHR(9); 
  $comma:= NULL; 
  $c:=0/ 
 (. (*  $e 
  /IF $e >= 0 -> 
   GEN<] @ $comma ' const' $e 
   ELSIF  T  -> 
   GEN<] @ $comma ' const_minus_' (-$e) 
   FI; 
   $c +:=1; IF $c MOD 4 = 0 -> GEN<< #CHR(9) FI; 
   $comma:= ','/ 
     *) .) 






  GEN<< one sig LT '{'; 
  GEN<] #CHR(9) 'lt:  Value -> Value }'; 
  GEN<< '{  lt = ^('; 
  $plus:= ' '; 
  $i:=1; 
  LOOP 
    IF $i > #LEN($x) -1  -> BREAK FI; 
    GEN<< #CHR(9) $plus '('; 
    $e:= $x[$i]; 
    IF $e >= 0 -> 
   GEN<] @ ' const' $e 
    ELSIF  T  -> 
   GEN<] @ ' const_minus_' (-$e) 
    FI; 
    GEN<] #CHR(9) ' -> ';  
    $e:= $x[$i+1]; 
    IF $e >= 0 -> 
   GEN<] @ ' const' $e 
    ELSIF  T  -> 
   GEN<] @ ' const_minus_' (-$e) 
    FI; 
    GEN<] ')'; 
    $plus := '+'; $i +:=1 
  END; 






RIGAL FILE – GENERATE.RIG 
------------------------------------------------------------- 





  GEN<< '------------------------------------'; 
  GEN<< '/*** State Transition Predicate ***/'; 
  GEN<< '------------------------------------'; 
  GEN<< fact trans '{'; 
  GEN<< #CHR(9) 'all st1: State - InitialState | some st: State |'; 
  $else:= NULL; 
  / 
 <* $stmt: /GEN<< #CHR(9) $separator; 
     $separator:= ') or'; 
     GEN<<; 
     GEN<< #CHR(9) '( st.stmt =' $stmt '&&'; 
     GEN<< #CHR(9) '  st1.prev_state = st &&'/ 
     #gen_stmt_clause 
 *> 
 /GEN<< #CHR(9) ')'; 





 <. type:  $t:= Read_dev, 
    destination: <. var: $Id .>, 
    subject_label: $al, 
    next:  $next, 
   [ within_scope_of_cond: $enclosing_cond_list]  
 .> 
 /GEN<< #CHR(9)#CHR(9) '-- ' $t; 
  GEN<< #CHR(9)#CHR(9) '( st1.access_label = st.access_label ++ (' 
$Id '-> ' $al ' ) &&'; 
  GEN<< #CHR(9)#CHR(9) 'some n: Value | st1.vars = st.vars ++ (' 
  $Id '-> n) &&'; 
  GEN<< #CHR(9)#CHR(9) @ 'st1.stmt = s' $next ' &&'; 
  GEN<< #CHR(9)#CHR(9) 'st1.direct_file = st.direct_file &&'; 
  GEN<< #CHR(9)#CHR(9) 'st1.current_clock = 
TO/next[st.current_clock] &&'; 
  GEN<< #CHR(9)#CHR(9) 'st1.last_cond_checked = 
st.last_cond_checked &&'; 
  GEN<< #CHR(9)#CHR(9) 'st1.influenced_by ='; 
  GEN<<; 
  GEN<< #CHR(9)#CHR(9)#CHR(9) '-- Part A, copy all dependencies for 
vars different from' $Id; 
  GEN<< #CHR(9)#CHR(9)#CHR(9) '{v: Variable, s: State | (v -> s) in 
st.influenced_by && v!=' $Id '}'; 
 
  IF $enclosing_cond_list -> 
  GEN<<; 
  GEN<< #CHR(9)#CHR(9)#CHR(9) '-- Part B, all states from 
last_cond_checked'; 
  GEN<< #CHR(9)#CHR(9)#CHR(9) '-- within which scope this 
assignment belongs'; 
  GEN<< #CHR(9)#CHR(9)#CHR(9) '+ (' $Id '-> {x: 
st.last_cond_checked | x.stmt in'; 
  #print_enclosing_conditions($enclosing_cond_list);  
  GEN<] '} )';  
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  GEN<<; 
  GEN<< #CHR(9)#CHR(9)#CHR(9) '-- Part C, copy dependencies for 
all variables participating in'; 
  GEN<< #CHR(9)#CHR(9)#CHR(9) '-- conditions within which scope 
this assignment belongs'; 
  GEN<< #CHR(9)#CHR(9)#CHR(9) '+ (' $Id '-> State.{ x: 
st.last_cond_checked,'; 
  GEN<< #CHR(9)#CHR(9)#CHR(9)#CHR(9) 'y: 
x.influenced_by[x.stmt.source] | x.stmt in'; 
 #print_enclosing_conditions($enclosing_cond_list);  
  GEN<] #CHR(9)#CHR(9)#CHR(9) '} )'; 
  FI; 
  GEN<< #CHR(9)#CHR(9) ')'/;; 
 
 
 <.type: $t:= Write_dev, 
   source: ( <.constant: $c .> ! <. var: $Id .> ), 
   subject_label: $al, 
   next: $next 
 .> 
 /GEN<< #CHR(9)#CHR(9) '-- ' $t; 
  GEN<< #CHR(9)#CHR(9) '( st1.access_label = st.access_label &&'; 
  GEN<< #CHR(9)#CHR(9) @ 'st1.stmt = s' $next ' &&'; 
  GEN<< #CHR(9)#CHR(9) 'st1.direct_file = st.direct_file &&'; 
  GEN<< #CHR(9)#CHR(9) 'st1.current_clock = 
TO/next[st.current_clock] &&'; 
  GEN<< #CHR(9)#CHR(9) 'st1.influenced_by = st.influenced_by &&'; 
  GEN<< #CHR(9)#CHR(9) 'st1.last_cond_checked = 
st.last_cond_checked'; 
  GEN<< #CHR(9)#CHR(9) ')'/;; 
 
 
 <.type:   $t:= Assign, 
   destination:  <. var: $Id  .>, 
   source:  ( <.var: $Id2 .> ! <.constant: $c .> ), 
   [ source_label:  ( <.var: $Id3 .> ! <.src_label: $sl .> ) 
], 
   next:  $next, 
   [ within_scope_of_cond: $enclosing_cond_list]  
 .> 
 /GEN<< #CHR(9)#CHR(9) '-- '; 
  IF ($Id3 OR $sl) -> GEN<] 'Trusted'; 
  ELSIF T -> GEN<] 'Regular'; FI; 
  GEN<] $t; 
  IF ($Id3 OR $sl) -> 
   GEN<< #CHR(9)#CHR(9) '( let xx = tsFilter[ st.vars[' $Id '], 
'; 
   IF $Id2 -> 
   GEN<] @ 'st.vars[' $Id2 '], '; 
   ELSIF  T  -> 
   GEN<] @ 'const' $c ', '; 
   FI; 
   IF $Id3 -> 
   GEN<] @ 'st.vars[' $Id3 '], '; 
   ELSIF  T  -> 
   GEN<] @ 'const0, '; 
   FI; 
   GEN<< #CHR(9)#CHR(9)#CHR(9) 'st.access_label[' $Id '], '; 
   IF $Id2 -> 
   GEN<] 'st.access_label[' $Id2 '], '; 
   ELSIF  T  -> 
   GEN<] 'SysLow, '; 
   FI; 
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   IF $Id3 -> 
   GEN<] 'st.access_label[' $Id3 ']] | ('; 
   ELSIF  T  -> 
   GEN<] $sl' ] | ('; 
   FI; 
  FI; 
  IF ($Id3 OR $sl) -> 
   GEN<< #CHR(9)#CHR(9)#CHR(9) 'st1.vars = st.vars ++ (' $Id '-> 
xx.val ) &&'; 
   GEN<< #CHR(9)#CHR(9)#CHR(9) 'st1.access_label = 
st.access_label ++ (' $Id '-> xx.label )'; 
   GEN<< #CHR(9)#CHR(9)#CHR(9) ') &&'; 
  ELSIF $Id2 -> 
   GEN<< #CHR(9)#CHR(9) '( st1.vars = st.vars ++ (' $Id '-> 
st.vars[' $Id2 '] ) &&'; 
   GEN<< #CHR(9)#CHR(9) 'st1.access_label = st.access_label ++ (' 
$Id '-> st.access_label[' $Id2 '] ) &&'; 
  ELSIF T -> 
   GEN<< #CHR(9)#CHR(9) '( st1.vars = st.vars ++ (' $Id @ '-> 
const' $c ' ) &&'; 
   GEN<< #CHR(9)#CHR(9) 'st1.access_label = st.access_label ++ (' 
$Id '-> SysLow ) &&'; 
  FI; 
  GEN<< #CHR(9)#CHR(9) @ 'st1.stmt = s' $next ' &&'; 
  GEN<< #CHR(9)#CHR(9) 'st1.direct_file = st.direct_file &&'; 
  GEN<< #CHR(9)#CHR(9) 'st1.current_clock = st.current_clock &&'; 
  GEN<< #CHR(9)#CHR(9) 'st1.last_cond_checked = 
st.last_cond_checked &&'; 
  GEN<< #CHR(9)#CHR(9) 'st1.influenced_by ='; 
  GEN<<; 
  GEN<< #CHR(9)#CHR(9)#CHR(9) '-- Part A, copy all dependencies for 
vars different from' $Id; 
  GEN<< #CHR(9)#CHR(9)#CHR(9) '{v: Variable, s: State | (v -> s) in 
st.influenced_by && v!=' $Id '}'; 
  GEN<<; 
  IF $Id3 -> 
   GEN<< #CHR(9)#CHR(9)#CHR(9) '-- and inherit all dependencies 
of the source_label' $Id3;  
   GEN<< #CHR(9)#CHR(9)#CHR(9) '+ (' $Id '-> st.influenced_by[' 
$Id3 '])'; 
  ELSIF $Id2 -> 
   GEN<< #CHR(9)#CHR(9)#CHR(9) '-- and inherit all dependencies 
of the right-hand part' $Id2;  
   GEN<< #CHR(9)#CHR(9)#CHR(9) '+ (' $Id '-> st.influenced_by[' 
$Id2 '])'; 
  FI; 
  
  IF $enclosing_cond_list -> 
  GEN<<; 
  GEN<< #CHR(9)#CHR(9)#CHR(9) '-- Part B, all states from 
last_cond_checked'; 
  GEN<< #CHR(9)#CHR(9)#CHR(9) '-- within which scope this 
assignment belongs'; 
  GEN<< #CHR(9)#CHR(9)#CHR(9) '+ (' $Id '-> {x: 
st.last_cond_checked | x.stmt in'; 
  #print_enclosing_conditions($enclosing_cond_list);  
  GEN<] '} )';  
  GEN<<; 
  GEN<< #CHR(9)#CHR(9)#CHR(9) '-- Part C, copy dependencies for 
all variables participating in'; 
  GEN<< #CHR(9)#CHR(9)#CHR(9) '-- conditions within which scope 
this assignment belongs'; 
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  GEN<< #CHR(9)#CHR(9)#CHR(9) '+ (' $Id '-> State.{ x: 
st.last_cond_checked,'; 
  GEN<< #CHR(9)#CHR(9)#CHR(9)#CHR(9) 'y: 
x.influenced_by[x.stmt.source] | x.stmt in'; 
  #print_enclosing_conditions($enclosing_cond_list);  
  GEN<] ' } )'; 
  FI; 
  GEN<< #CHR(9)#CHR(9) ')'/;; 
 
 
 <. type:  $t:= ( if ! while ), 
    cond:  $expr, 
    next_if_false: $next_if_false, 
    next_if_true:  $next_if_true, 
    stmt_num:  $stmt_num 
 .> 
 /GEN<< #CHR(9)#CHR(9) '-- ' $t; 
  GEN<< #CHR(9)#CHR(9) '( st1.access_label = st.access_label &&'; 
  GEN<< #CHR(9)#CHR(9) 'st1.vars = st.vars  &&'; 
  GEN<< #CHR(9)#CHR(9) 'st1.current_clock = st.current_clock  &&'; 
  GEN<< #CHR(9)#CHR(9) 'st1.direct_file = st.direct_file  &&'; 
  GEN<< #CHR(9)#CHR(9) 'st1.influenced_by = st.influenced_by &&'; 
  GEN<< #CHR(9)#CHR(9) @ 'st1.last_cond_checked = {x: 
st.last_cond_checked | x.stmt != s' $stmt_num '} + st &&'; 
  GEN<< #CHR(9)#CHR(9) '('; 
  #gen_expr($expr); 
  GEN<< #CHR(9)#CHR(9)#CHR(9) @ ' => st1.stmt = s' $next_if_true; 
  GEN<< #CHR(9)#CHR(9)#CHR(9) @ ' else st1.stmt = s' $next_if_false 
')'; 




 <.type:   $t:= GetDirectFile, 
     key:  ( <.var: $Id .> ! <.constant: $c .> ), 
     destination: <.var: $Id2 .>, 
   subject_label: $al, 
     next: $next 
 .> 
 /GEN<< #CHR(9)#CHR(9) '-- ' $t; 
  GEN<< #CHR(9)#CHR(9) @ '( st1.stmt = s' $next ' &&'; 
  GEN<< #CHR(9)#CHR(9) '  st1.current_clock = 
TO/next[st.current_clock] &&'; 
  GEN<< #CHR(9)#CHR(9) '  st1.direct_file.keyContent = 
st.direct_file.keyContent  &&'; 
  GEN<< #CHR(9)#CHR(9) '  st1.direct_file.keyLabel = 
st.direct_file.keyLabel  &&'; 
  GEN<< #CHR(9)#CHR(9) '  st1.last_cond_checked = 
st.last_cond_checked &&'; 
  GEN<< #CHR(9)#CHR(9) '  st1.direct_file.full = 
st.direct_file.full &&'; 
 
  IF $Id -> 
    GEN<< #CHR(9)#CHR(9) '  ( (st.vars[' $Id '] in 
st.direct_file.keyContent.Value) =>' 
  ELSIF  T  -> 
    GEN<< #CHR(9)#CHR(9) @ '  ( (const' $c ' in 
st.direct_file.keyContent.Value) =>' 
  FI; 
 
  GEN<< #CHR(9)#CHR(9) '     -- the key is found'; 
  GEN<< #CHR(9)#CHR(9) '     ( st1.access_label = st.access_label 
++ (' $Id2 '-> ' $al ' ) &&'; 
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  GEN<< #CHR(9)#CHR(9) '       st1.vars = st.vars ++ '; 
  IF $Id -> 
    GEN<< #CHR(9)#CHR(9) '        (' $Id2 '-> 
st.direct_file.keyContent[st.vars[' $Id ']] ) &&'; 
  ELSIF  T  -> 
    GEN<< #CHR(9)#CHR(9) @ '        ( ' $Id2 ' -> 
st.direct_file.keyContent[const' $c '] ) &&'; 
  FI; 
 
  GEN<< #CHR(9)#CHR(9) '       st1.direct_file.success = const1 )'; 
  GEN<< #CHR(9)#CHR(9) '    else  -- the key is not found'; 
  GEN<< #CHR(9)#CHR(9) '     ( st1.vars = st.vars &&';  
  GEN<< #CHR(9)#CHR(9) '       st1.access_label = st.access_label 
&&'; 
  GEN<< #CHR(9)#CHR(9) '       st1.direct_file.success = const0 )'; 
  GEN<< #CHR(9)#CHR(9)   '  )'; 
  GEN<< #CHR(9)#CHR(9)   ')'/;; 
 
 
 <.type:   $t:= PutDirectFile, 
   key:  ( <.var: $Id  .> ! <.constant: $c  .> ), 
     source: ( <.var: $Id2 .> ! <.constant: $c2 .> ), 
   subject_label: $al, 
     next: $next 
 .> 
 /GEN<< #CHR(9)#CHR(9) '-- ' $t; 
  GEN<< #CHR(9)#CHR(9) @ '( st1.stmt = s' $next ' &&'; 
  GEN<< #CHR(9)#CHR(9) '  st1.current_clock = 
TO/next[st.current_clock] &&'; 
  GEN<< #CHR(9)#CHR(9) '  st1.last_cond_checked = 
st.last_cond_checked &&'; 
  GEN<< #CHR(9)#CHR(9) '  st1.vars = st.vars &&';  
  GEN<< #CHR(9)#CHR(9) '  st1.access_label = st.access_label &&'; 
 
  IF $Id -> 
    GEN<< #CHR(9)#CHR(9) '  ( (st.vars[' $Id '] in 
st.direct_file.keyContent.Value) =>' 
  ELSIF  T  -> 
    GEN<< #CHR(9)#CHR(9) @ '  ( (const' $c ' in 
st.direct_file.keyContent.Value) =>' 
  FI; 
 
  GEN<< #CHR(9)#CHR(9) '     -- the key is found'; 
  GEN<< #CHR(9)#CHR(9) '       (st1.direct_file.success = const1 
&&'; 
 
  GEN<< #CHR(9)#CHR(9) '        st1.direct_file.keyContent = 
st.direct_file.keyContent ++'; 
  IF $Id -> 
    GEN<<  #CHR(9)#CHR(9)#CHR(9) '        (st.vars[' $Id '] -> 
'; 
  ELSIF  T  -> 
    GEN<<  #CHR(9)#CHR(9)#CHR(9) @ '        ( const' $c ' -> '; 
  FI; 
  IF $Id2 -> 
    GEN<]  'st.vars[' $Id2 ']) &&'; 
  ELSIF  T  -> 
    GEN<]  @ const $c2 ') &&'; 
  FI; 
 
  GEN<< #CHR(9)#CHR(9) '        st1.direct_file.keyLabel = 
st.direct_file.keyLabel ++';  
  IF $Id -> 
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    GEN<<  #CHR(9)#CHR(9)#CHR(9) '        (st.vars[' $Id '] -> 
'; 
  ELSIF  T  -> 
    GEN<<  #CHR(9)#CHR(9)#CHR(9) @ '        ( const' $c ' -> '; 
  FI; 
  GEN<] $al ' ) &&'; 
  GEN<< #CHR(9)#CHR(9) '        -- since key already existed, full 
remains the same'; 
  GEN<< #CHR(9)#CHR(9) '        st1.direct_file.full = 
st.direct_file.full'; 
  GEN<< #CHR(9)#CHR(9) '       )'; 
  GEN<< #CHR(9)#CHR(9) '      else -- the key is not found'; 
  GEN<< #CHR(9)#CHR(9) '       ( st.direct_file.full = const0 =>   
-- Direct File not Full'; 
 
  GEN<< #CHR(9)#CHR(9) '        ( st1.direct_file.keyContent = 
st.direct_file.keyContent ++'; 
  IF $Id -> 
    GEN<<  #CHR(9)#CHR(9)#CHR(9) '        (st.vars[' $Id '] -> 
'; 
  ELSIF  T  -> 
    GEN<<  #CHR(9)#CHR(9)#CHR(9) @ '        ( const' $c ' -> '; 
  FI; 
  IF $Id2 -> 
    GEN<]  'st.vars[' $Id2 ']) &&'; 
  ELSIF  T  -> 
    GEN<]  @ const $c2 ') &&'; 
  FI; 
 
  GEN<< #CHR(9)#CHR(9) '          st1.direct_file.keyLabel = 
st.direct_file.keyLabel ++';  
  IF $Id -> 
    GEN<<  #CHR(9)#CHR(9)#CHR(9) '        (st.vars[' $Id '] -> 
'; 
  ELSIF  T  -> 
    GEN<<  #CHR(9)#CHR(9)#CHR(9) @ '        ( const' $c ' -> '; 
  FI; 
  GEN<] $al ' ) &&'; 
  GEN<< #CHR(9)#CHR(9) '          st1.direct_file.success = const1 
&&'; 
  GEN<< #CHR(9)#CHR(9) '          -- if content limit reached, set 
full to const1 (true)'; 
  GEN<< #CHR(9)#CHR(9) '          (#st1.direct_file.keyContent = 
st1.direct_file.max_slots => '; 
  GEN<< #CHR(9)#CHR(9) '             st1.direct_file.full = const1 
else st1.direct_file.full = const0)'; 
  GEN<< #CHR(9)#CHR(9) '         )'; 
  GEN<< #CHR(9)#CHR(9) '         else  -- Direct File is Full'; 
  GEN<< #CHR(9)#CHR(9) '          (st1.direct_file = st.direct_file 
&&'; 
  GEN<< #CHR(9)#CHR(9) '           st1.direct_file.success = const0 
&&'; 
  GEN<< #CHR(9)#CHR(9) '           -- assign full to const1 
(true)'; 
  GEN<< #CHR(9)#CHR(9) '           st1.direct_file.full = const1)'; 
  GEN<< #CHR(9)#CHR(9) '       )'; 
  GEN<< #CHR(9)#CHR(9) '   )'; 
  GEN<< #CHR(9)#CHR(9) ' )'/;; 
 
 
 <.type:  $t:= GetClock, 
   destination: <.var: $Id .>, 
   subject_label: $al, 
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   next:  $next .> 
 /GEN<< #CHR(9)#CHR(9) '-- ' $t; 
  GEN<< #CHR(9)#CHR(9) '( st1.access_label = st.access_label ++ (' 
$Id '-> ' $al ' ) &&'; 
  GEN<< #CHR(9)#CHR(9) 'st1.vars = st.vars ++ (' $Id @ '-> 
st.current_clock ) &&'; 
  GEN<< #CHR(9)#CHR(9) @ 'st1.stmt = s' $next ' &&'; 
  GEN<< #CHR(9)#CHR(9) 'st1.direct_file = st.direct_file &&'; 
  GEN<< #CHR(9)#CHR(9) 'st1.current_clock = st.current_clock &&'; 
  GEN<< #CHR(9)#CHR(9) 'st1.last_cond_checked = 
st.last_cond_checked'; 
  GEN<< #CHR(9)#CHR(9) ')'/;; 
 
 
 <. type: $t:= Stop .> 
 /GEN<< #CHR(9)#CHR(9) '-- ' $t; 
  GEN<< #CHR(9)#CHR(9) '( st1.stmt = st.stmt )'/;; 
 






 /$plus:= ' '/ 





 <. flag: $f .>/GEN<] @ 'st.direct_file.'$f' '/;; 
 
 <. bool: $b .> 
 /IF $b = True -> 
    GEN<] 'const1'; 
  ELSIF $b = False -> 
    GEN<] 'const0'; 
  FI/;; 
 
 <. var: $Id .>/GEN<] 'st.vars[' $Id ']'/;; 
 
 <. constant: $Num .> /GEN<] @ const $Num/;; 
 
 <. op:    $op:= ( or ! and ! '=' ), 
    arg1:  /GEN<] '('/ #gen_expr /GEN<] $op/, 
    arg2:  #gen_expr /GEN<] ')'/ 
 .> ;; 
 
 <. op:    '<', 
    arg1: /GEN<< #CHR(9) #CHR(9) #CHR(9) '(('/ #gen_expr, 
    arg2: /GEN<] '->'/ #gen_expr 
 .> 
 /GEN<] ') in LT.lt)'/;; 
 
 <. op:    '>', 
    arg2: /GEN<< #CHR(9) #CHR(9) #CHR(9)  '(('/ #gen_expr, 
    arg1: /GEN<] '->'/ #gen_expr 
 .> 
 /GEN<] ') in LT.lt)'/;; 
 
 <. op:    '<=', 
    arg1: /GEN<< #CHR(9) #CHR(9) #CHR(9) '(('/ #gen_expr, 
    arg2: /GEN<] '->'/ #gen_expr /GEN<] ') in LT.lt or'/, 
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    arg1:  #gen_expr, 
    arg2: /GEN<] '='/ #gen_expr /GEN<] ')'/ 
 .>;; 
 
 <. op:    '>=', 
    arg2: /GEN<< #CHR(9) #CHR(9) #CHR(9) '(('/ #gen_expr, 
    arg1: /GEN<] '->'/ #gen_expr /GEN<] ') in LT.lt or'/, 
    arg1:  #gen_expr, 
    arg2: /GEN<] '='/ #gen_expr /GEN<] ')'/ 
 .>;; 
 
 <. op:    Before, 
    arg1: /GEN<< #CHR(9) #CHR(9) #CHR(9) '(('/ #gen_expr, 
    arg2: /GEN<] '->'/ #gen_expr 
 .> 
 /GEN<] ') in Clock.before)'/;; 
 
 <. op:    LongBefore, 
    arg1: /GEN<< #CHR(9) #CHR(9) #CHR(9) '(('/ #gen_expr, 
    arg2: /GEN<] '->'/ #gen_expr 
 .> 
 /GEN<] ') in Clock.long_before)'/;; 
 
 <. op: 'not' /GEN<< #CHR(9)  #CHR(9)  #CHR(9)  'not ('/, 
    arg: #gen_expr  /GEN<] ')'/  
 .>;; 
 





APPENDIX B.1 – GENERATED DM FOR BASE PROGRAM 
EXAMPLE 1 
This appendix provides complete code for the overt control dependency flaw 
example base program and resultant DM described in Chapter VI - “Example DM 
Implementations.”  The DM below is generated by the DM-Compiler from the following 
base program: 
(s1) Read_dev (SysHigh, x1); 
(s2) if x1 = 0 then  
(s3)    x2:= 0; 
(s4) else x2:= 1; 
(s5) Write_dev (SysLow, x2); 
(s6) Stop; 
 
The Alloy specification for the DM follows: 
/********************************************************************/ 
module static_model 




/** DM Invariant Model **/  
/**************************/  
 
sig Statement { 
 type:   Stmt_type, 
 destination: lone Variable, 
 source:  set Variable + Value, 
 source_label: lone (AccessLabel + Variable), 
 key:   lone (Variable + Value), 
 subject_label: lone AccessLabel 
} 
 
enum Stmt_type { 
 Assign, Condition, 
 Read_dev, Write_dev,  
 GetDirectFile, PutDirectFile, 
 GetClock, Stop  
} 
 
-- define access labels based on security policy lattice 
enum AccessLabel { SysHigh, SysMid, SysLow } 
 
-- define a Policy signature to allow BLP-style info flows 
one sig Policy { 
 ord: AccessLabel -> AccessLabel 
} 
{ ord = ^( (SysLow -> SysMid)  
   + (SysMid -> SysHigh) ) 




sig State { 
 stmt:  Statement, -- next stmt to execute 
 vars:  Variable -> one (Value + Time), -- variable table 
 access_label:  Variable -> one AccessLabel, 
 direct_file:  DirectFile, -- current snapshot 
 current_clock:  Time, 
 prev_state:  lone State, 
 err_msg:  lone Error, 
 influenced_by:  Variable -> State, 
 last_cond_checked: set State, 
} 
{ -- define error conditions 
 ( err_msg = InfoFlow_error <=> 
  not consistent_with_FlowPolicy [this] ) && 
 ( err_msg = Overt_flaw_detected <=> 
  dependency_flaw_found[this] ) && 
 ( err_msg = Storage_channel_detected <=> 
  storage_channel_found[this] ) && 
 ( err_msg = Timing_channel_detected <=> 
  timing_channel_found[this] )   
} 
 
-- Signature for error types 








-- Initialization of State signature: all variables initially have 0 
--  value and SysLow label, and DirectFile is empty 
one sig InitialState extends State {} 
{  
 vars = (Variable -> const0)  
 access_label = (Variable -> SysLow)  
 stmt = S1  
 direct_file.full = const0 
 direct_file.success =const1 
 current_clock = TO/first[] 
 prev_state =  none 
 err_msg =  none 
 last_cond_checked = none 
 no influenced_by  
 no direct_file.keyContent 
 no direct_file.keyLabel 
} 
 
-- Sig establishes ordering of States in a program execution 
one sig State_order { 
 st_after: State -> State 
} 
{ st_after = ^ prev_state 
} 
 
-- a "Stop" State cannot precede another State 
fact { all s: State | s.prev_state.stmt.type != Stop } 
 
-- no two States can be identical 
fact { no disj st1, st2: State |  
 (st1.stmt = st2.stmt  && 
  st1.prev_state = st2.prev_state && 
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  st1.vars = st2.vars && 




sig DirectFile { 
 -- each key Value is assigned a content Value and AccessLabel 
 keyContent: Value -> lone Value, 
 keyLabel: Value -> lone AccessLabel, 
 last_written: lone AccessLabel, 
 full:   (const0 + const1), 
 success: (const0 + const1), 
 max_slots: Int 
} 




sig Time {} 
 
one sig Clock { 
 before:  Time -> Time, 
 long_before: Time -> Time 
} 
{ long_before in before && 
 all t1: Time, t2: Time - t1 | 
 ((t1->t2) in before <=> t2 in TO/nexts[t1]) && 
 ((t1->t2) in long_before <=> some t3: Time | 




-- Alloy signature used for passing results of tsFilter function  
sig FTuple { 
 val: Value, 
 label: AccessLabel 
} 
 
fact { all v: Value, a: AccessLabel | one f: FTuple |  
 f.val=v && f.label=a } 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------- 
-- Functions, Facts, Assertions and Predicates for info flow security 
--  policy and security rules 
------------------------------------------------------------------- 
-- The tsFilter function defines the semantics of the Trusted Subj 
--  Assignment statement, by enabling a TS to act as a Content  
--  or Label Filter. 
-- Different invariant models may define different filter functions, 
--  depending on the TS semantics that must be demonstrated. 
fun tsFilter[dv, s1v, s2v: Value,  
              da, s1a, s2a: AccessLabel]: FTuple { 
{ result: FTuple | { 
    result.val = (((s1v->const0) in LT.lt)  
        => const0 else s1v) 
    result.label = (((da->s2a) in Policy.ord) 
        => s2a else 
      (((s2a->SysMid) in Policy.ord) 




-- Security assertion to verify program abides by all security rules 
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--  assert verify_security { 
 all s: State |  
  consistent_with_FlowPolicy [s] &&  
  not dependency_flaw_found [s] && 
  not storage_channel_found [s] && 




-- Define how statements abide by info flow policy 
assert verify_flow_policy { 
 all s: State | consistent_with_FlowPolicy[s] } 
 
pred consistent_with_FlowPolicy [s: State] { 
 let stm = s.stmt | { 
  -- for Write_dev or PutDirectFile statement 
  (stm.type in (Write_dev + PutDirectFile) && 
   stm.source in Variable) 
  => ((s.access_label[stm.source] -> stm.subject_label) 





-- Verify no overt control dependency flaw found in current State 
 
assert verify_no_dependency_flaw { 
 all s: State | not dependency_flaw_found[s] } 
 
-- Define conditions under which a control dependency flaw could 
--  exist; checks for a Write, where source in the current state is 
--  influenced_by State with higher label in required access. 
--  Assertion uses dynamic slicing techniques. 
pred dependency_flaw_found [s: State] { 
 let stm = s.stmt, s1 = s.influenced_by[stm.source] | { 
  stm.type = Write_dev  && 
  stm.source in Variable &&  
  -- check if Write_dev source was influenced_by a var  
  --  higher than subject 
  not ((s1.access_label[s1.stmt.source] -> stm.subject_label) 





-- Verify no storage covert channels found in current State 
 
assert verify_no_storage_channel { 
 all s: State | 
  not storage_channel_found[s] } 
 
-- Define conditions under which a storage channel could exist icw 
--  a PutDirectFile 
pred storage_channel_found [s: State] { 
 let stm = s.stmt | { 
  stm.type = PutDirectFile && 
  s.direct_file.full = const1 && 
  -- check if direct file was last written by a higher subject 
  not ((s.direct_file.last_written -> stm.subject_label) 






-- Verify no timing covert channels found in current State 
 
assert verify_no_timing_channel { 
 all s: State | not timing_channel_found[s] } 
 
-- Define conditions under which a timing channel could exist 
pred timing_channel_found [gc2: State] { 
 some disj rw, gc1: State | { 
  (gc2 -> rw) in State_order.st_after && 
  (rw -> gc1) in State_order.st_after && 
  gc1.stmt.type = GetClock && 
  gc2.stmt.type = GetClock && 
  rw.stmt.type in (Read_dev + Write_dev  
   + PutDirectFile + GetDirectFile) && 
  -- check if GetClocks are at same level 
  gc1.stmt.subject_label = gc2.stmt.subject_label && 
  -- check if Read/Write/DirectFile operation at  
  --  higher level than GetClock 
  not ((rw.stmt.subject_label -> gc2.stmt.subject_label)  





-- Find a consistent instance of this model 
pred show () {} 
------------------------------------------------------------------- 
/********************************/  
/** DM Implementation Model **/  
/********************************/  
-- The base program is below. Total of 6 statements  
-- (S1)   Read_dev ( SysHigh ,  x1 );  
-- (S2)   if ( x1 = 0 )  then  
-- (S3)    x2 := 0 ;  
--    else  
-- (S4)    x2 := 1 ;  
-- (S5)   Write_dev ( SysLow ,  x2 );  
-- (S6)   Stop;  
 
-------------------------  
/*** Statement sigs ***/  
-------------------------  
one sig S1 extends Statement {}  
{  
  type = Read_dev  
  destination = x1  
  source = none  
  source_label = none  
  key = none  
  subject_label =  SysHigh  
}  
 
one sig S3 extends Statement {}  
{  
  type = Assign  
  source = const0 
  destination = x2  
  source_label = none  
  key = none  
}  
 
one sig S4 extends Statement {}  
 120
{  
  type = Assign  
  source = const1 
  destination = x2  
  source_label = none  
  key = none  
}  
 
one sig S2 extends Statement {}  
{  
  type = Condition  
  source =   x1  
  destination = none  
  source_label = none  
  key = none  
}  
 
one sig S5 extends Statement {}  
{  
  type = Write_dev  
  source = x2  
  destination = none  
  source_label = none  
  key = none  
  subject_label =  SysLow  
}  
 
one sig S6 extends Statement {}  
{  
  type = Stop  
  source = none  
  destination = none  
  source_label = none  




/*** Variables & Constants ***/  
--------------------------------  
enum Variable {  
  x1, x2 
 }  
 
enum Value {  
   const_minus_3, const_minus_2, const0, const1 
  , const2, const3 
 }  
 
one sig LT {  lt:  Value -> Value }  
{  lt = ^(  
    (  const_minus_3   ->   const_minus_2)  
  + (  const_minus_2   ->   const0)  
  + (  const0   ->   const1)  
  + (  const1   ->   const2)  
  + (  const2   ->   const3)  
) }  
 
------------------------------------  
/*** State Transition Predicate ***/  
------------------------------------  
fact trans {  
  all st1: State - InitialState | some st: State |  
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  ( st.stmt = S1 &&  
    st1.prev_state = st &&  
    --  Read_dev  
    ( st1.access_label = st.access_label ++ ( x1 ->  SysHigh  ) &&  
    some n: Value | st1.vars = st.vars ++ ( x1 -> n) &&  
    st1.stmt = S2 && 
    st1.direct_file = st.direct_file &&  
    st1.current_clock = TO/next[st.current_clock] &&  
    st1.last_cond_checked = st.last_cond_checked &&  
    st1.influenced_by =  
 
      -- Part A, copy all dependencies for vars different from x1  
      {v: Variable, s: State | (v -> s) in st.influenced_by && 
v!= x1 }  
    )  
  ) or  
 
  ( st.stmt = S3 &&  
    st1.prev_state = st &&  
    --  Regular Assign  
    ( st1.vars = st.vars ++ ( x2 -> const0 ) && 
    st1.access_label = st.access_label ++ ( x2 -> SysLow ) &&  
    st1.stmt = S5 && 
    st1.direct_file = st.direct_file &&  
    st1.current_clock = st.current_clock &&  
    st1.last_cond_checked = st.last_cond_checked &&  
    st1.influenced_by =  
 
      -- Part A, copy all dependencies for vars different from x2  
      {v: Variable, s: State | (v -> s) in st.influenced_by && 
v!= x2 }  
 
 
      -- Part B, all states from last_cond_checked  
      -- within which scope this assignment belongs  
      + ( x2 -> {x: st.last_cond_checked | x.stmt in  S2} )  
 
      -- Part C, copy dependencies for all variables 
participating in  
      -- conditions within which scope this assignment belongs  
      + ( x2 -> State.{ x: st.last_cond_checked,  
        y: x.influenced_by[x.stmt.source] | x.stmt in  S2 } )  
    )  
  ) or  
 
  ( st.stmt = S4 &&  
    st1.prev_state = st &&  
    --  Regular Assign  
    ( st1.vars = st.vars ++ ( x2 -> const1 ) && 
    st1.access_label = st.access_label ++ ( x2 -> SysLow ) &&  
    st1.stmt = S5 && 
    st1.direct_file = st.direct_file &&  
    st1.current_clock = st.current_clock &&  
    st1.last_cond_checked = st.last_cond_checked &&  
    st1.influenced_by =  
 
      -- Part A, copy all dependencies for vars different from x2  
      {v: Variable, s: State | (v -> s) in st.influenced_by && 
v!= x2 }  
 
 
      -- Part B, all states from last_cond_checked  
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      -- within which scope this assignment belongs  
      + ( x2 -> {x: st.last_cond_checked | x.stmt in  S2} )  
 
      -- Part C, copy dependencies for all variables 
participating in  
      -- conditions within which scope this assignment belongs  
      + ( x2 -> State.{ x: st.last_cond_checked,  
        y: x.influenced_by[x.stmt.source] | x.stmt in  S2 } )  
    )  
  ) or  
 
  ( st.stmt = S2 &&  
    st1.prev_state = st &&  
    --  if  
    ( st1.access_label = st.access_label &&  
    st1.vars = st.vars  &&  
    st1.current_clock = st.current_clock  &&  
    st1.direct_file = st.direct_file  &&  
    st1.influenced_by = st.influenced_by &&  
    st1.last_cond_checked = {x: st.last_cond_checked | x.stmt != 
S2} + st && 
    ( ( st.vars[ x1 ] = const0)  
       => st1.stmt = S3 
       else st1.stmt = S4) 
    )  
  ) or  
 
  ( st.stmt = S5 &&  
    st1.prev_state = st &&  
    --  Write_dev  
    ( st1.access_label = st.access_label &&  
    st1.stmt = S6 && 
    st1.direct_file = st.direct_file &&  
    st1.current_clock = TO/next[st.current_clock] &&  
    st1.influenced_by = st.influenced_by &&  
    st1.last_cond_checked = st.last_cond_checked  
    )  
  ) or  
 
  ( st.stmt = S6 &&  
    st1.prev_state = st &&  
    --  Stop  
    ( st1.stmt = st.stmt )  
  )  
}  
--------------------------  
run show for 7 but 18 FTuple  
check verify_security for 7 but 18 FTuple  
check verify_flow_policy for 7 but 18 FTuple  
check verify_no_dependency_flaw for 7 but 18 FTuple  
check verify_no_storage_channel for 7 but 18 FTuple  
check verify_no_timing_channel for 7 but 18 FTuple  
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APPENDIX B.2 – GENERATED DM FOR BASE PROGRAM 
EXAMPLE 2 
This appendix provides complete code for the timing covert channel example base 
program and resultant DM described in Chapter VI - “Example DM Implementations.”  
The DM below is generated by the DM-Compiler from the following base program: 
(s1) Read_dev (SysHigh, x1); 
(s2) GetClock (SysLow, t1); 
(s3) if x1 < 0 then 
(s4)    PutDirectFile (SysHigh, 1, x1); 
(s5) GetClock(SysLow, t2); 
(s6) if t1 Before t2 then 
(s7)    Write_dev (SysLow, 1); 
(s8) else Write_dev (SysLow, 0); 
(s9) Stop; 
 
The Alloy specification for the DM follows: 
/********************************************************************/ 
module static_model 




/** DM Invariant Model **/  
/**************************/  
 
sig Statement { 
 type:   Stmt_type, 
 destination: lone Variable, 
 source:  set Variable + Value, 
 source_label: lone (AccessLabel + Variable), 
 key:   lone (Variable + Value), 
 subject_label: lone AccessLabel 
} 
 
enum Stmt_type { 
 Assign, Condition, 
 Read_dev, Write_dev,  
 GetDirectFile, PutDirectFile, 
 GetClock, Stop  
} 
 
-- define access labels based on security policy lattice 
enum AccessLabel { SysHigh, SysMid, SysLow } 
 
-- define a Policy signature to allow BLP-style info flows 
one sig Policy { 
 ord: AccessLabel -> AccessLabel 
} 
{ ord = ^( (SysLow -> SysMid)  
   + (SysMid -> SysHigh) ) 




sig State { 
 stmt:  Statement, -- next stmt to execute 
 vars:  Variable -> one (Value + Time), -- variable table 
 access_label:  Variable -> one AccessLabel, 
 direct_file:  DirectFile, -- current snapshot 
 current_clock:  Time, 
 prev_state:  lone State, 
 err_msg:  lone Error, 
 influenced_by:  Variable -> State, 
 last_cond_checked: set State, 
} 
{ -- define error conditions 
 ( err_msg = InfoFlow_error <=> 
  not consistent_with_FlowPolicy [this] ) && 
 ( err_msg = Overt_flaw_detected <=> 
  dependency_flaw_found[this] ) && 
 ( err_msg = Storage_channel_detected <=> 
  storage_channel_found[this] ) && 
 ( err_msg = Timing_channel_detected <=> 
  timing_channel_found[this] )   
} 
 
-- Signature for error types 








-- Initialization of State signature: all variables initially have 0 
--  value and SysLow label, and DirectFile is empty 
one sig InitialState extends State {} 
{  
 vars = (Variable -> const0)  
 access_label = (Variable -> SysLow)  
 stmt = S1  
 direct_file.full = const0 
 direct_file.success =const1 
 current_clock = TO/first[] 
 prev_state =  none 
 err_msg =  none 
 last_cond_checked = none 
 no influenced_by  
 no direct_file.keyContent 
 no direct_file.keyLabel 
} 
 
-- Sig establishes ordering of States in a program execution 
one sig State_order { 
 st_after: State -> State 
} 
{ st_after = ^ prev_state 
} 
 
-- a "Stop" State cannot precede another State 
fact { all s: State | s.prev_state.stmt.type != Stop } 
 
-- no two States can be identical 
fact { no disj st1, st2: State |  
 (st1.stmt = st2.stmt  && 
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  st1.prev_state = st2.prev_state && 
  st1.vars = st2.vars && 




sig DirectFile { 
 -- each key Value is assigned a content Value and AccessLabel 
 keyContent: Value -> lone Value, 
 keyLabel: Value -> lone AccessLabel, 
 last_written: lone AccessLabel, 
 full:   (const0 + const1), 
 success: (const0 + const1), 
 max_slots: Int 
} 




sig Time {} 
 
one sig Clock { 
 before:  Time -> Time, 
 long_before: Time -> Time 
} 
{ long_before in before && 
 all t1: Time, t2: Time - t1 | 
 ((t1->t2) in before <=> t2 in TO/nexts[t1]) && 
 ((t1->t2) in long_before <=> some t3: Time | 




-- Alloy signature used for passing results of tsFilter function  
sig FTuple { 
 val: Value, 
 label: AccessLabel 
} 
 
fact { all v: Value, a: AccessLabel | one f: FTuple |  
 f.val=v && f.label=a } 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------- 
-- Functions, Facts, Assertions and Predicates for info flow security 
--  policy and security rules 
------------------------------------------------------------------- 
-- The tsFilter function defines the semantics of the Trusted Subj 
--  Assignment statement, by enabling a TS to act as a Content  
--  or Label Filter. 
-- Different invariant models may define different filter functions, 
--  depending on the TS semantics that must be demonstrated. 
fun tsFilter[dv, s1v, s2v: Value,  
              da, s1a, s2a: AccessLabel]: FTuple { 
{ result: FTuple | { 
    result.val = (((s1v->const0) in LT.lt)  
        => const0 else s1v) 
    result.label = (((da->s2a) in Policy.ord) 
        => s2a else 
      (((s2a->SysMid) in Policy.ord) 





-- Security assertion to verify program abides by all security rules 
--  assert verify_security { 
 all s: State |  
  consistent_with_FlowPolicy [s] &&  
  not dependency_flaw_found [s] && 
  not storage_channel_found [s] && 




-- Define how statements abide by info flow policy 
assert verify_flow_policy { 
 all s: State | consistent_with_FlowPolicy[s] } 
 
pred consistent_with_FlowPolicy [s: State] { 
 let stm = s.stmt | { 
  -- for Write_dev or PutDirectFile statement 
  (stm.type in (Write_dev + PutDirectFile) && 
   stm.source in Variable) 
  => ((s.access_label[stm.source] -> stm.subject_label) 





-- Verify no overt control dependency flaw found in current State 
 
assert verify_no_dependency_flaw { 
 all s: State | not dependency_flaw_found[s] } 
 
-- Define conditions under which a control dependency flaw could 
--  exist; checks for a Write, where source in the current state is 
--  influenced_by State with higher label in required access. 
--  Assertion uses dynamic slicing techniques. 
pred dependency_flaw_found [s: State] { 
 let stm = s.stmt, s1 = s.influenced_by[stm.source] | { 
  stm.type = Write_dev  && 
  stm.source in Variable &&  
  -- check if Write_dev source was influenced_by a var  
  --  higher than subject 
  not ((s1.access_label[s1.stmt.source] -> stm.subject_label) 





-- Verify no storage covert channels found in current State 
 
assert verify_no_storage_channel { 
 all s: State | 
  not storage_channel_found[s] } 
 
-- Define conditions under which a storage channel could exist icw 
--  a PutDirectFile 
pred storage_channel_found [s: State] { 
 let stm = s.stmt | { 
  stm.type = PutDirectFile && 
  s.direct_file.full = const1 && 
  -- check if direct file was last written by a higher subject 
  not ((s.direct_file.last_written -> stm.subject_label) 






-- Verify no timing covert channels found in current State 
 
assert verify_no_timing_channel { 
 all s: State | not timing_channel_found[s] } 
 
-- Define conditions under which a timing channel could exist 
pred timing_channel_found [gc2: State] { 
 some disj rw, gc1: State | { 
  (gc2 -> rw) in State_order.st_after && 
  (rw -> gc1) in State_order.st_after && 
  gc1.stmt.type = GetClock && 
  gc2.stmt.type = GetClock && 
  rw.stmt.type in (Read_dev + Write_dev  
   + PutDirectFile + GetDirectFile) && 
  -- check if GetClocks are at same level 
  gc1.stmt.subject_label = gc2.stmt.subject_label && 
  -- check if Read/Write/DirectFile operation at  
  --  higher level than GetClock 
  not ((rw.stmt.subject_label -> gc2.stmt.subject_label)  





-- Find a consistent instance of this model 
pred show () {} 
------------------------------------------------------------------- 
/********************************/  
/** DM Implementation Model **/  
/********************************/  
-- The base program is below. Total of 9 statements  
-- (S1)   Read_dev ( SysHigh ,  x1 );  
-- (S2)   GetClock ( SysLow ,  t1 );  
-- (S3)   if ( x1 < 0 )  then  
-- (S4)    PutDirectFile ( SysHigh ,  1 , x1 );  
-- (S5)   GetClock ( SysLow ,  t2 );  
-- (S6)   if ( t1 Before t2 )  then  
-- (S7)    Write_dev ( SysLow ,  1 );  
--    else  
-- (S8)    Write_dev ( SysLow ,  0 );  
-- (S9)   Stop;  
 
-------------------------  
/*** Statement sigs ***/  
-------------------------  
one sig S1 extends Statement {}  
{  
  type = Read_dev  
  destination = x1  
  source = none  
  source_label = none  
  key = none  
  subject_label =  SysHigh  
}  
 
one sig S2 extends Statement {}  
{  
  type = GetClock  
  destination = t1  
  source = none  
  source_label = none  
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  key = none  
  subject_label =  SysLow  
}  
 
one sig S4 extends Statement {}  
{  
  type = PutDirectFile  
  source = x1  
  key = const1 
  destination = none  
  source_label = none  
  subject_label =  SysHigh  
}  
 
one sig S3 extends Statement {}  
{  
  type = Condition  
  source =   x1  
  destination = none  
  source_label = none  
  key = none  
}  
 
one sig S5 extends Statement {}  
{  
  type = GetClock  
  destination = t2  
  source = none  
  source_label = none  
  key = none  
  subject_label =  SysLow  
}  
 
one sig S7 extends Statement {}  
{  
  type = Write_dev  
  source = const1 
  destination = none  
  source_label = none  
  key = none  
  subject_label =  SysLow  
}  
 
one sig S8 extends Statement {}  
{  
  type = Write_dev  
  source = const0 
  destination = none  
  source_label = none  
  key = none  
  subject_label =  SysLow  
}  
 
one sig S6 extends Statement {}  
{  
  type = Condition  
  source =   t1 + t2  
  destination = none  
  source_label = none  
  key = none  
}  
 
one sig S9 extends Statement {}  
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{  
  type = Stop  
  source = none  
  destination = none  
  source_label = none  




/*** Variables & Constants ***/  
--------------------------------  
enum Variable {  
  x1, t1, t2 
 }  
 
enum Value {  
   const_minus_4, const_minus_3, const_minus_2, const0 
  , const1, const2, const3, const4 
   
 }  
 
one sig LT {  lt:  Value -> Value }  
{  lt = ^(  
    (  const_minus_4   ->   const_minus_3)  
  + (  const_minus_3   ->   const_minus_2)  
  + (  const_minus_2   ->   const0)  
  + (  const0   ->   const1)  
  + (  const1   ->   const2)  
  + (  const2   ->   const3)  
  + (  const3   ->   const4)  
) }  
 
------------------------------------  
/*** State Transition Predicate ***/  
------------------------------------  
fact trans {  
  all st1: State - InitialState | some st: State |  
   
 
  ( st.stmt = S1 &&  
    st1.prev_state = st &&  
    --  Read_dev  
    ( st1.access_label = st.access_label ++ ( x1 ->  SysHigh  ) &&  
    some n: Value | st1.vars = st.vars ++ ( x1 -> n) &&  
    st1.stmt = S2 && 
    st1.direct_file = st.direct_file &&  
    st1.current_clock = TO/next[st.current_clock] &&  
    st1.last_cond_checked = st.last_cond_checked &&  
    st1.influenced_by =  
 
      -- Part A, copy all dependencies for vars different from x1  
      {v: Variable, s: State | (v -> s) in st.influenced_by && 
v!= x1 }  
    )  
  ) or  
 
  ( st.stmt = S2 &&  
    st1.prev_state = st &&  
    --  GetClock  
    ( st1.access_label = st.access_label ++ ( t1 ->  SysLow  ) &&  
    st1.vars = st.vars ++ ( t1 -> st.current_clock ) && 
    st1.stmt = S3 && 
    st1.direct_file = st.direct_file &&  
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    st1.current_clock = st.current_clock &&  
    st1.last_cond_checked = st.last_cond_checked  
    )  
  ) or  
 
  ( st.stmt = S4 &&  
    st1.prev_state = st &&  
    --  PutDirectFile  
    ( st1.stmt = S5 && 
      st1.current_clock = TO/next[st.current_clock] &&  
      st1.last_cond_checked = st.last_cond_checked &&  
      st1.vars = st.vars &&  
      st1.access_label = st.access_label &&  
      ( (const1 in st.direct_file.keyContent.Value) => 
         -- the key is found  
           (st1.direct_file.success = const1 &&  
            st1.direct_file.keyContent = st.direct_file.keyContent 
++  
              ( const1 -> st.vars[ x1 ]) &&  
            st1.direct_file.keyLabel = st.direct_file.keyLabel ++  
              ( const1 -> SysHigh  ) &&  
            -- since key already existed, full remains the same  
            st1.direct_file.full = st.direct_file.full  
           )  
          else -- the key is not found  
           ( st.direct_file.full = const0 =>   -- Direct File not 
Full  
            ( st1.direct_file.keyContent = 
st.direct_file.keyContent ++  
              ( const1 -> st.vars[ x1 ]) &&  
              st1.direct_file.keyLabel = st.direct_file.keyLabel 
++  
              ( const1 -> SysHigh  ) &&  
              st1.direct_file.success = const1 &&  
              -- if content limit reached, set full to const1 
(true)  
              (#st1.direct_file.keyContent = 
st1.direct_file.max_slots =>   
     
             st1.direct_file.full = const1 else st1.direct_file.full = 
const0)  
             )  
             else  -- Direct File is Full  
              (st1.direct_file = st.direct_file &&  
               st1.direct_file.success = const0 &&  
               -- assign full to const1 (true)  
               st1.direct_file.full = const1)  
           )  
       )  
     )  
  ) or  
 
  ( st.stmt = S3 &&  
    st1.prev_state = st &&  
    --  if  
    ( st1.access_label = st.access_label &&  
    st1.vars = st.vars  &&  
    st1.current_clock = st.current_clock  &&  
    st1.direct_file = st.direct_file  &&  
    st1.influenced_by = st.influenced_by &&  
    st1.last_cond_checked = {x: st.last_cond_checked | x.stmt != 
S3} + st && 
    (  
 131
      (( st.vars[ x1 ] -> const0) in LT.lt)  
       => st1.stmt = S4 
       else st1.stmt = S5) 
    )  
  ) or  
 
  ( st.stmt = S5 &&  
    st1.prev_state = st &&  
    --  GetClock  
    ( st1.access_label = st.access_label ++ ( t2 ->  SysLow  ) &&  
    st1.vars = st.vars ++ ( t2 -> st.current_clock ) && 
    st1.stmt = S6 && 
    st1.direct_file = st.direct_file &&  
    st1.current_clock = st.current_clock &&  
    st1.last_cond_checked = st.last_cond_checked  
    )  
  ) or  
 
  ( st.stmt = S7 &&  
    st1.prev_state = st &&  
    --  Write_dev  
    ( st1.access_label = st.access_label &&  
    st1.stmt = S9 && 
    st1.direct_file = st.direct_file &&  
    st1.current_clock = TO/next[st.current_clock] &&  
    st1.influenced_by = st.influenced_by &&  
    st1.last_cond_checked = st.last_cond_checked  
    )  
  ) or  
 
  ( st.stmt = S8 &&  
    st1.prev_state = st &&  
    --  Write_dev  
    ( st1.access_label = st.access_label &&  
    st1.stmt = S9 && 
    st1.direct_file = st.direct_file &&  
    st1.current_clock = TO/next[st.current_clock] &&  
    st1.influenced_by = st.influenced_by &&  
    st1.last_cond_checked = st.last_cond_checked  
    )  
  ) or  
 
  ( st.stmt = S6 &&  
    st1.prev_state = st &&  
    --  if  
    ( st1.access_label = st.access_label &&  
    st1.vars = st.vars  &&  
    st1.current_clock = st.current_clock  &&  
    st1.direct_file = st.direct_file  &&  
    st1.influenced_by = st.influenced_by &&  
    st1.last_cond_checked = {x: st.last_cond_checked | x.stmt != 
S6} + st && 
    (  
      (( st.vars[ t1 ] -> st.vars[ t2 ] ) in Clock.before)  
       => st1.stmt = S7 
       else st1.stmt = S8) 
    )  
  ) or  
 
  ( st.stmt = S9 &&  
    st1.prev_state = st &&  
    --  Stop  
    ( st1.stmt = st.stmt )  
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  )  
}  
--------------------------  
run show for 10 but 32 FTuple  
check verify_security for 10 but 32 FTuple  
check verify_flow_policy for 10 but 32 FTuple  
check verify_no_dependency_flaw for 10 but 32 FTuple  
check verify_no_storage_channel for 10 but 32 FTuple  
check verify_no_timing_channel for 10 but 32 FTuple  
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APPENDIX B.3 – GENERATED DM FOR BASE PROGRAM 
EXAMPLE 3 
This appendix provides complete code for the trusted subject information flow 
violation example base program and resultant DM described in Chapter VI - “Example 
DM Implementations.”  The DM below is generated by the DM-Compiler from the 
following base program: 
(s1) Read_dev (SysHigh, x1); 
(s2) Read_dev (SysMid, x2); 
(s3) Assign x1 from x2 as SysLow; 
(s4) Write_dev (SysLow, x1); 
(s5) Stop; 
 
The Alloy specification for the DM follows: 
/********************************************************************/ 
module static_model 




/** DM Invariant Model **/  
/**************************/  
 
sig Statement { 
 type:   Stmt_type, 
 destination: lone Variable, 
 source:  set Variable + Value, 
 source_label: lone (AccessLabel + Variable), 
 key:   lone (Variable + Value), 
 subject_label: lone AccessLabel 
} 
 
enum Stmt_type { 
 Assign, Condition, 
 Read_dev, Write_dev,  
 GetDirectFile, PutDirectFile, 
 GetClock, Stop  
} 
 
-- define access labels based on security policy lattice 
enum AccessLabel { SysHigh, SysMid, SysLow } 
 
-- define a Policy signature to allow BLP-style info flows 
one sig Policy { 
 ord: AccessLabel -> AccessLabel 
} 
{ ord = ^( (SysLow -> SysMid)  
   + (SysMid -> SysHigh) ) 
   + (iden & (AccessLabel -> AccessLabel) ) 
} 
 
sig State { 
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 stmt:  Statement, -- next stmt to execute 
 vars:  Variable -> one (Value + Time), -- variable table 
 access_label:  Variable -> one AccessLabel, 
 direct_file:  DirectFile, -- current snapshot 
 current_clock:  Time, 
 prev_state:  lone State, 
 err_msg:  lone Error, 
 influenced_by:  Variable -> State, 
 last_cond_checked: set State, 
} 
{ -- define error conditions 
 ( err_msg = InfoFlow_error <=> 
  not consistent_with_FlowPolicy [this] ) && 
 ( err_msg = Overt_flaw_detected <=> 
  dependency_flaw_found[this] ) && 
 ( err_msg = Storage_channel_detected <=> 
  storage_channel_found[this] ) && 
 ( err_msg = Timing_channel_detected <=> 
  timing_channel_found[this] )   
} 
 
-- Signature for error types 








-- Initialization of State signature: all variables initially have 0 
--  value and SysLow label, and DirectFile is empty 
one sig InitialState extends State {} 
{  
 vars = (Variable -> const0)  
 access_label = (Variable -> SysLow)  
 stmt = S1  
 direct_file.full = const0 
 direct_file.success =const1 
 current_clock = TO/first[] 
 prev_state =  none 
 err_msg =  none 
 last_cond_checked = none 
 no influenced_by  
 no direct_file.keyContent 
 no direct_file.keyLabel 
} 
 
-- Sig establishes ordering of States in a program execution 
one sig State_order { 
 st_after: State -> State 
} 
{ st_after = ^ prev_state 
} 
 
-- a "Stop" State cannot precede another State 
fact { all s: State | s.prev_state.stmt.type != Stop } 
 
-- no two States can be identical 
fact { no disj st1, st2: State |  
 (st1.stmt = st2.stmt  && 
  st1.prev_state = st2.prev_state && 
  st1.vars = st2.vars && 
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sig DirectFile { 
 -- each key Value is assigned a content Value and AccessLabel 
 keyContent: Value -> lone Value, 
 keyLabel: Value -> lone AccessLabel, 
 last_written: lone AccessLabel, 
 full:   (const0 + const1), 
 success: (const0 + const1), 
 max_slots: Int 
} 




sig Time {} 
 
one sig Clock { 
 before:  Time -> Time, 
 long_before: Time -> Time 
} 
{ long_before in before && 
 all t1: Time, t2: Time - t1 | 
 ((t1->t2) in before <=> t2 in TO/nexts[t1]) && 
 ((t1->t2) in long_before <=> some t3: Time | 




-- Alloy signature used for passing results of tsFilter function  
sig FTuple { 
 val: Value, 
 label: AccessLabel 
} 
 
fact { all v: Value, a: AccessLabel | one f: FTuple |  
 f.val=v && f.label=a } 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------- 
-- Functions, Facts, Assertions and Predicates for info flow security 
--  policy and security rules 
------------------------------------------------------------------- 
-- The tsFilter function defines the semantics of the Trusted Subj 
--  Assignment statement, by enabling a TS to act as a Content  
--  or Label Filter. 
-- Different invariant models may define different filter functions, 
--  depending on the TS semantics that must be demonstrated. 
fun tsFilter[dv, s1v, s2v: Value,  
              da, s1a, s2a: AccessLabel]: FTuple { 
{ result: FTuple | { 
    result.val = (((s1v->const0) in LT.lt)  
        => const0 else s1v) 
    result.label = (((da->s2a) in Policy.ord) 
        => s2a else 
      (((s2a->SysMid) in Policy.ord) 




-- Security assertion to verify program abides by all security rules 
--  assert verify_security { 
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 all s: State |  
  consistent_with_FlowPolicy [s] &&  
  not dependency_flaw_found [s] && 
  not storage_channel_found [s] && 




-- Define how statements abide by info flow policy 
assert verify_flow_policy { 
 all s: State | consistent_with_FlowPolicy[s] } 
 
pred consistent_with_FlowPolicy [s: State] { 
 let stm = s.stmt | { 
  -- for Write_dev or PutDirectFile statement 
  (stm.type in (Write_dev + PutDirectFile) && 
   stm.source in Variable) 
  => ((s.access_label[stm.source] -> stm.subject_label) 





-- Verify no overt control dependency flaw found in current State 
 
assert verify_no_dependency_flaw { 
 all s: State | not dependency_flaw_found[s] } 
 
-- Define conditions under which a control dependency flaw could 
--  exist; checks for a Write, where source in the current state is 
--  influenced_by State with higher label in required access. 
--  Assertion uses dynamic slicing techniques. 
pred dependency_flaw_found [s: State] { 
 let stm = s.stmt, s1 = s.influenced_by[stm.source] | { 
  stm.type = Write_dev  && 
  stm.source in Variable &&  
  -- check if Write_dev source was influenced_by a var  
  --  higher than subject 
  not ((s1.access_label[s1.stmt.source] -> stm.subject_label) 





-- Verify no storage covert channels found in current State 
 
assert verify_no_storage_channel { 
 all s: State | 
  not storage_channel_found[s] } 
 
-- Define conditions under which a storage channel could exist icw 
--  a PutDirectFile 
pred storage_channel_found [s: State] { 
 let stm = s.stmt | { 
  stm.type = PutDirectFile && 
  s.direct_file.full = const1 && 
  -- check if direct file was last written by a higher subject 
  not ((s.direct_file.last_written -> stm.subject_label) 






-- Verify no timing covert channels found in current State 
 
assert verify_no_timing_channel { 
 all s: State | not timing_channel_found[s] } 
 
-- Define conditions under which a timing channel could exist 
pred timing_channel_found [gc2: State] { 
 some disj rw, gc1: State | { 
  (gc2 -> rw) in State_order.st_after && 
  (rw -> gc1) in State_order.st_after && 
  gc1.stmt.type = GetClock && 
  gc2.stmt.type = GetClock && 
  rw.stmt.type in (Read_dev + Write_dev  
   + PutDirectFile + GetDirectFile) && 
  -- check if GetClocks are at same level 
  gc1.stmt.subject_label = gc2.stmt.subject_label && 
  -- check if Read/Write/DirectFile operation at  
  --  higher level than GetClock 
  not ((rw.stmt.subject_label -> gc2.stmt.subject_label)  





-- Find a consistent instance of this model 
pred show () {} 
------------------------------------------------------------------- 
/********************************/  
/** DM Implementation Model **/  
/********************************/  
-- The base program is below. Total of 5 statements  
-- (S1)   Read_dev ( SysHigh ,  x1 );  
-- (S2)   Read_dev ( SysMid ,  x2 );  
-- (S3)   Assign x1 from x2 as SysLow ;  
-- (S4)   Write_dev ( SysLow ,  x1 );  
-- (S5)   Stop;  
 
-------------------------  
/*** Statement sigs ***/  
-------------------------  
one sig S1 extends Statement {}  
{  
  type = Read_dev  
  destination = x1  
  source = none  
  source_label = none  
  key = none  
  subject_label =  SysHigh  
}  
 
one sig S2 extends Statement {}  
{  
  type = Read_dev  
  destination = x2  
  source = none  
  source_label = none  
  key = none  
  subject_label =  SysMid  
}  
 
one sig S3 extends Statement {}  
{  
  type = Assign  
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  source = x2  
  destination = x1  
  source_label = SysLow  
  key = none  
}  
 
one sig S4 extends Statement {}  
{  
  type = Write_dev  
  source = x1  
  destination = none  
  source_label = none  
  key = none  
  subject_label =  SysLow  
}  
 
one sig S5 extends Statement {}  
{  
  type = Stop  
  source = none  
  destination = none  
  source_label = none  




/*** Variables & Constants ***/  
--------------------------------  
enum Variable {  
  x1, x2 
 }  
 
enum Value {  
   const_minus_3, const_minus_2, const0, const1 
  , const2 
 }  
 
one sig LT {  lt:  Value -> Value }  
{  lt = ^(  
    (  const_minus_3   ->   const_minus_2)  
  + (  const_minus_2   ->   const0)  
  + (  const0   ->   const1)  
  + (  const1   ->   const2)  
) }  
 
------------------------------------  
/*** State Transition Predicate ***/  
------------------------------------  
fact trans {  
  all st1: State - InitialState | some st: State |  
   
 
  ( st.stmt = S1 &&  
    st1.prev_state = st &&  
    --  Read_dev  
    ( st1.access_label = st.access_label ++ ( x1 ->  SysHigh  ) &&  
    some n: Value | st1.vars = st.vars ++ ( x1 -> n) &&  
    st1.stmt = S2 && 
    st1.direct_file = st.direct_file &&  
    st1.current_clock = TO/next[st.current_clock] &&  
    st1.last_cond_checked = st.last_cond_checked &&  
    st1.influenced_by =  
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      -- Part A, copy all dependencies for vars different from x1  
      {v: Variable, s: State | (v -> s) in st.influenced_by && 
v!= x1 }  
    )  
  ) or  
 
  ( st.stmt = S2 &&  
    st1.prev_state = st &&  
    --  Read_dev  
    ( st1.access_label = st.access_label ++ ( x2 ->  SysMid  ) &&  
    some n: Value | st1.vars = st.vars ++ ( x2 -> n) &&  
    st1.stmt = S3 && 
    st1.direct_file = st.direct_file &&  
    st1.current_clock = TO/next[st.current_clock] &&  
    st1.last_cond_checked = st.last_cond_checked &&  
    st1.influenced_by =  
 
      -- Part A, copy all dependencies for vars different from x2  
      {v: Variable, s: State | (v -> s) in st.influenced_by && 
v!= x2 }  
    )  
  ) or  
 
  ( st.stmt = S3 &&  
    st1.prev_state = st &&  
    --  Trusted Assign  
    ( let xx = tsFilter[ st.vars[ x1 ],  st.vars[x2], const0,  
      st.access_label[ x1 ],  st.access_label[ x2 ],  SysLow  ] | 
(  
      st1.vars = st.vars ++ ( x1 -> xx.val ) &&  
      st1.access_label = st.access_label ++ ( x1 -> xx.label )  
      ) &&  
    st1.stmt = S4 && 
    st1.direct_file = st.direct_file &&  
    st1.current_clock = st.current_clock &&  
    st1.last_cond_checked = st.last_cond_checked &&  
    st1.influenced_by =  
 
      -- Part A, copy all dependencies for vars different from x1  
      {v: Variable, s: State | (v -> s) in st.influenced_by && 
v!= x1 }  
 
      -- and inherit all dependencies of the right-hand part x2  
      + ( x1 -> st.influenced_by[ x2 ])  
    )  
  ) or  
 
  ( st.stmt = S4 &&  
    st1.prev_state = st &&  
    --  Write_dev  
    ( st1.access_label = st.access_label &&  
    st1.stmt = S5 && 
    st1.direct_file = st.direct_file &&  
    st1.current_clock = TO/next[st.current_clock] &&  
    st1.influenced_by = st.influenced_by &&  
    st1.last_cond_checked = st.last_cond_checked  
    )  
  ) or  
 
  ( st.stmt = S5 &&  
    st1.prev_state = st &&  
    --  Stop  
    ( st1.stmt = st.stmt )  
 140
  )  
}  
--------------------------  
run show for 6 but 15 FTuple  
check verify_security for 6 but 15 FTuple  
check verify_flow_policy for 6 but 15 FTuple  
check verify_no_dependency_flaw for 6 but 15 FTuple  
check verify_no_storage_channel for 6 but 15 FTuple  
check verify_no_timing_channel for 6 but 15 FTuple  
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APPENDIX B.4 – GENERATED DM FOR BASE PROGRAM 
EXAMPLE 4 
This appendix provides complete code for the trusted subject information flow 
with overt dependency flaw violation example base program and resultant DM described 
in Chapter VI - “Example DM Implementations.”  The DM below is generated by the 
DM-Compiler from the following base program: 
(s1) Read_dev (SysHigh, x1); 
(s2) Read_dev (SysLow, x2); 
(s3) Read_dev (SysMid, x3); 
(s4) if x1 < 0 then { 
(s5)  Assign x1 from x2 as x3; 
(s6)  Write_dev (SysMid, x1); }  
(s7) else  Write_dev (SysMid, x1); 
(s8) Stop; 
 
The Alloy specification for the DM follows: 
/********************************************************************/ 
module static_model 




/** DM Invariant Model **/  
/**************************/  
 
sig Statement { 
 type:   Stmt_type, 
 destination: lone Variable, 
 source:  set Variable + Value, 
 source_label: lone (AccessLabel + Variable), 
 key:   lone (Variable + Value), 
 subject_label: lone AccessLabel 
} 
 
enum Stmt_type { 
 Assign, Condition, 
 Read_dev, Write_dev,  
 GetDirectFile, PutDirectFile, 
 GetClock, Stop  
} 
 
-- define access labels based on security policy lattice 
enum AccessLabel { SysHigh, SysMid, SysLow } 
 
-- define a Policy signature to allow BLP-style info flows 
one sig Policy { 
 ord: AccessLabel -> AccessLabel 
} 
{ ord = ^( (SysLow -> SysMid)  
   + (SysMid -> SysHigh) ) 




sig State { 
 stmt:  Statement, -- next stmt to execute 
 vars:  Variable -> one (Value + Time), -- variable table 
 access_label:  Variable -> one AccessLabel, 
 direct_file:  DirectFile, -- current snapshot 
 current_clock:  Time, 
 prev_state:  lone State, 
 err_msg:  lone Error, 
 influenced_by:  Variable -> State, 
 last_cond_checked: set State, 
} 
{ -- define error conditions 
 ( err_msg = InfoFlow_error <=> 
  not consistent_with_FlowPolicy [this] ) && 
 ( err_msg = Overt_flaw_detected <=> 
  dependency_flaw_found[this] ) && 
 ( err_msg = Storage_channel_detected <=> 
  storage_channel_found[this] ) && 
 ( err_msg = Timing_channel_detected <=> 
  timing_channel_found[this] )   
} 
 
-- Signature for error types 








-- Initialization of State signature: all variables initially have 0 
--  value and SysLow label, and DirectFile is empty 
one sig InitialState extends State {} 
{  
 vars = (Variable -> const0)  
 access_label = (Variable -> SysLow)  
 stmt = S1  
 direct_file.full = const0 
 direct_file.success =const1 
 current_clock = TO/first[] 
 prev_state =  none 
 err_msg =  none 
 last_cond_checked = none 
 no influenced_by  
 no direct_file.keyContent 
 no direct_file.keyLabel 
} 
 
-- Sig establishes ordering of States in a program execution 
one sig State_order { 
 st_after: State -> State 
} 
{ st_after = ^ prev_state 
} 
 
-- a "Stop" State cannot precede another State 
fact { all s: State | s.prev_state.stmt.type != Stop } 
 
-- no two States can be identical 
fact { no disj st1, st2: State |  
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 (st1.stmt = st2.stmt  && 
  st1.prev_state = st2.prev_state && 
  st1.vars = st2.vars && 




sig DirectFile { 
 -- each key Value is assigned a content Value and AccessLabel 
 keyContent: Value -> lone Value, 
 keyLabel: Value -> lone AccessLabel, 
 last_written: lone AccessLabel, 
 full:   (const0 + const1), 
 success: (const0 + const1), 
 max_slots: Int 
} 




sig Time {} 
 
one sig Clock { 
 before:  Time -> Time, 
 long_before: Time -> Time 
} 
{ long_before in before && 
 all t1: Time, t2: Time - t1 | 
 ((t1->t2) in before <=> t2 in TO/nexts[t1]) && 
 ((t1->t2) in long_before <=> some t3: Time | 




-- Alloy signature used for passing results of tsFilter function  
sig FTuple { 
 val: Value, 
 label: AccessLabel 
} 
 
fact { all v: Value, a: AccessLabel | one f: FTuple |  
 f.val=v && f.label=a } 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------- 
-- Functions, Facts, Assertions and Predicates for info flow security 
--  policy and security rules 
------------------------------------------------------------------- 
-- The tsFilter function defines the semantics of the Trusted Subj 
--  Assignment statement, by enabling a TS to act as a Content  
--  or Label Filter. 
-- Different invariant models may define different filter functions, 
--  depending on the TS semantics that must be demonstrated. 
fun tsFilter[dv, s1v, s2v: Value,  
              da, s1a, s2a: AccessLabel]: FTuple { 
{ result: FTuple | { 
    result.val = (((s1v->const0) in LT.lt)  
        => const0 else s1v) 
    result.label = (((da->s2a) in Policy.ord) 
        => s2a else 
      (((s2a->SysMid) in Policy.ord) 





-- Security assertion to verify program abides by all security rules 
--  assert verify_security { 
 all s: State |  
  consistent_with_FlowPolicy [s] &&  
  not dependency_flaw_found [s] && 
  not storage_channel_found [s] && 




-- Define how statements abide by info flow policy 
assert verify_flow_policy { 
 all s: State | consistent_with_FlowPolicy[s] } 
 
pred consistent_with_FlowPolicy [s: State] { 
 let stm = s.stmt | { 
  -- for Write_dev or PutDirectFile statement 
  (stm.type in (Write_dev + PutDirectFile) && 
   stm.source in Variable) 
  => ((s.access_label[stm.source] -> stm.subject_label) 





-- Verify no overt control dependency flaw found in current State 
 
assert verify_no_dependency_flaw { 
 all s: State | not dependency_flaw_found[s] } 
 
-- Define conditions under which a control dependency flaw could 
--  exist; checks for a Write, where source in the current state is 
--  influenced_by State with higher label in required access. 
--  Assertion uses dynamic slicing techniques. 
pred dependency_flaw_found [s: State] { 
 let stm = s.stmt, s1 = s.influenced_by[stm.source] | { 
  stm.type = Write_dev  && 
  stm.source in Variable &&  
  -- check if Write_dev source was influenced_by a var  
  --  higher than subject 
  not ((s1.access_label[s1.stmt.source] -> stm.subject_label) 





-- Verify no storage covert channels found in current State 
 
assert verify_no_storage_channel { 
 all s: State | 
  not storage_channel_found[s] } 
 
-- Define conditions under which a storage channel could exist icw 
--  a PutDirectFile 
pred storage_channel_found [s: State] { 
 let stm = s.stmt | { 
  stm.type = PutDirectFile && 
  s.direct_file.full = const1 && 
  -- check if direct file was last written by a higher subject 
  not ((s.direct_file.last_written -> stm.subject_label) 






-- Verify no timing covert channels found in current State 
 
assert verify_no_timing_channel { 
 all s: State | not timing_channel_found[s] } 
 
-- Define conditions under which a timing channel could exist 
pred timing_channel_found [gc2: State] { 
 some disj rw, gc1: State | { 
  (gc2 -> rw) in State_order.st_after && 
  (rw -> gc1) in State_order.st_after && 
  gc1.stmt.type = GetClock && 
  gc2.stmt.type = GetClock && 
  rw.stmt.type in (Read_dev + Write_dev  
   + PutDirectFile + GetDirectFile) && 
  -- check if GetClocks are at same level 
  gc1.stmt.subject_label = gc2.stmt.subject_label && 
  -- check if Read/Write/DirectFile operation at  
  --  higher level than GetClock 
  not ((rw.stmt.subject_label -> gc2.stmt.subject_label)  





-- Find a consistent instance of this model 
pred show () {} 
------------------------------------------------------------------- 
/********************************/  
/** DM Implementation Model **/  
/********************************/  
-- The base program is below. Total of 8 statements  
-- (S1)   Read_dev ( SysHigh ,  x1 );  
-- (S2)   Read_dev ( SysLow ,  x2 );  
-- (S3)   Read_dev ( SysMid ,  x3 );  
-- (S4)   if ( x1 < 0 )  then {  
-- (S5)    Assign x1 from x2 as x3 ;  
-- (S6)    Write_dev ( SysMid ,  x1 ); }  
--    else  
-- (S7)    Write_dev ( SysMid ,  x1 );  
-- (S8)   Stop;  
 
-------------------------  
/*** Statement sigs ***/  
-------------------------  
one sig S1 extends Statement {}  
{  
  type = Read_dev  
  destination = x1  
  source = none  
  source_label = none  
  key = none  
  subject_label =  SysHigh  
}  
 
one sig S2 extends Statement {}  
{  
  type = Read_dev  
  destination = x2  
  source = none  
  source_label = none  
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  key = none  
  subject_label =  SysLow  
}  
 
one sig S3 extends Statement {}  
{  
  type = Read_dev  
  destination = x3  
  source = none  
  source_label = none  
  key = none  
  subject_label =  SysMid  
}  
 
one sig S5 extends Statement {}  
{  
  type = Assign  
  source = x2  
  destination = x1  
  source_label = x3  
  key = none  
}  
 
one sig S6 extends Statement {}  
{  
  type = Write_dev  
  source = x1  
  destination = none  
  source_label = none  
  key = none  
  subject_label =  SysMid  
}  
 
one sig S7 extends Statement {}  
{  
  type = Write_dev  
  source = x1  
  destination = none  
  source_label = none  
  key = none  
  subject_label =  SysMid  
}  
 
one sig S4 extends Statement {}  
{  
  type = Condition  
  source =   x1  
  destination = none  
  source_label = none  
  key = none  
}  
 
one sig S8 extends Statement {}  
{  
  type = Stop  
  source = none  
  destination = none  
  source_label = none  




/*** Variables & Constants ***/  
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--------------------------------  
enum Variable {  
  x1, x2, x3 
 }  
 
enum Value {  
   const_minus_4, const_minus_3, const_minus_2, const0 
  , const1, const2, const3 
 }  
 
one sig LT {  lt:  Value -> Value }  
{  lt = ^(  
    (  const_minus_4   ->   const_minus_3)  
  + (  const_minus_3   ->   const_minus_2)  
  + (  const_minus_2   ->   const0)  
  + (  const0   ->   const1)  
  + (  const1   ->   const2)  
  + (  const2   ->   const3)  
) }  
 
------------------------------------  
/*** State Transition Predicate ***/  
------------------------------------  
fact trans {  
  all st1: State - InitialState | some st: State |  
   
 
  ( st.stmt = S1 &&  
    st1.prev_state = st &&  
    --  Read_dev  
    ( st1.access_label = st.access_label ++ ( x1 ->  SysHigh  ) &&  
    some n: Value | st1.vars = st.vars ++ ( x1 -> n) &&  
    st1.stmt = S2 && 
    st1.direct_file = st.direct_file &&  
    st1.current_clock = TO/next[st.current_clock] &&  
    st1.last_cond_checked = st.last_cond_checked &&  
    st1.influenced_by =  
 
      -- Part A, copy all dependencies for vars different from x1  
      {v: Variable, s: State | (v -> s) in st.influenced_by && 
v!= x1 }  
    )  
  ) or  
 
  ( st.stmt = S2 &&  
    st1.prev_state = st &&  
    --  Read_dev  
    ( st1.access_label = st.access_label ++ ( x2 ->  SysLow  ) &&  
    some n: Value | st1.vars = st.vars ++ ( x2 -> n) &&  
    st1.stmt = S3 && 
    st1.direct_file = st.direct_file &&  
    st1.current_clock = TO/next[st.current_clock] &&  
    st1.last_cond_checked = st.last_cond_checked &&  
    st1.influenced_by =  
 
      -- Part A, copy all dependencies for vars different from x2  
      {v: Variable, s: State | (v -> s) in st.influenced_by && 
v!= x2 }  
    )  
  ) or  
 
  ( st.stmt = S3 &&  
    st1.prev_state = st &&  
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    --  Read_dev  
    ( st1.access_label = st.access_label ++ ( x3 ->  SysMid  ) &&  
    some n: Value | st1.vars = st.vars ++ ( x3 -> n) &&  
    st1.stmt = S4 && 
    st1.direct_file = st.direct_file &&  
    st1.current_clock = TO/next[st.current_clock] &&  
    st1.last_cond_checked = st.last_cond_checked &&  
    st1.influenced_by =  
 
      -- Part A, copy all dependencies for vars different from x3  
      {v: Variable, s: State | (v -> s) in st.influenced_by && 
v!= x3 }  
    )  
  ) or  
 
  ( st.stmt = S5 &&  
    st1.prev_state = st &&  
    --  Trusted Assign  
    ( let xx = tsFilter[ st.vars[ x1 ],  st.vars[x2], st.vars[x3],  
      st.access_label[ x1 ],  st.access_label[ x2 ],  
st.access_label[ x3 ]] | ( 
  
      st1.vars = st.vars ++ ( x1 -> xx.val ) &&  
      st1.access_label = st.access_label ++ ( x1 -> xx.label )  
      ) &&  
    st1.stmt = S6 && 
    st1.direct_file = st.direct_file &&  
    st1.current_clock = st.current_clock &&  
    st1.last_cond_checked = st.last_cond_checked &&  
    st1.influenced_by =  
 
      -- Part A, copy all dependencies for vars different from x1  
      {v: Variable, s: State | (v -> s) in st.influenced_by && 
v!= x1 }  
 
      -- and inherit all dependencies of the source_label x3  
      + ( x1 -> st.influenced_by[ x3 ])  
 
      -- Part B, all states from last_cond_checked  
      -- within which scope this assignment belongs  
      + ( x1 -> {x: st.last_cond_checked | x.stmt in  S4} )  
 
      -- Part C, copy dependencies for all variables 
participating in  
      -- conditions within which scope this assignment belongs  
      + ( x1 -> State.{ x: st.last_cond_checked,  
        y: x.influenced_by[x.stmt.source] | x.stmt in  S4 } )  
    )  
  ) or  
 
  ( st.stmt = S6 &&  
    st1.prev_state = st &&  
    --  Write_dev  
    ( st1.access_label = st.access_label &&  
    st1.stmt = S8 && 
    st1.direct_file = st.direct_file &&  
    st1.current_clock = TO/next[st.current_clock] &&  
    st1.influenced_by = st.influenced_by &&  
    st1.last_cond_checked = st.last_cond_checked  
    )  
  ) or  
 
  ( st.stmt = S7 &&  
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    st1.prev_state = st &&  
    --  Write_dev  
    ( st1.access_label = st.access_label &&  
    st1.stmt = S8 && 
    st1.direct_file = st.direct_file &&  
    st1.current_clock = TO/next[st.current_clock] &&  
    st1.influenced_by = st.influenced_by &&  
    st1.last_cond_checked = st.last_cond_checked  
    )  
  ) or  
 
  ( st.stmt = S4 &&  
    st1.prev_state = st &&  
    --  if  
    ( st1.access_label = st.access_label &&  
    st1.vars = st.vars  &&  
    st1.current_clock = st.current_clock  &&  
    st1.direct_file = st.direct_file  &&  
    st1.influenced_by = st.influenced_by &&  
    st1.last_cond_checked = {x: st.last_cond_checked | x.stmt != 
S4} + st && 
    (  
      (( st.vars[ x1 ] -> const0) in LT.lt)  
       => st1.stmt = S5 
       else st1.stmt = S7) 
    )  
  ) or  
 
  ( st.stmt = S8 &&  
    st1.prev_state = st &&  
    --  Stop  
    ( st1.stmt = st.stmt )  
  )  
}  
--------------------------  
run show for 9 but 28 FTuple  
check verify_security for 9 but 28 FTuple  
check verify_flow_policy for 9 but 28 FTuple  
check verify_no_dependency_flaw for 9 but 28 FTuple  
check verify_no_storage_channel for 9 but 28 FTuple  
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APPENDIX B.5 – GENERATED DM FOR BASE PROGRAM 
EXAMPLE 5 
This appendix provides complete code for the trusted subject storage covert 
channel violation example base program and resultant DM described in Chapter VI - 
“Example DM Implementations.”  The DM below is generated by the DM-Compiler 
from the following base program: 
(s1) Read_dev (SysLow, x1);  
(s2) Read_dev (SysLow, x2); 
(s3) Assign x1 from x2 as SysHigh;  
(s4) if x1 > const_minus_1 then { 
(s5)    PutDirectFile (SysHigh, 1, x1); 
(s6)    PutDirectFile (SysHigh, 2, x2); } 
(s7) PutDirectFile (SysLow, 3, 1);  
(s8) if (full = True) then 
(s9)    Write_dev (SysLow, 1); 
(s10) else Write_dev (SysLow, 0); 
(s11) Stop; 
 
The Alloy specification for the DM follows: 
/********************************************************************/ 
module static_model 




/** DM Invariant Model **/  
/**************************/  
 
sig Statement { 
 type:   Stmt_type, 
 destination: lone Variable, 
 source:  set Variable + Value, 
 source_label: lone (AccessLabel + Variable), 
 key:   lone (Variable + Value), 
 subject_label: lone AccessLabel 
} 
 
enum Stmt_type { 
 Assign, Condition, 
 Read_dev, Write_dev,  
 GetDirectFile, PutDirectFile, 
 GetClock, Stop  
} 
 
-- define access labels based on security policy lattice 
enum AccessLabel { SysHigh, SysMid, SysLow } 
 
-- define a Policy signature to allow BLP-style info flows 
one sig Policy { 
 ord: AccessLabel -> AccessLabel 
} 
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{ ord = ^( (SysLow -> SysMid)  
   + (SysMid -> SysHigh) ) 
   + (iden & (AccessLabel -> AccessLabel) ) 
} 
 
sig State { 
 stmt:  Statement, -- next stmt to execute 
 vars:  Variable -> one (Value + Time), -- variable table 
 access_label:  Variable -> one AccessLabel, 
 direct_file:  DirectFile, -- current snapshot 
 current_clock:  Time, 
 prev_state:  lone State, 
 err_msg:  lone Error, 
 influenced_by:  Variable -> State, 
 last_cond_checked: set State, 
} 
{ -- define error conditions 
 ( err_msg = InfoFlow_error <=> 
  not consistent_with_FlowPolicy [this] ) && 
 ( err_msg = Overt_flaw_detected <=> 
  dependency_flaw_found[this] ) && 
 ( err_msg = Storage_channel_detected <=> 
  storage_channel_found[this] ) && 
 ( err_msg = Timing_channel_detected <=> 
  timing_channel_found[this] )   
} 
 
-- Signature for error types 








-- Initialization of State signature: all variables initially have 0 
--  value and SysLow label, and DirectFile is empty 
one sig InitialState extends State {} 
{  
 vars = (Variable -> const0)  
 access_label = (Variable -> SysLow)  
 stmt = S1  
 direct_file.full = const0 
 direct_file.success =const1 
 current_clock = TO/first[] 
 prev_state =  none 
 err_msg =  none 
 last_cond_checked = none 
 no influenced_by  
 no direct_file.keyContent 
 no direct_file.keyLabel 
} 
 
-- Sig establishes ordering of States in a program execution 
one sig State_order { 
 st_after: State -> State 
} 
{ st_after = ^ prev_state 
} 
 
-- a "Stop" State cannot precede another State 
fact { all s: State | s.prev_state.stmt.type != Stop } 
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-- no two States can be identical 
fact { no disj st1, st2: State |  
 (st1.stmt = st2.stmt  && 
  st1.prev_state = st2.prev_state && 
  st1.vars = st2.vars && 




sig DirectFile { 
 -- each key Value is assigned a content Value and AccessLabel 
 keyContent: Value -> lone Value, 
 keyLabel: Value -> lone AccessLabel, 
 last_written: lone AccessLabel, 
 full:   (const0 + const1), 
 success: (const0 + const1), 
 max_slots: Int 
} 




sig Time {} 
 
one sig Clock { 
 before:  Time -> Time, 
 long_before: Time -> Time 
} 
{ long_before in before && 
 all t1: Time, t2: Time - t1 | 
 ((t1->t2) in before <=> t2 in TO/nexts[t1]) && 
 ((t1->t2) in long_before <=> some t3: Time | 




-- Alloy signature used for passing results of tsFilter function  
sig FTuple { 
 val: Value, 
 label: AccessLabel 
} 
 
fact { all v: Value, a: AccessLabel | one f: FTuple |  
 f.val=v && f.label=a } 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------- 
-- Functions, Facts, Assertions and Predicates for info flow security 
--  policy and security rules 
------------------------------------------------------------------- 
-- The tsFilter function defines the semantics of the Trusted Subj 
--  Assignment statement, by enabling a TS to act as a Content  
--  or Label Filter. 
-- Different invariant models may define different filter functions, 
--  depending on the TS semantics that must be demonstrated. 
fun tsFilter[dv, s1v, s2v: Value,  
              da, s1a, s2a: AccessLabel]: FTuple { 
{ result: FTuple | { 
    result.val = (((s1v->const0) in LT.lt)  
        => const0 else s1v) 
    result.label = (((da->s2a) in Policy.ord) 
        => s2a else 
      (((s2a->SysMid) in Policy.ord) 
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-- Security assertion to verify program abides by all security rules 
--  assert verify_security { 
 all s: State |  
  consistent_with_FlowPolicy [s] &&  
  not dependency_flaw_found [s] && 
  not storage_channel_found [s] && 




-- Define how statements abide by info flow policy 
assert verify_flow_policy { 
 all s: State | consistent_with_FlowPolicy[s] } 
 
pred consistent_with_FlowPolicy [s: State] { 
 let stm = s.stmt | { 
  -- for Write_dev or PutDirectFile statement 
  (stm.type in (Write_dev + PutDirectFile) && 
   stm.source in Variable) 
  => ((s.access_label[stm.source] -> stm.subject_label) 





-- Verify no overt control dependency flaw found in current State 
 
assert verify_no_dependency_flaw { 
 all s: State | not dependency_flaw_found[s] } 
 
-- Define conditions under which a control dependency flaw could 
--  exist; checks for a Write, where source in the current state is 
--  influenced_by State with higher label in required access. 
--  Assertion uses dynamic slicing techniques. 
pred dependency_flaw_found [s: State] { 
 let stm = s.stmt, s1 = s.influenced_by[stm.source] | { 
  stm.type = Write_dev  && 
  stm.source in Variable &&  
  -- check if Write_dev source was influenced_by a var  
  --  higher than subject 
  not ((s1.access_label[s1.stmt.source] -> stm.subject_label) 





-- Verify no storage covert channels found in current State 
 
assert verify_no_storage_channel { 
 all s: State | 
  not storage_channel_found[s] } 
 
-- Define conditions under which a storage channel could exist icw 
--  a PutDirectFile 
pred storage_channel_found [s: State] { 
 let stm = s.stmt | { 
  stm.type = PutDirectFile && 
  s.direct_file.full = const1 && 
  -- check if direct file was last written by a higher subject 
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  not ((s.direct_file.last_written -> stm.subject_label) 





-- Verify no timing covert channels found in current State 
 
assert verify_no_timing_channel { 
 all s: State | not timing_channel_found[s] } 
 
-- Define conditions under which a timing channel could exist 
pred timing_channel_found [gc2: State] { 
 some disj rw, gc1: State | { 
  (gc2 -> rw) in State_order.st_after && 
  (rw -> gc1) in State_order.st_after && 
  gc1.stmt.type = GetClock && 
  gc2.stmt.type = GetClock && 
  rw.stmt.type in (Read_dev + Write_dev  
   + PutDirectFile + GetDirectFile) && 
  -- check if GetClocks are at same level 
  gc1.stmt.subject_label = gc2.stmt.subject_label && 
  -- check if Read/Write/DirectFile operation at  
  --  higher level than GetClock 
  not ((rw.stmt.subject_label -> gc2.stmt.subject_label)  





-- Find a consistent instance of this model 
pred show () {} 
------------------------------------------------------------------- 
/********************************/  
/** DM Implementation Model **/  
/********************************/  
-- The base program is below. Total of 11 statements  
-- (S1)   Read_dev ( SysLow ,  x1 );  
-- (S2)   Read_dev ( SysLow ,  x2 );  
-- (S3)   Assign x1 from x2 as SysHigh ;  
-- (S4)   if ( x1 > const_minus_1 )  then {  
-- (S5)    PutDirectFile ( SysHigh ,  1 , x1 );  
-- (S6)    PutDirectFile ( SysHigh ,  2 , x2 ); }  
-- (S7)   PutDirectFile ( SysLow ,  3 , 1 );  
-- (S8)   if ( full = True )  then  
-- (S9)    Write_dev ( SysLow ,  1 );  
--    else  
-- (S10)   Write_dev ( SysLow ,  0 );  
-- (S11)   Stop;  
 
-------------------------  
/*** Statement sigs ***/  
-------------------------  
one sig S1 extends Statement {}  
{  
  type = Read_dev  
  destination = x1  
  source = none  
  source_label = none  
  key = none  




one sig S2 extends Statement {}  
{  
  type = Read_dev  
  destination = x2  
  source = none  
  source_label = none  
  key = none  
  subject_label =  SysLow  
}  
 
one sig S3 extends Statement {}  
{  
  type = Assign  
  source = x2  
  destination = x1  
  source_label = SysHigh  
  key = none  
}  
 
one sig S5 extends Statement {}  
{  
  type = PutDirectFile  
  source = x1  
  key = const1 
  destination = none  
  source_label = none  
  subject_label =  SysHigh  
}  
 
one sig S6 extends Statement {}  
{  
  type = PutDirectFile  
  source = x2  
  key = const2 
  destination = none  
  source_label = none  
  subject_label =  SysHigh  
}  
 
one sig S4 extends Statement {}  
{  
  type = Condition  
  source =   x1 + const_minus_1  
  destination = none  
  source_label = none  
  key = none  
}  
 
one sig S7 extends Statement {}  
{  
  type = PutDirectFile  
  source = const1 
  key = const3 
  destination = none  
  source_label = none  
  subject_label =  SysLow  
}  
 
one sig S9 extends Statement {}  
{  
  type = Write_dev  
  source = const1 
  destination = none  
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  source_label = none  
  key = none  
  subject_label =  SysLow  
}  
 
one sig S10 extends Statement {}  
{  
  type = Write_dev  
  source = const0 
  destination = none  
  source_label = none  
  key = none  
  subject_label =  SysLow  
}  
 
one sig S8 extends Statement {}  
{  
  type = Condition  
  source = none  
  destination = none  
  source_label = none  
  key = none  
}  
 
one sig S11 extends Statement {}  
{  
  type = Stop  
  source = none  
  destination = none  
  source_label = none  




/*** Variables & Constants ***/  
--------------------------------  
enum Variable {  
  x1, x2, const_minus_1 
 }  
 
enum Value {  
   const_minus_4, const_minus_3, const_minus_2, const0 
  , const1, const2, const3, const4 
  , const5, const6 
 }  
 
one sig LT {  lt:  Value -> Value }  
{  lt = ^(  
    (  const_minus_4   ->   const_minus_3)  
  + (  const_minus_3   ->   const_minus_2)  
  + (  const_minus_2   ->   const0)  
  + (  const0   ->   const1)  
  + (  const1   ->   const2)  
  + (  const2   ->   const3)  
  + (  const3   ->   const4)  
  + (  const4   ->   const5)  
  + (  const5   ->   const6)  
) }  
 
------------------------------------  
/*** State Transition Predicate ***/  
------------------------------------  
fact trans {  
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  all st1: State - InitialState | some st: State |  
   
 
  ( st.stmt = S1 &&  
    st1.prev_state = st &&  
    --  Read_dev  
    ( st1.access_label = st.access_label ++ ( x1 ->  SysLow  ) &&  
    some n: Value | st1.vars = st.vars ++ ( x1 -> n) &&  
    st1.stmt = S2 && 
    st1.direct_file = st.direct_file &&  
    st1.current_clock = TO/next[st.current_clock] &&  
    st1.last_cond_checked = st.last_cond_checked &&  
    st1.influenced_by =  
 
      -- Part A, copy all dependencies for vars different from x1  
      {v: Variable, s: State | (v -> s) in st.influenced_by && 
v!= x1 }  
    )  
  ) or  
 
  ( st.stmt = S2 &&  
    st1.prev_state = st &&  
    --  Read_dev  
    ( st1.access_label = st.access_label ++ ( x2 ->  SysLow  ) &&  
    some n: Value | st1.vars = st.vars ++ ( x2 -> n) &&  
    st1.stmt = S3 && 
    st1.direct_file = st.direct_file &&  
    st1.current_clock = TO/next[st.current_clock] &&  
    st1.last_cond_checked = st.last_cond_checked &&  
    st1.influenced_by =  
 
      -- Part A, copy all dependencies for vars different from x2  
      {v: Variable, s: State | (v -> s) in st.influenced_by && 
v!= x2 }  
    )  
  ) or  
 
  ( st.stmt = S3 &&  
    st1.prev_state = st &&  
    --  Trusted Assign  
    ( let xx = tsFilter[ st.vars[ x1 ],  st.vars[x2], const0,  
      st.access_label[ x1 ],  st.access_label[ x2 ],  SysHigh  ] | (  
      st1.vars = st.vars ++ ( x1 -> xx.val ) &&  
      st1.access_label = st.access_label ++ ( x1 -> xx.label )  
      ) &&  
    st1.stmt = S4 && 
    st1.direct_file = st.direct_file &&  
    st1.current_clock = st.current_clock &&  
    st1.last_cond_checked = st.last_cond_checked &&  
    st1.influenced_by =  
 
      -- Part A, copy all dependencies for vars different from x1  
      {v: Variable, s: State | (v -> s) in st.influenced_by && 
v!= x1 }  
 
      -- and inherit all dependencies of the right-hand part x2  
      + ( x1 -> st.influenced_by[ x2 ])  
    )  
  ) or  
 
  ( st.stmt = S5 &&  
    st1.prev_state = st &&  
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    --  PutDirectFile  
    ( st1.stmt = S6 && 
      st1.current_clock = TO/next[st.current_clock] &&  
      st1.last_cond_checked = st.last_cond_checked &&  
      st1.vars = st.vars &&  
      st1.access_label = st.access_label &&  
      ( (const1 in st.direct_file.keyContent.Value) => 
         -- the key is found  
           (st1.direct_file.success = const1 &&  
            st1.direct_file.keyContent = st.direct_file.keyContent 
++  
              ( const1 -> st.vars[ x1 ]) &&  
            st1.direct_file.keyLabel = st.direct_file.keyLabel ++  
              ( const1 -> SysHigh  ) &&  
            -- since key already existed, full remains the same  
            st1.direct_file.full = st.direct_file.full  
           )  
          else -- the key is not found  
           ( st.direct_file.full = const0 =>   -- Direct File not 
Full  
            ( st1.direct_file.keyContent = 
st.direct_file.keyContent ++  
              ( const1 -> st.vars[ x1 ]) &&  
              st1.direct_file.keyLabel = st.direct_file.keyLabel 
++  
              ( const1 -> SysHigh  ) &&  
              st1.direct_file.success = const1 &&  
              -- if content limit reached, set full to const1 
(true)  
              (#st1.direct_file.keyContent = 
st1.direct_file.max_slots =>   
     
             st1.direct_file.full = const1 else st1.direct_file.full = 
const0)  
             )  
             else  -- Direct File is Full  
              (st1.direct_file = st.direct_file &&  
               st1.direct_file.success = const0 &&  
               -- assign full to const1 (true)  
               st1.direct_file.full = const1)  
           )  
       )  
     )  
  ) or  
 
  ( st.stmt = S6 &&  
    st1.prev_state = st &&  
    --  PutDirectFile  
    ( st1.stmt = S7 && 
      st1.current_clock = TO/next[st.current_clock] &&  
      st1.last_cond_checked = st.last_cond_checked &&  
      st1.vars = st.vars &&  
      st1.access_label = st.access_label &&  
      ( (const2 in st.direct_file.keyContent.Value) => 
         -- the key is found  
           (st1.direct_file.success = const1 &&  
            st1.direct_file.keyContent = st.direct_file.keyContent 
++  
              ( const2 -> st.vars[ x2 ]) &&  
            st1.direct_file.keyLabel = st.direct_file.keyLabel ++  
              ( const2 -> SysHigh  ) &&  
            -- since key already existed, full remains the same  
            st1.direct_file.full = st.direct_file.full  
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           )  
          else -- the key is not found  
           ( st.direct_file.full = const0 =>   -- Direct File not 
Full  
            ( st1.direct_file.keyContent = 
st.direct_file.keyContent ++  
              ( const2 -> st.vars[ x2 ]) &&  
              st1.direct_file.keyLabel = st.direct_file.keyLabel 
++  
              ( const2 -> SysHigh  ) &&  
              st1.direct_file.success = const1 &&  
              -- if content limit reached, set full to const1 
(true)  
              (#st1.direct_file.keyContent = 
st1.direct_file.max_slots =>   
     
             st1.direct_file.full = const1 else st1.direct_file.full = 
const0)  
             )  
             else  -- Direct File is Full  
              (st1.direct_file = st.direct_file &&  
               st1.direct_file.success = const0 &&  
               -- assign full to const1 (true)  
               st1.direct_file.full = const1)  
           )  
       )  
     )  
  ) or  
 
  ( st.stmt = S4 &&  
    st1.prev_state = st &&  
    --  if  
    ( st1.access_label = st.access_label &&  
    st1.vars = st.vars  &&  
    st1.current_clock = st.current_clock  &&  
    st1.direct_file = st.direct_file  &&  
    st1.influenced_by = st.influenced_by &&  
    st1.last_cond_checked = {x: st.last_cond_checked | x.stmt != 
S4} + st && 
    (  
      (( st.vars[ const_minus_1 ] -> st.vars[ x1 ] ) in LT.lt)  
       => st1.stmt = S5 
       else st1.stmt = S7) 
    )  
  ) or  
 
  ( st.stmt = S7 &&  
    st1.prev_state = st &&  
    --  PutDirectFile  
    ( st1.stmt = S8 && 
      st1.current_clock = TO/next[st.current_clock] &&  
      st1.last_cond_checked = st.last_cond_checked &&  
      st1.vars = st.vars &&  
      st1.access_label = st.access_label &&  
      ( (const3 in st.direct_file.keyContent.Value) => 
         -- the key is found  
           (st1.direct_file.success = const1 &&  
            st1.direct_file.keyContent = st.direct_file.keyContent 
++  
              ( const3 -> const1) && 
            st1.direct_file.keyLabel = st.direct_file.keyLabel ++  
              ( const3 -> SysLow  ) &&  
            -- since key already existed, full remains the same  
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            st1.direct_file.full = st.direct_file.full  
           )  
          else -- the key is not found  
           ( st.direct_file.full = const0 =>   -- Direct File not 
Full  
            ( st1.direct_file.keyContent = 
st.direct_file.keyContent ++  
              ( const3 -> const1) && 
              st1.direct_file.keyLabel = st.direct_file.keyLabel 
++  
              ( const3 -> SysLow  ) &&  
              st1.direct_file.success = const1 &&  
              -- if content limit reached, set full to const1 
(true)  
              (#st1.direct_file.keyContent = 
st1.direct_file.max_slots =>   
     
             st1.direct_file.full = const1 else st1.direct_file.full = 
const0)  
             )  
             else  -- Direct File is Full  
              (st1.direct_file = st.direct_file &&  
               st1.direct_file.success = const0 &&  
               -- assign full to const1 (true)  
               st1.direct_file.full = const1)  
           )  
       )  
     )  
  ) or  
 
  ( st.stmt = S9 &&  
    st1.prev_state = st &&  
    --  Write_dev  
    ( st1.access_label = st.access_label &&  
    st1.stmt = S11 && 
    st1.direct_file = st.direct_file &&  
    st1.current_clock = TO/next[st.current_clock] &&  
    st1.influenced_by = st.influenced_by &&  
    st1.last_cond_checked = st.last_cond_checked  
    )  
  ) or  
 
  ( st.stmt = S10 &&  
    st1.prev_state = st &&  
    --  Write_dev  
    ( st1.access_label = st.access_label &&  
    st1.stmt = S11 && 
    st1.direct_file = st.direct_file &&  
    st1.current_clock = TO/next[st.current_clock] &&  
    st1.influenced_by = st.influenced_by &&  
    st1.last_cond_checked = st.last_cond_checked  
    )  
  ) or  
 
  ( st.stmt = S8 &&  
    st1.prev_state = st &&  
    --  if  
    ( st1.access_label = st.access_label &&  
    st1.vars = st.vars  &&  
    st1.current_clock = st.current_clock  &&  
    st1.direct_file = st.direct_file  &&  
    st1.influenced_by = st.influenced_by &&  
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    st1.last_cond_checked = {x: st.last_cond_checked | x.stmt != 
S8} + st && 
    ( ( st.direct_file.full = const1 )  
       => st1.stmt = S9 
       else st1.stmt = S10) 
    )  
  ) or  
 
  ( st.stmt = S11 &&  
    st1.prev_state = st &&  
    --  Stop  
    ( st1.stmt = st.stmt )  
  )  
}  
--------------------------  
run show for 12 but 40 FTuple  
check verify_security for 12 but 40 FTuple  
check verify_flow_policy for 12 but 40 FTuple  
check verify_no_dependency_flaw for 12 but 40 FTuple  
check verify_no_storage_channel for 12 but 40 FTuple  
check verify_no_timing_channel for 12 but 40 FTuple  
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